assigned full-time training at your centralized facility at Oklahoma City.

Your Agency's letter says

Such employees are away from their regular posts of duty. It is periodically necessary due to various operating conditions to assign such employees to more than forty hours of training for one administrative workweek or to more than eighty hours of training during any one pay period. The circumstances surrounding the training situation are such as to preclude consideration under the exceptions to Section 10 established by the Civil Service Commission in Section 39.402 (a) of its training regulations. Therefore, the employees involved clearly may not be paid at overtime rates.

The questions upon which our decision is requested are stated as follows:

(1) May these employees be granted compensatory time off in lieu of such irregular overtime since compensatory time off is not specifically prohibited by the language of Section 10?

(2) Would there be any objection to the payment of appropriate straighttime rates for such hours of overtime?

Section 10 of the Government Employees Training Act authorizes the head of each Department, in accordance with regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission, "(1) to pay all or any part of the salary, pay, or compensation (excluding overtime, holiday, and night differential pay) of each employee of such Department who is selected and assigned for training * * *.”

Section 201 of the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 911, provides that "All hours of work officially ordered or approved in excess of forty hours in any administrative workweek performed by officers and employees *** shall be considered to be overtime work ***"

Section 202 of that act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 912, provides for the granting, under the conditions specified herein, of compensatory time off in lieu of overtime compensation for "overtime work" performed.

Under the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, compensatory time off may be granted "in lieu of overtime" compensation for "overtime work" performed. Therefore, unless an employee can qualify for overtime compensation he would not be eligible for compensatory time off. Moreover, payment for "overtime work," when authorized, would have to be at the overtime rate specified in the controlling statute rather than at straight time rates.

Therefore, and in view of the restriction in section 10 of the Government Employees Training Act against the payment of overtime compensation incident to the training under that act, neither the payment of additional compensation nor the granting of compensatory time off would be authorized unless by appropriate action the Civil Service Commission were to establish an exception to the restriction appearing in such section which would apply to the type of training here under consideration.

[B-141311]

Military Personnel-Gratuities-Reenlistment Bonus Payments-Recoupment-Effective Date of Decisions of the Comptroller General

A decision of the Comptroller General which involves an original construction of a statute must be regarded as effective from the effective date of the statute which is being interpreted; therefore, the decision 35 Comp. Gen. 663, which was rendered on May 22, 1956, and which construed the reenlistment bonus provisions of section 208 (a), of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as added by section 2 of the act of July 16, 1954, 37 U.S.C. 239, is effective from July 16, 1954, and the conclusion that members who were paid reenlistment bonuses on the date of the extension agreement, rather than the normal date of expiration of the then current enlistment are indebted for such reenlistment bonus, must be applied to any applicable case whether arising before or after May 22, 1956, the date of the decision.

To the Secretary of Defense, December 21, 1959:

On February 18, 1959, the Army Finance Center, Indianapolis, Indiana, made a determination of uncollectibility of the indebtedness in the amount of $896.19 of a former member of the U.S. Army, Ralph F. Hooker, Jr., RA 44 163 106, and reported the debt to this Office for collection.

The record shows that the member enlisted in the Regular Army on February 28, 1955, for a period of three years and that on January 24, 1956, he extended such enlistment to six years. By reason of the extension, he was credited a reenlistment bonus as for a first reenlistment for three years in the amount of $538.20, under the provisions of section 208(a) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as added by section 2 of the act of July 16, 1954, 68 Stat. 488, 37 U.S.C. 239. He was discharged from active military service on November 2, 1956, prior to completing his three-year term of service, by reason of medical disqualification which existed prior to entry into the service. The reenlistment bonus was included in the items of indebtedness reported as uncollectible.

In response to an inquiry made by this Office on October 7, 1959, concerning the reason for recoupment of the reenlistment bonus in the amount of $538.20, the Finance Center, U.S. Army, Indianapolis, Indiana, reported on October 16, 1959, that recoupment of the reenlistment bonus was properly made on the service member's military pay record in accordance with our decision dated May 22, 1956, 35 Comp. Gen. 663, but that collection action should not have been taken in this case in view of the information furnished by first endorsement from the Chief of Finance, FINEM 242.15, in reply to letter from the Commanding General, Finance Center, U.S. Army, Indianapolis 49, Indiana, dated July 10, 1956. The endorsement cited states in part that no collection action should be taken in those cases where prior to May 22, 1956, members were paid reenlistment

bonuses on the date of the extension agreement rather than after the normal date of expiration of the enlistment then current.

Thus it is indicated that the Department of the Army is giving only prospective effect to the above-cited decision in this and similar cases. However, the decision did not authorize such application nor do we consider it in our province to limit the effect of that decision so that it will apply prospectively only. That decision is an original construction of section 208 (a) of the Career Compensation Act and under well-established rules it must be regarded as effective on the effective date of the statutory provisions that it construes. See 32 Comp. Gen. 17, 18 and 27 id. 686, 688. Consequently, the conclusion is required that the holding in our decision of May 22, 1956, applies to any applicable case—whether arising before or after the date of such decisionin which a member of the Army or Air Force is paid a reenlistment bonus under section 208 (a) of the Career Compensation Act for an extension of an enlistment.

Accordingly, it is requested that appropriate action be taken to correct the administrative action referred to above and to give proper effect to the decision from the effective date of section 208 as added by the 1954 act.

