Opinion of the Court.

that Abner B. Page (party 1st part,) shall recover of James Tucker (party 2d part,) the sum of $3500, and that the same shall be in full of all matters referred to us.

"Witness our hands, this 1st day of October, 1870."

The jury returned a verdict of $3678.33 damages in favor of the plaintiff. The court refused a motion for a new trial, and rendered judgment on the verdict, and the defendant brings the case to this court on writ of error.

Messrs. DAVIDSON & GLENN, for the plaintiff in error.

Messrs. STEWART, PHELPS & STEWART, for the defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

Liberal constructions should always be given to arbitrations. It is for the reason they are tribunals of the parties' own choosing, and afford an expeditious mode, in many instances, of settling, with trifling expense, most complicated litigation. But, to prevent any abuse that might defeat the end to be attained, viz: the promotion of justice, certain fundamental principles should never be disregarded.

The general doctrine is, the award will be void, unless it comprehends all the matters submitted which are named in the submission. But where the submission is general, and an award of one or more things is made, it will be presumed, until the contrary is shown, that nothing else was referred or submitted to the arbitrators. Hubbard v. Furman, 29 Ill. 90; Wright v. Wright, 5 Cowen, 197.

The arbitrators must, as a general rule, pursue their authority, and any marked departure will render their award inoperative and void. In such cases it is immaterial whether the submission is special or general, or whether it is by parol or obligation under seal. In either case, the submission must be substantially followed. It must be certain and final as to

Opinion of the Court.

the rights of the parties. Certainty to a common intent, however, is all that is required under the rule that an award must be certain and final. Henrichson v. Remback, 33 Ill. 299; Jackson v. Ambler, 14 Johns. 96.

The submission in this case was by parol, and counsel seek to maintain there was no valid submission ever made definitely specifying or stating what the arbitrators were to decide.

The evidence shows that all the differences between the parties in regard to their partnership affairs were submitted to the arbitrament of the arbitrators mutually chosen. The language used in making the submission is general, but it is comprehensive, and, under the authority given, no reason is perceived why the arbitrators could not adjust every question of dispute arising out of the partnership transactions. It would be a narrow and illiberal construction of the terms of the submission, as shown in evidence by all the witnesses, to adopt the views of counsel, and hold the submission only had reference to the books of the parties. This would make nonsense of that which is obviously plain by the use of intelligent terms employed.

It is apparent that neither of the parties nor the arbitrators understood the investigation was to be restricted within such narrow limits. The contrary unmistakably appears in all they did, and we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion it was the intention to submit everything in dispute in relation to their complicated partnership transactions, extending through a series of years. The language used is broad enough to bear this construction, and we may say it will bear no other consistently with the meaning of the words employed.

Regarding this as the true meaning of the agreement between the parties, the award follows the submission, and has all the elements of certainty and finality required by the strictest construction. It will bar any future litigation in regard to the matters submitted.

Opinion of the Court.

We are unable to discover any foundation for the suggestion that there is a variance between the proof and the declaration. The averment is, the matters of partnership business submitted covered a period of twelve or thirteen years. And so we understand the testimony.

On the hearing before the arbitrators, it was agreed the parties had a settlement in 1865, and there was a certain balance found due. This was mere evidence, and the stipulation was, no doubt, made with a view to lighten the labors of the arbitrators. Both parties being satisfied with the previous settlement, it was not deemed necessary to open the investigation. What was said in regard to the settlement did not and could not operate to change the terms of submission previously made.

No means is afforded us of knowing whether the award. will do justice between the parties; whether it is correct or No accident, fraud or mistake being shown, it will be presumed to be just and correct. That question can not be retried in this proceeding.

erroneous.

The award is signed by all the arbitrators, and evidence could not be heard to show that one of them signed it under the belief it would not be binding, or would not be the last of it, or would not be legal." An arbitrator can not be permitted to impeach the integrity of his own conduct or that of his co-arbitrators in making the award, either as to its execution, delivery, or the binding effect it is to have. Denman v Bayless, 22 Ill. 302.

