which religion, and that too, of the kind which they approve is not taught at all, is an offense to their consciences, and hence, an invasion of their religious rights. These parties do not complain of what such a school positively is or of the secular knowledge which it imparts, since this is certainly good as far as it goes; but they do complain that it does not go far enough. It is defective because it does not, by including religion, sweep the whole circle of education. We submit the following answer to this sort of religious conscience, if such it may be called :

1. A public school in which no religion is taught invades the religious rights of nobody. It taxes no one to teach religion. It simply lets this one subject entirely alone, and justifies its existence. and support by general taxation on grounds which have no reference to religion, and in respect to which all have a common interest, however widely they may differ in their religious opinions.

2. This so-called conscience assumes that it is the province and duty of the State in its public school, if it sees fit to establish one, to discharge the religious duty which the constitution of things and the law of Christianity assigns to the family and the Church. Now, where did these Catholics. or these Protestants learn that any such duty is imposed on the State? Certainly not in the Bible, and certainly not out of it by right reason. Unfortunately for the assumption, the State is neither

:

a father nor a mother, and is not charged with the special duties of either. The State is not a Church or, at least, should not be, and has no apostolic commission to fulfil. Civil government holds no such relation to God or man that the propagation of religion, whether among the young or the old, is one of its duties. That is, indeed, a very singular conscience which asserts a personal grievance and injustice because the state does not do what does not belong to it.

3. This conscience, when sifted to the bottom, is merely an opinion that the State should have religious teaching in its public school, and clearly involves no right of conscience that such teaching should be there. We do not deny the right of any man to have such an opinion; yet when he presents the omission of the State to undertake the work of religious teaching as a violation of his rights of conscience he assumes that his conscience is the proper guide for determining the positive duties of the State. How much this comes short of sheer stupidity we leave the reader to judge.

4. What the State does by secular education for the common good of the whole body politic, and, hence, by general taxation of the whole, in no way interferes with religious education by such agencies as parents or the Church may choose to employ. It simply does not enter this field; yet it does not shut it up against others, or control it in any way. Religious education is to the State

The State, by the very nothing into the public.

unoccupied territory, left entirely open to all who
choose to enter it. The territory which it does.
occupy comes within the scope of its powers; and
the occupancy furnishes sufficient advantages to
the whole people to justify it at the public expense.
5. If parents, for religious or other reasons,
do not choose to use the advantages for a secular
education afforded by the State, then this is and
must be their own matter.
terms of the case, puts
school in conflict with any right of religious con-
science which they possess; and if, nevertheless,
they do not like the school, then they are at liberty
to dislike it, and, if they thus choose, to educate
their children elsewhere, at their own charges.
This is their privilege; and if they avail themselves
of it, then so be it. Let them, however, not stul
tify common sense by saying that their religious
rights are outraged, because they are taxed to
support a public school whose single object is
secular education-an object in which all the peo-
ple, including themselves, have a common interest.

The conclusion that we reach from this examination of the question is this: A public school system planned on the principle of secular education, and, hence, excluding all religious teaching and religious worship is, in a community indiscriminately taxed for its support and in which there are diverse forms of religious faith, the only State school system that is just, that does not

violate the fundamental theory of the Saviour in respect to the propagation of his Gospel, and that accords with the golden rule of doing to others as we would have them do to us. It respects the rights of all, and commits no encroachment upon the rights of anybody. Accepting this conclusion, we necessarily accept another, which is this: those who demand religious teaching and religious. worship in the public schools of this country are justly amendable to the charge of seeking a good end by an unchristian method. We bring this charge not against their motives, but against what they propose.

IX.

GOVERNMENTAL JURISDICTION.

Jurisdiction is a law term used to denote the idea of governmental authority over persons and things within the scope of its action. No such authority is absolutely universal as to the persons subject to it, or as to the territory over which it extends, or as to the matters which it embraces. Many things are so entirely private in their nature or so little concern the general public that they are by universal consent left exclusively to individual choice, without any attempt to regulate

them by law. Governments exist for particular purposes, which by no means include the entire bulk of human affairs.

How, then, is it with religion considered as a faith or a worship, as a spiritual exercise or a social expression thereof? Does it come within the rightful jurisdiction of human government? Does it properly belong to any such government to regulate, administer, propagate, or in any way take charge of the religion of the people? The answer given by history is that most of the governments of the world have assumed that religion lies within the scope of their regulating and administrative agency. The legislation consequent upon the assumption, whether more or less liberal, or more or less oppressive, will be according to the general civilization of the people. Pains and penalties, discriminations on religious grounds, special immunities granted or denied on these grounds, compulsory taxation for the support and propagation of religion, the appointment and control of religious teachers, religious tests as qualifications for civil office or to testify in a court of justice-these are among the things which the assumption carries along with it, and by which it makes itself operative. The principle is the same in all cases, varying only in the extent to which it is applied.

It seems not a little strange that a principle fraught with so much evil and so essentially false,