Statement of the case. The notice is not materially different from the one held to be sufficient in Weld et al. v. Rees, 48 ib. 428. We think it sufficient in this case. None of the objections of appellant are tenable, and we affirm the decree of the Superior Court. Decree affirmed. GEORGE W. CLARK, JR. V. LEWIS DUTTON. 1. INTEREST-liquidated account. If a party receives notes, property and cash, for which he agrees to execute his promissory note in a given sum to the party letting him have the same, this will make the account or debt a liquidated one, and interest is recoverable upon the debt, under the statute. 2. DEBT-when liquidated. A debt is liquidated when it is certain what is due and how much is due. Although it may appear that something is due, if it does not also appear how much is due, the debt is not liquidated. An unliquidated debt is one which one of the parties can not alone render certain. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. WILLIAM A. PORTER, Judge, presiding. This was an action of assumpsit, by Lewis Dutton against George W. Clark, Jr., to recover the value of certain notes and other property alleged to have been sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, and for which the defendant was to give his note, as was alleged, for $5000, with security. The cause was tried by the court, without a jury, who found for the plaintiff, and allowed. interest on the debt, and rendered judgment accordingly. To reverse this judgment the defendant appealed. Messrs. GARDNER & SCHUYLER, for the appellant. Opinion of the Court. Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court: The first and principal objection urged as a cause for the reversal of this judgment is, that the finding of the court below was contrary to the evidence. Appellee's claim is, that appellant is indebted to him for $5000, in notes on Hass and Powell, appellee's check for $500, a pair of horses of the value of $175, and a horse, buggy, harness and lap-robe, of the value of $200, which appellee let appellant have, in the fall of 1871, shortly after the great fire in Chicago, to enable him to start in business. There appears to be no controversy but that appellant received this money and property from appellee, but the parties differ widely as to the terms upon which it was received, appellee claiming that appellant agreed to give him a note for it, secured by mortgage, and appellant, who was at that time the son-in-law of appellee, claiming that it was a gift to his wife, appellee's daughter, who is since deceased, with the privilege of a present use by appellant. The parties, in giving testimony, directly contradict each other, and each is, to some extent, corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses. Without, however, going through the useless process of repeating the evidence at length, and giving the reasoning by which our conclusion thereon is formed, we deem it only necessary to say that we are entirely satisfied that the finding of the court below was correct. To our apprehension the evidence fairly preponderates in favor of the appellee. It is claimed, however, that, even if this be conceded, still it was error for the court below to allow interest upon appellee's claim. From appellant's view of the case, most certainly interest should not be allowed, for his view excludes the allowance of the principal; but from appellee's view of the case, which we are compelled to assume is the true one, there can be no question but that it was competent to allow interest. Syllabus. Under our statute it is proper to allow interest upon a liquidated account. If appellant received the money and the property at the prices claimed, and agreed to give a promissory note therefor, we are at a loss to perceive what remained to be done to liquidate the account. It can not be that it required the execution of the note to complete it, for the interest would then be computed upon the note and not upon a liquidated account, as is authorized by the statute. Bouvier says: "A debt is liquidated when it is certain what is due, and how much is due, cum certum est an et quantum debeatur; for, although it may appear that something is due, if it does not also appear how much is due, the debt is not liquidated. An unliquidated debt is one which one of the parties can not alone render certain." (Law Dictionary, vol. 2, 73, title, “Liquidated.") There does not appear here to be any dispute as to the value or amount of what was received, even from appellant's version of the facts. The evidence preponderates that the debt was liquidated, to the same extent that it preponderates that a debt existed at all. The judgment of the court below is affirmed Judgment affirmed. 69 523 125 340 69 523 133 600 FREDERICK MAPES บ. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. 