Objection is taken to the first instruction given for appellee, for the reason it authorized the jury to allow interest on the amount of the award after demand of payment. It is conceded the instruction announces a correct principle of law, but the objection proceeds on the ground the declaration contains no count for interest. It contains, however, the common counts, and under them, we think, interest is recoverable as an incident to the principal sum due, after demand, without being specially claimed. McConnell v. Thomas, 2 Scam. 213.

Syllabus.

In Noyes v. McLaflin, 62 Ill. 474, it was held that interest might be recovered on an award.

Perceiving no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.

1. CONTRACT-by what law governed. A conveyance on contract for the sale of land, situate in this State, is governed by the laws of this State, and not by those of the State where the contract is made.

2. POWERS-strict construction applied to agent's authority to sell land required by Statute of Frauds. The written authority of an agent to sell lands of his principal, required by the Statute of Frauds, must receive the same strict interpretation as ordinary written powers, such as letters of attorney or letters of instruction, in which the authority is never extended beyond that which is given in terms, or is absolutely necessary for carrying into effect that which is expressly given.

3. SAME-construed with reference to surrounding circumstances. Where letters written by the owner of land are relied on as conferring an authority to sell the same, they will be construed with reference to the surrounding facts and circumstances, in determining whether they were, in fact, intended to authorize the party addressed to make a sale.

4. SALE by one claiming to be agent. Where a real estate agent of Chicago called upon the owner of lots, situate in that city, to know if they were for sale, and the owner informed him they were, and fixed his lowest price thereon, but requested information as to their real value, and for the purpose of learning such fact wrote to the agent, giving their numbers, and the latter, instead of giving the desired information, sent an offer for their purchase, which was declined, the owner replying that he adhered to the price first named by him, and the agent, on receipt of this, contracted, in writing, for the sale of the lots at the price named, which provided that if the owner should not ratify the same as to the incumbrances to be taken to secure the deferred payments, the purchaser should have the right to rescind the contract, and a copy of the contract was sent to the owner for his ratification, and the owner, on receipt thereof,

Statement of the case.

immediately returned the same, with a letter stating that he had previously sold the lots, and expressing regret that the offer had not come sooner: Held, on bill by the purchaser for specific performance, that the writing, given by the agent, under the circumstances, never became a complete and binding contract upon the owner.

5. In such case, even if the agent had written authority to sell the lots, but did not choose to exercise it without the personal approval of his principal, and sent the written contract to him to be ratified, this would leave the sale incomplete; and the agent, after notice from his principal that he had sold the property to another, would have no power to complete the same.

6. AGENCY-revocation by implication of law. Where the principal disposes of the subject matter of the agency, this, by implication of law, will operate as a revocation of the power of his agent to sell the same.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. WILLIAM W. FARWELL, Judge, presiding.

This was a bill in equity, in the circuit court of Cook county, by appellant, Bissell, against William Terry and others, the appellees, to enforce specific performance by Terry of a contract for the sale of certain real estate therein described, situate in the city of Chicago, which contract was alleged to have been made by Terry, through his legally authorized agent, M. N. Lord, and is as follows:

"Sold to Josiah H. Bissell the following described pieces, parcels of land, situate in the city of Chicago, county of Cook, and State of Illinois, to-wit: Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22, all in block 5, on Milwaukee Avenue; lots 31 to 35 inclusive, and 37 to 45 inclusive, in block 12, on Milwaukee Avenue; lots 45 to 48 inclusive, in block 7, all the above in Pierce's addition to Holstein, for the price and sum of five hundred and fifty dollars ($550) per lot, to be paid as follows: One-third cash, upon a delivery of a good and sufficient warranty deed, with release of dower, after title has been examined and found good, and the balance in two equal annual payments, with interest at eight per cent per annum, payable annually, to be secured back upon said property, to be in not less than three separate incumbrances,