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the President, not to exceed $1,000 a year. And the principal officer of the consulate or commercial agency within the limits of which such consular agent is appointed is entitled only to the residue, if any, in addition to any other compensation allowed him by law for his services therein. But all moneys received for fees at any vice-consulates or consular agencies of the United States beyond the sum of $1,000 in any one year, and all moneys received by any consul-general or consul from consular agencies or vice-consulates in excess of $1,000 in the aggregate from all such agencies or vice-consulates must be accounted for to the Secretary of the Treasury and held subject to his draft or other directions."

The question of doubt, concerning which you wish my official opinion, is as to the effect of the limitation placed upon the compensation of onsular agents by section 1733. Does that section mean that all the fees earned and collected at any consular agency beyond the sum of $1,000 in any one year shall be accounted for to the Secretary of the Treasury without regard to any order which the President may make with reference to the division of the same between the agent and the principal consul; or does it mean that a consular agent may receive and retain for his compensation a sum not to exceed $1,000, and that the principal consul may receive as residue the balance of fees so earned and collected, provided that such principal consul shall not, in the aggregate, retain more than $1,000 from all the agencies or vice-consulates within his territory?

The question is one of doubt arising on the face of the two sections in question. If literally interpreted, section 1733, standing by itself, would have the effect of limiting the total amount of compensation, both to the agent and the principal, to $1,000 a year, which sum might, under section 1703, be divided between them as the President might determine.

On the other hand, read in connection with section 1703, the provisions of section 1733 might be understood to mean that all moneys received by consular agents as their share of fees under the apportionment of the President in excess of $1,000 a year should be accounted for to the Secretary of the Treasury.

The construction of the statute, therefore, being one of doubt, it is proper to resort to the construction which has been placed upon these provisions of law by the State Department and by the Department of the Treasury. I am advised that the uniform method of settling the accounts of consuls and consular agents, ever since the adoption of section 1733 in its original form in the act of 1868, has been to allow the agent to retain a sum not to exceed $1,000 a year out of fees received by him, and to allow the principal consul to receive the residue, provided such residue did not, together with similar fees received from other consular agencies or vice-consulates in his territory, exceed $1,000 a year. In view of this uniform construction, prevailing now for thirty years, I am unable to say that the law has been erroneously interpreted by the departments.

The effect to be given in the construction of a statute to the practice of the various departments and officers of the Government has been frequently stated in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. In the case of Robertson v. Downing (127 U. S., 607–613) it is said:

"The regulation of a department of the Government is not, of course, to control the construction of an act of Congress when its meaning is plain; but when there has been a long acquiescence in a regulation, and by it rights of parties for many years have been determined and adjusted, it is not to be disregarded without the most cogent and persuasive

reasons.

In Edwards's Lessee v. Darby (12 Wheat., 206–210) it was said:

"In the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law the contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect is entitled to very great respect."

In the case of United States v. Hill (120 U. S., 169–182) it is said that where there has been a long practice amounting to a contemporaneous and continuous construction of the statute, in a case where it is doubtful whether the statute requires a return of disputed fees, judges of eminence, heads of departments, and accounting officers of the Treasury having concurred in an interpretation in which

those concerned have confided, a surety on a bond given in pursuance of such statute, as well as his principal, had a right to rely on that interpretation in giving a bond. The courts further say in this last case:

"This principle has been applied, as a wholesome one, for the establishment and enforcement of justice, in many cases in this court, not only between man and man, but between the Government and those who deal with it and put faith in the action of its constituted authorities, judicial, executive, and administrative."

As a particular instance of the interpretation of this particular statute, which in a collateral way conforms to the view I have above expressed concerning it, I may refer to the decision of the Comptroller of the Treasury (4 Dec. Comp., part 3, p. 546) where the retention of $1,000 by the consular agent and the payment of the residue of $1,000 to the principal consul are impliedly approved. Also to the case of Marston et al. v. United States (71 Fed. Rep., 496), where the retention by the consular agent of $1,000 as compensation for a year was approved, notwithstanding the payment of $665 as residue to the principal consul.