1. CRIMINAL LAW-technical objections not favored. When the charge against a party in an indictment is so plainly stated that he may know how to make his defense, and the jury may readily understand the nature of the accusation, the trial ought to be conducted solely with a view to determine whether the accused is guilty or innocent. This court is not Statement of the case. inclined to regard with favor mere trivial objections interposed for no other purpose than to obstruct the administration of justice. 2. SPIRITUOUS LIQUOR-indictment for selling to one in the habit of becoming intoxicated. An indictment which charged that the defendant “on, etc., at, etc., intoxicating liquors to one C D, a person then in the habit of getting intoxicated, unlawfully did then and there sell, contrary to the form of the statute," etc., was held sufficient. It is not necessary to aver that the defendant knew of the habits of the person to whom the liquor was sold. The sale is made at the peril of the party selling. 3. SAME-sufficiency and competency of proof. On the trial of one for selling intoxicating liquor to a person in the habit of getting intoxicated, it is competent to prove by witnesses that they have frequently seen such person under the influence of intoxicating liquor; and proof that such person was in the habit of using such liquor intemperately, is sufficient proof that he is in the habit of getting intoxicated. 4. JURY-challenge as to mode of drawing. Where the office of county clerk was divided in a county, the fact that the person acting as county clerk for mere county matters, assisted in the drawing of a jury, instead of the clerk who attended to the business of the court in probate and other matters, was regarded as no ground for a challenge to the array, he being de facto a county clerk, and the objection was considered trivial. 5. OFFICER-acts of, binding. An officer de facto is one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, in the exercise of the functions of the office, and yet, in point of law, may not be entitled to the office. Until such an officer is in some lawful way adjudged to hold the office and perform its duties without authority of law, his acts must be regarded valid. 6. CIRCUIT COURT-jurisdiction to try for misdemeanors. Under the constitution, the circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all cases in "law and equity," and the legislature can not deprive them of the juris diction to try persons charged with misdemeanors. It may, however, confer concurrent jurisdiction of such matters upon county courts. Therefore, it is not error for the circuit court to refuse to certify a case of misdemeanor to the county court. As both courts have jurisdiction of such offenses, under the law of 1872 for increasing that of the county court, and the constitution, it follows that the first obtaining jurisdiction in a particular case, may retain it until it pronounces judgment. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. WILLIAM BROWN, Judge, presiding. This was an indictment against Frederick Mapes for selling intoxicating liquor to one Bissel Rice, who, it was alleged, was in the habit of getting intoxicated. Statement of the case. The indictment, leaving out the formal parts, was as follows: "1. That Frederick Mapes, on, etc., at, etc., intoxicating liquors to one Bissel Rice, a person then in the habit of getting intoxicated, unlawfully did then and there sell, contrary to the form of the statute," etc. The court overruled a motion to certify the cause and papers to the county court for process and trial, and also a motion to quash the indictment. The defendant pleaded not guilty. On the trial the prosecution proved by Bissel Rice that he bought intoxicating liquor of the defendant, and by several other witnesses that they were acquainted with Rice, and the length of time they were so acquainted with him. The following question was asked the witnesses by the prosecution: "Have you ever seen, during that time, the witness Bissel Rice under the influence of intoxicating liquors ?" The defendant objected to such question as irrelevant, incompetent, and as seeking an opinion from the witnesses upon a matter in which they were not shown to be experts, and because no sufficient foundation had been laid. The court. overruled the objection. The witnesses testified in substance that they had frequently seen him under the influence of intoxicating liquors, or when they considered him so, some stating as often as once a week, and some that it was as often as he came to town. It was also proved by two or three witnesses that they had seen Rice drunk, one as many as a hundred times, he thought. The jury found the defendant guilty, and the court overruled defendant's motion for a new trial, and rendered judgment on the verdict. The defendant brings the case here by writ of error. Mr. N. C. WARNER, and Mr. L. F. WARNER, for the appellant. Mr. JAMES K. EDSALL, Attorney General, and Mr. J. C. GARVER, State's Attorney, for the People. |