determine whether the funds had been so expended. This of necessity involved an interpretation of what constituted an approach as that word was used in the act. Hence, we believe our decision of January 14, 1959, 38 Comp. Gen. 495, is within our jurisdiction and binding upon the executive branch of the Government.

That decision, however, was based upon the information available to our Office at the time it was rendered. We are now faced with a direct conflict between the allegations of fact presented by the State of Washington through your Department and the allegations of fact presented through Mr. Tollefson with respect to one of the three projects involved. No question is raised regarding Project SN-FAP 283-E (1) on the west, or Seattle, side of the bridge, or Project SN-FAP 283-G(1) on the east, or Mercer Island, side, and the validity of our interpretation with regard thereto appears to have been accepted. The allegations of fact concerning the third project, SN-FAP 283-F(1), covering landscaping along a 0.421 mile section running east from a point near the eastern end of the bridge to the western end of Project SN-FAP 283-G (1) and including the former toll plaza and the overpass and frontage road complex, are completely in conflict. The allegations of fact presented through your Department indicate that the landscaping covered by said project benefited the frontage roads at least as much as, if not more than, the main road crossing the bridge, whereas the briefs allege that the landscaping primarily benefited the main road with mere incidental benefit to the frontage roads. As an example of the direct conflict of evidence furnished, the briefs state that the holly hedges on both sides of the main highway were by far the most costly item involved in the landscape project in question and primarily benefited the main road, whereas the documents furnished through your Department state that the holly hedges were in existence prior to the landscaping performed under the project in question and in fact screen much of the landscaping actually performed under that project from travelers on the main road. Also, the documents furnished through your Department state that the frontage roads are subject to extensive traffic, whereas the briefs state that the traffic thereon is slight. Thus it will be seen that the question as to whether the reported Federal-aid expenditure of $6,900 under Project SN-FAP 283-F (1) must be considered as having been expended on an approach to the bridge and, hence, subject to the condition in section 204 (g) is now dependent upon facts in dispute between the involved parties.

Hence, while we believe that the principle stated in our decision of January 14, 1959, 38 Comp. Gen. 495, is correct, the effect of its application to Project SN-FAP 283-F(1) depends on a resolution of the factual question whether or not the landscaping primarily bene

fited the approach roads. Our Office is not in a position to determine conclusively disputed questions of fact of the nature here involved; and it has long been the rule that we accept the administrative version thereof unless clearly erroneous. Because of the administrative version of the facts, as stated in your letters of December 29, 1958, and July 8, 1959, we would not be warranted in questioning the administrative view that the prohibition against the imposition of tolls contained in the Federal-aid highway legislation is not applicable to this bridge. As you are aware, however, our views in the matter do not preclude parties in interest from seeking judicial determination of the matter, if otherwise proper.

Since neither question one nor question two was answered in the affirmative, no reply to question three is required. It should be noted that, while the question assumes that the proposed new offramp is "otherwise unnecessary," that fact likewise is in dispute. The documents furnished through your Department allege that the traffic on Mercer Island has increased so that the new ramp is really necessary, whereas the briefs allege the exact opposite. It may be stated, however, that the necessity or nonnecessity of the proposed off-ramp is immaterial. It is our view that, if the situation at the time Federal-aid highway money was expended on the project was such that the condition contained in section 204 (g) attached, the addition at this time of a new off-ramp, whether necessary or not, would not release such condition.

[B-140583]

Civilian Personnel-Wage Board Employees—Transfer to Classification Act Positions-Periodic Step-Increases

Wage board increases which are administratively granted pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 1082 (7) may not be regarded as "increases in compensation granted by law" as that term is used in section 701 (b) of the Classification Act of 1949, 5 U.S.C. 1121 (b), to exclude such increases from consideration as equivalent increases for periodic step-increases; hence, wage board employees who receive wage increases prior to transfer to positions under the Classification Act of 1949 are required to wait the prescribed period from the wage board increase before becoming entitled to a periodic step-increase.

