The section referred to reads as follows:

"That while serving in Cuba during the existing war, officers of the Army of the United States exercising separate commands may, by special order, cause subsistence, medical, and quartermaster's supplies to be issued to, and other aid rendered to, inhabitants of the island of Cuba who are destitute and in imminent danger of perishing unless they receive the same."

The first matter of doubt to which you direct my attention relates to the meaning of the words "while serving in Cuba during the existing war." While you do not so state, I assume that your doubt arises as to whether there is a status of war between the United States and Spain at the present time, the protocol providing for the cessation of hostilities and the appointment of commissioners to negotiate peace having been signed on the 12th of August instant.

Notwithstanding the signing of the protocol and the suspension of hostilities, a state of war between this country and Spain still exists. Peace has not been declared and can not be declared except in pursuance of the negotiations between the peace commissioners authorized by the protocol. In my judgment, therefore, so far as this question is conerned, the act is still operative.

The next question suggested is whether the War Department, under this act, can send officers of the Army and others into districts of the island of Cuba where the United States has no army and does not exercise any military or other control, for the purpose of distributing supplies to the inhabitants of the island of Cuba who are destitute and in imminent danger of perishing unless they receive the same.

The manifest object of the act was to render relief to destitute inhabitants of the island of Cuba. The whole island is comprehended within the meaning of the statute. The means designated by Congress for effecting this purpose is through the employment of officers of the United States exercising separate commands while serving in Cuba. These officers are to act only in pursuance of special orders, by which, no doubt, is meant orders from the Commander in Chief, through the War Department. This provision of the statute will be complied with if the Secretary of War

will direct any officer of the United States exercising a separate command in Cuba to cause subsistence, etc., to be issued to, and other aid rendered to, the destitute inhabitants of Cuba. No restriction is placed by the act upon the means by which such officers shall cause subsistence to be rendered. In making distribution of supplies, the commanding officers may use either the officers of the Army or such other volunteer agencies as may be available for the purpose.

The field of their operations will not necessarily be restricted to the territory over which they exercise actual control. In theory, if not in actual fact, the whole island of Cuba is subject to the military domination of the United States, the Spanish Government having agreed to immediately evacuate the island. The only difficulties to be encountered will be physical difficulties in carrying out the purpose of the act. I see no legal difficulties in the way. Very respectfully,

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

JOHN W. GRIGGS.

TAXES-CONTRACT.

The word "goods" includes money, securities, and other choses in action.

When the Government enters into an agreement with a citizen it is not acting in its capacity of a sovereign, but places itself on the level with an ordinary individual, and its contracts have the same meaning as those between private persons.

The provision of the r'ederal Constitution forbidding the impairment of contracts, applies only to the States and not to acts of Congress. The constitutional requirement with reference to uniformity in the imposition of taxes, imposts, etc., is satisfied when a particular impost is uniform upon all subjects of the same kind or class.

So long as a contractor is taxed uniformly with all others in the same line of business, upon the same transactions, and the tax is levied for proper objects of taxation, he can not complain merely because his compensation or profits under his contract with the Government are thereby indirectly reduced.

The bill of lading, manifest, or receipt issued to the consignor by the United States Express Company when receiving money and securities for transportation under its contract with the Government, must have attached a revenue stamp duly canceled.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 26, 1898.

SIR: By contract entered into March 1, 1889, between the United States by the Secretary of the Treasury, and the United States Express Company, the United States agreed to employ the said company exclusively as its transportation agent for the transportation of all moneys and securities belonging to the United States within certain territorial limits in the contract specified. The contract fixes the rate of compensation to be paid to the company for the transportation of each kind of money, coin, paper currency. bonds, certificates, canceled securities, and mixed packages of currency and coin. The contract is terminable on six months' notice in writing by either party to the other and is still in force.

You submit for my decision the question whether under the war-revenue act of June 13, 1898, the United States Express Company is required, when receiving money and securities for transportation for the Government, under this contract, to issue to the consignor a bill of lading, manifest, or other receipt with a 1-cent stamp duly attached and canceled.