I therefore advise you that the proposed regulation submitted to me is consistent with the provisions of law governing the subject of compensation of consular agents.

Very respectfully,

The SECRETARY OF STATE.

JOHN W. GRIGGS.

STAMP TAX-CHARTER PARTIES.

The paragraph of the war-revenue act of June 13, 1898, relating to charter parties does not apply to vessels engaged in domestic commerce, as the law does not require that their tonnage should be registered.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
August 2, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of yours of July 9th, ultimo, inclosing a letter of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of July 8, relative to the construction of that part of the war-revenue act under the head of "Charter party."

You request an opinion on the question presented in the letter of the Commissioner, which is as follows:

"In regard to that paragraph of the revenue act of June 13, 1898, relating to charter parties, the language is as follows:

'Charter party: Contract or agreement for the charter of any ship, or vessel, or steamer, or any letter, memorandum, or other writing between the captain, master, or owner, or person acting as agent of any ship, or vessel, or steamer, and any other person or persons, for or relating to the charter of such ship, or vessel, or steamer, or any renewal or transfer thereof, if the registered tonnage of such ship, or vessel, or steamer does not exceed three hundred tons, three dollars.'.

"It is claimed that vessels engaged in domestic commerce are exempt from this requirement, as the law does not require that their tonnage should be registered."

It is as to this question, therefore, that an opinion is requested.

I have recently, at the request of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in response to an inquiry by the Lake Carriers' Association, given a memorandum of opinion as follows:

"The law as found in the Revised Statutes, Title XLVIII, the regulation of commerce and navigation, providing for the registry and recording of vessels, applies to such vessels as are required to be registered; and the law in Title L, Revised Statutes, regulation of vessels in domestic commerce, provides for the enrollment of vessels.

"Under Title XLVIII registered tonnage comprises the tonnage of vessels of the United States employed in foreign trade or the whale fisheries, and under Title L enrolled tonnage comprises the tonnage of vessels employed in domestic trade and in trade on the Great Lakes with Canada, over 20 tons, those under 20 tons of this class being termed 'licensed vessels.'

"I am of the opinion that the clause of the war-revenue act under consideration applies only to vessels registered under Title XLVIII, and does not apply to vessels enrolled or licensed under Title L. I think the purpose of the law

was to make this distinction because of the fact that the vessels enrolled and licensed under Title L are engaged in domestic transportation, and it would be a palpable discrimination against them in favor of other methods of domestic or inland transportation to require the tax provided for under the paragraph cited. When the term 'registered tonnage' was used in the act, it could mean, in my opinion, nothing more than to apply the law to such vessels as are required by law to be registered. It is a technical term, and applied to a particular class of vessels known as registered vessels, in distinction from enrolled vessels and licensed vessels."

Upon a further examination of this question I feel fully convinced that the foregoing is the correct interpretation and construction of the provision of the war-revenue act referred to. I am strengthened in the position that the law makes the distinction before stated between vessels of registered tonnage and enrolled vessels, because of the fact that our law, in addition to the registration of vessels of the United States, as provided in Title XLVIII, makes provision by which the registered tonnage of foreign vessels coming into our ports shall be made to conform to that of our own vessels.

By the act of August 5, 1882 (22 Stat. L., ch. 398, p. 300, sec. 2), the following was substituted for section 4154 of the Revised Statutes, which was repealed:

"SEC. 4154. Whenever it is made to appear to the Secretary of the Treasury that the rules concerning the measurement for tonnage of vessels of the United States have been substantially adopted by the government of any foreign country, he may direct that the vessels of such foreign country be deemed to be of the tonnage denoted in their certificates of register or other national papers, and thereupon it shall not be necessary for such vessels to be remeasured at any port in the United States; and when it shall be necessary to ascertain the tonnage of any vessel not a vessel of the United States, the said tonnage shall be ascertained in the manner provided by law for the measurement of vessels of the United States."

This places foreign vessels coming into our ports upon

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