To the Administrator, General Services Administration, October 8, 1959:

Your letter of August 24, 1959, asks whether a wage adjustment— increase accorded wage board employees subsequently transferred to positions under the Classification Act of 1949, constitutes an "equivalent increase in compensation" for periodic step-increase purposes under the facts and circumstances hereinafter related.

You say our representatives in your agency raised informal inquiries concerning four wage board employees. The facts of one of the cases

are furnished as typical, viz: Effective August 25, 1957, the employee's wage rate was adjusted from $2.12 per hour to $2.28, an increase on an annual basis from $4,409.60 to $4,742.40, or $332.80. On January 12, 1958, the employee was transferred to a position in grade GS-7 under the Classification Act and given a periodic step-increase to the fourth step of the grade, $4,930 per annum. The third step of grade GS-7 is $4,795, $52.60 per annum more than the employee was receiving in the wage board position at the time of his transfer.

You point out that the compensation of wage board employees shall be fixed and adjusted from time to time as nearly as is consistent with the public interest in accordance with prevailing rates and that such employees are exempt from coverage of the Classification Act, 5 U.S.C. 1082. Also, you direct our attention to the regulations of the Civil Service Commission defining the term "equivalent increase in compensation” in section 25.11 (e), page Z1-314.01 and Z1–315, Federal Personnel Manual. In that regard you say that while the regulation does not specifically refer to wage board increases in compensation under prevailing rate system, you believe that the regulation is broad enough to include such increases among those which expressly are excluded by regulation from the definition of the term "equivalent increase." Further, you direct our attention to the fact that your own regulations, GSA Manual GS 2-3 301.01 et seq. provides that the "application of a new wage schedule" is not an "equivalent increase." Your reference to Senate Report No. 560 of July 20, 1951, concerning the 1951 amendment (section 1(e) of the act of October 24, 1951, 65 Stat. 613, which amended section 701 of the Classification Act of 1949) 5 U.S.C. 1121(b), quoted hereinafter, points out that Congress intended to regard increases resulting from wage board surveys the same as those general compensation increases authorized by statute under the Classification Act; that is, they were no longer to be viewed as "equivalent increases." Lastly, you refer to our decision 36 Comp. Gen. 217, which concerns a simultaneous periodic step-increase and promotion, wherein it was determined such changes should be processed so as to accord the greatest benefit to employees.

5 U.S.C. 1121 (b), the provision with which we are here concerned, reads in pertinent part as follows:

Any increase in compensation granted by law after June 30, 1951, shall not be construed to be an equivalent increase in compensation ***

That provision is section 701 (b) of the Classification Act and pertains to employees covered thereby. While the foregoing provision was being considered as an amendment to the Classification Act, the following comment was made by the Committee considering it, H. Report No. 959, 82d Congress, 1st Session:

551978 O- 61 - 20

The bill also adds a new subsection (b) to section 701 of the Classification Act of 1949, as amended. Section 701 provides for within-grade step increases in compensation for employees at the expiration of certain stipulated periods on condition that "no equivalent increase in compensation from any cause was received during such period." This provision (which was also contained in the Classification Act of 1923) has made it necessary in the past to include in each act providing an increase in rates of compensation for employees subject to the Classification Act of 1923 and, since the repeal of such act, the Classification Act of 1949, a declaration that such increase in rates shall not be construed to be an "equivalent increase" in compensation within the meaning of the appropriate section of the Classification Act of 1923 or the Classification Act of 1949. Furthermore, the Comptroller General has held in a ruling (B-85380) dated May 13, 1949, that an employee transferred from the field service of the Post Office Department to a position under the Classification Act was not entitled to receive a withingrade salary advance because the pay increase such employee had received by law less than a month prior to his transfer was considered to be an "equivalent increase in compensation from any cause." The new subsection (b) provides that any increase in compensation granted by act of Congress after June 30, 1951, "shall not be construed to be an equivalent increase in compensation" within the meaning of the present section 701. This language will safeguard on a permanent basis the right of employees subject to the Classification Act of 1949, as amended (including employees who transfer, or are transferred, to positions under such act after June 30, 1951), to within-grade step increases in compensation without regard to any increase in compensation which they may have been granted by law." [Italics supplied.]