It is contended by counsel for the express company that moneys and securities transported by it under this contract are exempt from the provisions of the act in question for two reasons:

First. Because the act applies in terms to "goods," and moneys and public securities such as are described in the contract are not "goods" within the meaning of the act. I have already, in my opinion of August 17, 1898, decided that the word "goods" used in this connection includes money, securities, and other choses in action.

Second. It is claimed in behalf of the express company that, in view of the fact that the amount of its compensation for carrying each shipment had been determined and agreed upon in advance, the imposition by the Government. through this act of Congress of a stamp tax upon each shipment is in effect a reduction of the compensation reserved to the company, and an impairment to that extent of the obligation of the contract, amounting to a violation of the 7843-VOL 22, PT 1—13

contractual obligation of the Government, and in fact an arbitrary and oppressive act under the guise of taxation.

When a government enters into such an agreement, it is not acting in its capacity of a sovereign, but it comes down to the level of an ordinary individual. Its contracts have the same meaning as that of similar contracts between private persons. (Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S., 432, 445.)

The provision of the Federal Constitution which forbids the passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts applies only to the States; there is no such prohibition expressly made in relation to acts of Congress. It is unnecessary to discuss the question whether Congress has unrestricted power to do what the States can not do in the impairment of contract obligations. It is probable it would be held that in some instances and for some purposes it can. Such an instance might be the enactment of a bankrupt law, which necessarily implies the impairment and even the entire discharge of contract obligations. (Miller on Constitution, 529.)

It is not improbable, however, that any act of Congress which should provide for the repudiation of any substantial part of a valid contract would be obnoxious to those other provisions of the Federal Constitution which are intended to protect the citizen and his property against arbitrary seizure and confiscation.

But, in my judgment, there is no just ground to consider that the imposition of the stamp tax upon the United States Express Company by the act mentioned either impairs the obligation of its contract or takes private property for public use without compensation or without due process of law. While the imposition by way of stamp duty is commonly called a tax, nevertheless, considered in the light of the constitutional provision which regulates the levy of such taxes, it is not strictly a tax, but an impost.

The Constitution declares that "the Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; * * * but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." (Art. I, sec. 8.)

This constitutional quality of uniformity pertains to this particular piece of legislation. The law provides that "it

shall be the duty of every railroad or steamboat company, carrier, express company, or corporation or person whose occupation is to act as such, to issue to the shipper or consignor, or his agent, or person from whom any goods are accepted for transportation, a bill of lading, manifest, or other evidence of receipt and forwarding for each shipment received for carriage and transportation; and there shall be duly attached and canceled, as is in this act provided, to each of said bills of lading, manifests, or other memorandum, and to each duplicate thereof, a stamp of the value of 1 cent." It satisfies the constitutional requirement of uniformity, when a particular impost is uniform upon all subjects of the same kind or class. Such is the character of this particular levy. It extends to all cases where goods are received for transportation by express companies, no matter whether the consignor be a municipality, a State, or the Federal Government itself, and without regard to whether such goods are received and transported under a continuing contract previously entered into, or under the ordinary obligation of a common carrier to take and transport the goods of all who apply and tender reasonable compensation.

No difference is perceived in the effect of this law in its operation upon the United States Express Company where it transports goods for the Government under this contract, and those instances wherein this or other companies are under similar contract with private persons at fixed rates established prior to the passage of the act and continuing during its operation. If the obligation of the contract is impaired in one case it is in the other. It would terminate the power of the Government to levy taxes and imposts if individuals were allowed to set up the plea that thereby their contracts were rendered less profitable than before, or even that their profits were more than balanced by the governmental exactions. The payment of taxes in any form is not supposed to contribute to the profits of the subject, but to swell the funds of the Government. Taxes may be ruinous, but they for that reason are not unlawful. The power to tax is the power to destroy. (Marshall, Ch. J., McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 431.) Counsel for the

express company does not contend, as I understand his brief,