in this country, constitutional rights, and that, too, without any discrimination or distinction among different consciences. The necessary inference is that no State should, and that no State consistently can, compel anybody to contribute a penny for the support or propagation of any form of religion. Public schools, established by State authority and supported at the public expense, ought to be so regulated as to avoid this result; and the only regulation which secures the end is the exclusion of religion from their educational programme. This and this only makes the schools consistent with the rights of conscience as laid down in the fundamental law of the States.

Those who have any controversy with the inference have the same controversy with this law. That man certainly is not free in the exercise of his religion who is by law forced to support a religion, and especially so if he condemns and rejects the religion he is thus compelled to support. The compulsion, whether it relates to the public school or church worship, is an abominable tyranny. It flies directly in the face of the very first principles of our constitutional system of State Governments.

XXIII.

TAXATION AND RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS.

Seventeen of the State constitutions—namely, those of California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont-contain no express provisions relating to the taxation of religious corporations. The whole question is, therefore, by implication, left to the discretion of the legislatures of these States.

The constitutions of Florida (XII., 1), Illinois. (IX., 3), Indiana (X., 1), Louisiana (VI., 118), Nevada (X., 1), North Carolina (V., 6), Ohio (XII., 2), Oregon (IX., 1), Pennsylvania (IX., 1), South Carolina (IX., 1), Tennessee (II., 28), Texas (XII., 19), Virginia (X., 3), West Virginia (X., 1), and Wisconsin (VIII., 1)-fifteen States in all-expressly remit the question of taxation in respect to these corporations to legislative determination.

The constitution of Minnesota (IX., 3), declares that "all churches, church property used for religious purposes, and houses of worship . . . shall

by general laws, be exempt from taxation." That of Arkansas (X., 2) provides that "houses used exclusively for public worship shall never be taxed. That of Kansas (XI., 1) also provides that "all property used exclusively for" religious purposes "shall be exempted from taxation." The legislatures of these States have no power to impose any tax upon property owned and used for public worship.

The constitution of Alabama (XIII., 4) declares that "the property of corporations now existing or hereafter created shall forever be subject to taxation the same as property of individuals, except corporations for educational and charitable purposes. Unless religious corporations are included under the title of "corporations for educational and charitable purposes"-a construction that would not be according to the general usage of State constitutions —it then follows that such corporations cannot be exempted in Alabama from taxation on the property owned by them. The constitution of Missouri XI., 16) provides that "no property, real or personal, shall be exempt from taxation, except such as may be used exclusively for public schools, and such as may belong to the United States, to this State, to counties, or to municipal corporations in this State." The property of religious corporations is not included in these exceptions, and hence, the legislature has no power to exempt it from taxation.

Thus we have thirty-two States in which the

question of taxing religious societies is left to the legislative will, three States in which the power of taxing these societies is denied to their respective legislatures, and two States whose constitutions in effect deny the power of exempting church property from taxation. The general fact in this country is that all property which is directly used for religious worship is thus exempted. No discrimination is made beween the different Christian sects or between Christian and other religious corporations.

A society of Jews, or of Mormons, or of Swedenborgians, or of Mohammedans, or of Pagans, if owning property directly used for religious purposes, would enjoy the benefit of the exemption. The Revised Statutes of New York State provide that "every building for public worship" shall be exempt from taxation. This applies to a Jewish synagogue as really as to a building owned and used for public worship by a Christian society. Neither the character of the worship nor the tenets and doctrines involved therein, furnish any rule of exemption. "Houses of worship," "buildings for public worship," "property exclusively used for religious purposes," "churches and church property used for religious purposes,"-such are the constitutional or statutory designations of the property to be exempted. It is not the intention of law to confine the exemption to buildings or houses for Christian worship. Such a limitation would make a discrimination between religious sects; and this

would be inconsistent with a fundamental principle of our political system.

According to the census of 1870, the amount of property belonging to the different religious denominations in the United States was then $354,483,581, against $171,397,932 in 1860 and $87,328,801 in 1850-showing that, for an average, it had doubled in each of the last two decades. The following table gives the result at this rate of increase in sixty years from 1870.

Thus the aggregate of property, mainly belonging to Christian sects, would in sixty years, at this rate of increase, reach the stupendous sum of nearly twenty-three billions of dollars. The same rate may not be continued; yet no one doubts whether there will be an immense increase of property vested in structures and their appurtenances used for religious worship. This will by no means be an evil, if considered in a moral and religious aspect, but rather a great blessing to the country; yet it does raise the question whether the exemption of Church property from taxation is not an evil that ought to be corrected. In regard to this question we submit the following observations:

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