Opinion of the Court. 22 barrels of whisky are shown to have been more valuable than the 20 barrels by some 50 cents on the gallon. We have looked in vain in the record to find any evidence that either of these loans and pledges were, by the contracts between appellants and Kiernan, dependent upon the other. It is not shown that when the first loan was made a future loan was anticipated, and when the second loan was made, it does not appear that the first loan was at all alluded to; but, upon the contrary, it does clearly appear that each loan was secured simply by the pledge then made. Under this state of the proof, we have no hesitancy in coming to the conclusion that the 20 barrels of whisky were alone pledged for the payment of the $962.36, then agreed to be due from Kiernan to appellants, and that the appellants retained an interest in the 22 barrels of whisky in controversy, for the $962.95 agreed to be due from Kiernan to appellants at the time they were pledged, for which they are now entitled to recover, unless the amount has been paid or the lien released by appellants. It is not claimed that this amount has been actually paid to appellants, but only that the recovery of the 20 barrels of whisky on the writ of replevin should be treated as a payment to the extent of their value. We are unable to appreciate the force of the argument in support of this position. The authorities cited only go to the extent of holding that it is competent to show, in mitigation of damages, that the debt has been paid or reduced. That is not denied, but no such question arises here. Here, the evidence shows merely that 20 barrels of whisky were taken on a writ of replevin, and placed in the possession of appellants. It is not shown that they were sold by appellants, or that they converted them to their own use. The property is, by the writ of replevin, merely placed where it was before it was seized under the attachments -in pledge. It is no more appellants' private property now than it was before the seizure. It is still subject to be redeemed upon equitable principles, and, before the absolute ownership is changed, the property must be sold for the satis Opinion of the Court. faction of appellants' lien, pursuant to law. If the evidence showed a complete conversion of this property to appellants' use, inconsistent with its mere retention as a pledge, we would doubtless hold that they should be chargeable with its value; but we have been unable to find any such evidence in the record. In Bailey v. Godfrey et al. 54 Ill. 508, trover was brought for the recovery of a quantity of wool, which had been secured to the plaintiff by a chattel mortgage, and which was subsequently sold by the mortgagor to the defendant. One of the defenses interposed was, that other property had also been mortgaged to secure the payment of the same debt, and that the plaintiff could not recover from the defendant unless it was shown that that property was insufficient for its payment. The court held that it was not incumbent on the plaintiff to make this proof; that the defendant might, in reduction of the mortgagor's interest in the property, have pleaded that other property was embraced in the mortgage, and that the plaintiff had reduced the same to possession in reduction of his mortgage indebtedness, but that the burden of proving these facts was on the defendant. It necessarily follows, from the views we have expressed, that appellants had a lien on the 22 barrels of whisky, to the amount of $962.95, and that they were, under the evidence before us, entitled to judgment for that amount. Appellee is in no condition to complain of the hardship wrought him by this result. He unnecessarily became his own judge of the legal rights of the parties, refused to surrender the whisky to the officer upon the writ of replevin, and must now necessarily bear the consequences. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Judgment reversed. Statement of the case. GEORGE R. H. HUGHES v. FREDERICK M. ZEIGLER. 1. ATTORNEY AT LAW-compensation fixed by special contract. Where an attorney at law takes a written power of attorney to transact and manage certain business for his client, which fixes his compensation for his services and trouble at 25 per cent of the net sum realized by him. if, instead of attending to the business himself, he employs other attorneys, he will have no right to charge their fee to his client in addition to his commissions, and he will have no right to charge a fee for his legal services above the compensation provided in the contract. 2. SAME-costs and expense growing out of his wrongful act. Where an attorney employed to transact certain business for his client, procures a third person to be invested with the legal title to property belonging to his client without any consideration being paid therefor, and the arrange ment serving no beneficial purpose to his client, and he afterwards incurs expense in costs and attorney's fees in getting the legal title in himself instead of his client, he will have no legal claim to be reimbursed or allowed for such expenses, on bill for an account by his client against him. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. E. S. WILLIAMS, Judge, presiding. This was a bill in equity, by the appellee against the appellant, for an account, etc. It appears that the complainant was the owner of a debt of $5860 secured by a mortgage on an undivided half of certain real estate in the city of Chicago, the mortgage being defectively acknowledged, and gave the defendant, an attorney at law, a power in writing to prosecute the claim and collect the debt by foreclosure, in which he promised to allow the defendant, out of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property, after deducting necessary court expenses and costs, 25 per cent commission for his services and trouble, on the net sales. The attorney obtained judgment by default for $7725.35, under which the property Statement of the case. was sold at sheriff's sale for $6000. A certificate of purchase was made to Zeigler, and delivered to Hughes. Before the expiration of fifteen months, Hughes procured Zeigler to execute an assignment of the judgment and certificate of purchase and mortgage to one Robert, of Cincinnati, to avoid the effect of a reversal of the judgment, should the case be taken to the Supreme Court on error, and Robert executed to Hughes a declaration of trust, stating that he held the judgment and title by sheriff's deed to be executed in trust for Hughes, and would convey to him when requested. After this, a sheriff's deed was executed to Robert on the certificate of purchase, and Zeigler, at Hughes' request, executed a quit-claim deed for the property to Hughes, shortly after which Robert suddenly died. Hughes then commenced a suit in equity against the heirs of Robert, which resulted in a decree vesting the title in the land in Hughes. Hughes then procured a release of the balance of the judgment above $6000 to be executed by Zeigler and Robert's administrator, to the original mortgagor, and thereby procured a quit-claim deed from him for the land to one Brown, who quit-claimed to Hughes. Hughes then divided the property with the owner of the other undivided half, such party paying Hughes $1250 for an excess which he received in the division. Hughes collected the rents on the part set off to him, and finally sold the same for $7500 cash. This bill was brought for an account of the rents and the moneys received by Hughes. For a fuller statement of the facts, reference is made to Zeigler v. Hughes, 55 Ill. 288. The decree of the court below was reversed and the cause remanded, and an account was taken in accordance with the opinion then announced in the case. The defendant now brings the case to this court on appeal. Mr. ROBERT RAE, for the appellant. Mr. GEORGE F. BAILEY, for the appellee. Opinion of the Court. Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court: This case was before this court at the September term, 1870, and the opinion of the court in the case reported in 55 Ill. page 288, gives a full statement of the facts. On a hearing of the cause in this court, the decree of the circuit court was reversed and the cause remanded. On the 8th day of May, 1870, a copy of the judgment of this court was filed in the circuit court of Cook county, and an order entered therein re-docketing the cause, when it was referred to John Woodbridge, Esq., Master in Chancery of Cook county, to take an account in accordance with the opinion of this court. After the cause was referred, the parties appeared before the master and introduced their evidence. The master stated the account, and on the 6th day of November filed a report, as follows: GEORGE R. H. HUGHES in account with G. R. 1865 1862 and F. M. ZEIGLER. Oct.21 To cash f'm Griswold $1250.00 M'y 23 By court costs fore $25.00 fees |