A study of that report leads us to the view that the Committee, in recommending the amendment, had in mind that the term "any increase in compensation granted by law" was to be synonymous with the language appearing in the report and reading "any increase in compensation granted by act of Congress." Hence, since the prevailing wage adjustments here involved were administratively granted under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 1082 (7), they obviously cannot be said to have been granted by "act of Congress." Hence, in light of the foregoing report, no basis exists for the U.S. Civil Service Commission by regulation to specifically designate wage board increases as being any other than "equivalent increases in compensation." Neither may your regulations properly be to the contrary. Hence, under existing law and regulation, we must conclude that the prevailing wage increases here involved are "equivalent increases" for periodic stepincrease purposes, so that the employees concerned, upon transfer to Classification Act positions, are required to serve the prescribed period of time from the date of such equivalent increase before becoming entitled to periodic step-increases under the Classification Act. Upon such transfers the provisions of section 25.103 (b) (1), Federal Employees Pay Regulations, providing that if the employee's highest previous rate falls between two scheduled rates of the new grade he may be given the higher rate, would be for application. However, when in any case the employee completes the prescribed time for a step-increase on the date of transfer to a Classification Act position, the changes should be processed so as to procure the maximum benefits for such employee. 36 Comp. Gen. 217.

[B-136320]

Military Personnel-Messes-Food and Operating Expense Reimbursement-Aviation Cadet Status

The provision in Department of Defense appropriation acts (section 609, of the 1960 appropriation act, 73 Stat. 379), which requires reimbursement to the Government of food and operating expenses of messes at which meals are furnished to civilians or officers who are not entitled to subsistence at Government expense or who receive a subsistence allowance, applies not only to civilian personnel and officers of the armed services but to any other members of the armed services whose right to a subsistence allowance is assimilated to that of officers; therefore, aviation cadets who have a special enlisted status but who, like officers, receive a subsistence allowance at all times whether or not messing facilities are avialable are regarded as officers under the mess reimbursement provision, and there is no justification for charging cadets for only food costs while officers are charged for both food and operating expenses of a mess operated by a contractor or agent of the Government.

To the Secretary of the Air Force, October 9, 1959:

Our Defense Accounting and Auditing Division has reported that in the audit of cost-type contracts Nos. AF 33 (600)–33471 and AF 33 (038)-28788, awarded to Texas Aviation Industries, Inc., Hondo, Texas, by the Department of the Air Force, for the training of pilots at Hondo Field, Hondo, Texas, a question has arisen with respect to the service rendered by the contractor in providing dining room facilities and meals to aviation cadets and the procedure in effect at that base for reimbursement by the Aviation Cadet Open Mess to the contractor of the costs involved.

The aviation cadets each receives a monthly allowance of $47.88 as provided by section 301 (a) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, 37 U.S.C. 251(a), as amended by section 20 (b) of the act of August 10, 1956, 70A Stat. 627, and section 10 of the act of September 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1556, 37 U.S.C 251(a). It appears that the entire allowance for subsistence received by each cadet, who is a member of the Aviation Cadet Open Mess, is paid by him to such mess, which in turn reimburses the contractor for raw food costs averaging $39.73 and retains as dues the difference between that amount and $47.88 provided by the cadet.

By letter dated October 15, 1958, copy attached, addressed to the Commander, Air Force Accounting and Finance Center, Denver, Colorado, an administrative explanation was requested as to why reimbursement to the contractor by the cadets or the Aviation Cadet Open Mess should be restricted to the raw food costs and why the difference between such costs and the subsistence allowance should not be required to be deposited to the credit of the appropriation from which the contractor is paid. The letter referred to the requirement of section 610 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1958, Public Law 85-117, approved August 2, 1957, 71 Stat. 325, that the rates for meals sold to officers and civilians must be sufficient