[B-141121]

Military Personnel-Retired-Annuities for Dependents

A retired member of the uniformed services who failed to sign an annuity option election form which was mailed to the finance center prior to April 30, 1954the deadline for submission of elections by retired members not on active duty on November 1, 1953, the effective date of the Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act of 1953, now 10 U.S.C. 1431-1444-is regarded as having made an actual timely election, and subsequent actions in executing and signing an election of option forms after the deadline date, which were consistent with the prior action, were confirmatory in nature and may be considered as merely correcting a formal defect in an otherwise valid and binding election.

A retired member of the uniformed services who sent a telegram to the finance center on April 30, 1954-the deadline for submission of annuity option elections by retired members under the Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act of 1953, now 10 U.S.C. 1431-1444-advising that he had lost the election papers and that he wanted to take advantage of the option for his youngest child may be regarded as having made a valid election even though the rate of reduced retired pay applicable to the election was not stated in the telegram, and the subsequent confirmation and execution of the election may be regarded as confirmatory in nature and merely correcting a formal defect in an otherwise valid and binding election.

To Commander R. A. Wilson, United States Navy, December 22, 1959:

Your letter of September 23, 1959, and enclosures, presents for advance decision under Department of Defense Military Pay and Allowance Committee Submission No. DO-N-464, the question whether

in the circumstances set forth below, Warrant Officer John D. Petty, U.S. Navy, retired, and Lieutenant (jg) Irvin A. Eubanks, U.S. Naval Reserve, retired, may be considered as having made valid elections of options under the provisions of the Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 501, 10 U.S.C. 1431-1444. In the case of Warrant Officer Petty it is stated that on April 21, 1954, he mailed to the Navy Finance Center an "election of options 2 and 4 at one-half reduced pay." However, the election form (NAVPers 591A) was not signed by him and in the absence of his signature thereon no deductions were then initiated from his retired pay. Thereafter, in the month of September 1954, he was advised by the Navy Finance Center that since his "unsigned election form was postmarked 28 April 1954, you are afforded the opportunity to be covered by the Act if you so desire." In accordance with the opportunity thus extended to him, he executed and signed an election of options form, electing the same options, 2 and 4 at one-half reduced retired pay. This latter election is reported to have been postmarked October 8, 1954, and it is stated that deductions at the rate of $2.94 per month were then established in his retired pay account effective from April 1, 1954.

The facts concerning Lieutenant Eubanks show that on April 30, 1954, he sent a telegraph message stating that he had lost the papers pertaining to the Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act and that he desired to "take advantage option where I pay until youngest child 18. This authorizes you deduct necessary amount from pay." On May 3, 1954, blank election of option forms were mailed to him and it is reported that his signed election of options 2 and 4 at one-half reduced retired pay-apparently the same benefits intended to be covered by his original election-was received in the Navy Finance Center on May 24, 1954, and that deductions at the rate of $5.88 per month were then established in his retired pay account effective from April 1, 1954.

Under the Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 501, retired members of the uniformed services who had theretofore been awarded retired pay were permitted to elect to receive the benefits of that act, on or before April 30, 1954. An election so made became irrevocable and, since both Warrant Officer Petty and Lieutenant Eubanks were theretofore retired within the meaning of the act, their elections of options in order to be effective were required to be made on or before that date. Section 206 of the Regulations for the Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act of 1953 provides that "The form for making elections will be submitted as indicated by the department concerned. All copies for

warded will be signed, and any signed copy may be used to substantiate the fact of election."

The basic question presented and considered in decision of April 15, 1954, to which you make specific reference (B-118336, 33 Comp. Gen. 455), concerned the method employed in making the election there involved, i.e., the use of a personal letter instead of utilizing the specific form prescribed by the department concerned for registering such an election. On that precise issue the decision of April 15, 1954, held that an otherwise valid election of options evidenced by a letter properly signed and duly filed was not rendered invalid simply because it had not been executed on the prescribed form. It was pointed out in that connection that no language has been found in the provisions of the Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act "requiring that the elections authorized thereunder be submitted in any particular manner or on any particular form" and that the pertinent regulations prescribed in accordance with such act provide that for an election to be effective in the case of a retired member not on active duty on November 1, 1953, the effective date of the Contingency Option Act "it need only be signed and postmarked not later than April 30, 1954."

The question whether there has been accomplished a valid and binding election of options must be ascertained and determined from all the circumstances in the particular case. The provision that an election to be effective must be signed by the member concerned is founded primarily on the view that a written election so signed constitutes the best evidence of his intent with respect to that matter. However, when the intent to make an election can be otherwise clearly and conclusively established, the lack of the member's personal autograph does not vitiate an election, as for example, when the member concerned is unable physically to write his name. In such a case it has been held that an election executed by a member's wife on his behalf and at his request-the record showing that the member was fully aware of his rights and his duty to elect if he desired the benefits of the Contingency Option Act and that his failure to sign personally was due entirely to his physical incapacity— constitutes a valid election of option. See 35 Comp. Gen. 489 and compare decision of August 19, 1959, 39 Com. Gen. 112. Also, compare decision of September 27, 1956, B-129136 (36 Com. Gen. 244), in which it was held that an election form "tentatively signed" did not constitute an unqualified and valid election under the Contingency Option Act. In decision dated May 20, 1955, B-122222 (cited in 35 Comp. Gen. 489 and also in B-135468, August 19, 1959) it was stated that:

Entitlement to the benefits provided by the act depends upon whether an election was made within the time permitted, and compliance with the regu