part Congress had in mind the intellectual work to be protected by copyright; in the latter part the mechanical processes used to place such work in salable shape.

Under the copyright laws as construed by the courts, the term "book" includes a musical or other composition, though printed on but one sheet. (Clayton et al. v. Stone et al., 2 Paine, 383-391; Drury v. Ewing, 1 Bond, 540–545; Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U. S., 428.) The reprint of a musical composition may be a "book" or "lithograph" or "photograph," according to the mechanical process used. The importation of copyrighted compositions reproduced by any of the processes mentioned in the concluding part of section 4956 is prohibited.

Your first and second questions must therefore be answered in the affirmative.

So, too, must the third question. Music books, made up in part of musical compositions copyrighted in the United States are prohibited importation. A prohibited article can not gain admission through being attached to an article which is not prohibited. A book must be treated as an entirety, and if part of it can not be imported, the whole must be excluded.

Your fourth and last question is submitted in view of the following stipulation contained in the existing convention between the United States and Canada, which bears date of January 19, 1888:

"All registered articles, ordinary letters, postal cards, and other manuscript matter, business or commercial papers, books (bound or stitched), proofs of printing, engravings, photographs, drawings, maps, and other articles manifestly of value to the sender, which are not delivered from any cause, shall be reciprocally returned, monthly, without charge, through the central administrations of the two countries in special bags or sacks, marked "Rebuts," after the expiration of the period for their retention required by the laws or regulations of the country of destination."

The last paragraph of section 4958, as amended by section 4 of the act of March 3, 1891, provides:

"The Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster-General are hereby empowered and required to make and enforce

such rules and regulations as shall prevent the importation into the United States, save upon the conditions above specified, of all articles prohibited by this act."

The Solicitor of the Treasury, in response to an inquiry from the Secretary of the Treasury, has expressed the opinion that the Secretary of the Treasury and the PostmasterGeneral have the authority, under this provision, to make rules and regulations for the destruction of music and music books imported into this country in violation of the copyright laws of the United States. From this view I am not prepared to dissent. The provision of the postal convention quoted certainly does not require the return to Canada of articles which shall become forfeited through a violation of the laws of the United States, and, in my opinion, rules and regulations for the forfeiture and, if deemed necessary, the destruction of prohibited articles may be so framed as to provide due process of law.

The imprisonment of a citizen of the United States by an officer of a foreign government, without judicial process, or allegation of a violation of law, but because of an alleged disrespect of such official's authority, is such an injury as to render such government liable in damages.

Loss of time, absence from business, personal humiliation, and bodily and mental suffering resulting from a wrongful arrest and imprisonment are, under the laws of civilized countries, grounds for compensatory damages, the amount being determined in cases of this character through negotiations.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
February 7, 1898.

SIR: On January 4, 1886, a citizen of the United States, Mr. Thomas J. Culliton, the treasurer of the dredging company then doing work on the Isthmus of Panama, was arrested

and imprisoned by the acting prefect of Colon without judicial process and without any allegation of a violation of law, but simply because Mr. Culliton's conduct was alleged by the prefect to be in disrespect of his authority. The United States consul at Colon and Admiral Jouett, who happened to be in port at that time, intervened, and Culliton was released by the order of the prefect after five hours' detention in the common jail. The statement of this outrage contained in the protest filed by Mr. Culliton with our consul at Colon April 6, 1886, is as follows:

"On the 4th day of January, 1886, about 10 o'clock a. m., the said T. J. Culliton, cashier of the American Contracting and Dredging Company, received from the prefect of Colon a letter which read (as nearly as he can recollect) as follows: 'Please place at my disposal the money and effects of the two men herein named.'

"On the foot of the prefect's letter the said T. J. Culliton noted his reply (as nearly as he can remember) as follows: 'This office has no money or effects belonging to the abovenamed men.' This letter was then inclosed in an envelope, addressed to the prefect of Colon, and returned to him by the person who brought it.

"At 11.30 a. m. of the same day, January 4, 1886, as the said T. J. Culliton was passing on his way from his office at Christopher Columbus, a suburb of Colon, he was halted by about six armed soldiers, and the same letter upon which he had made his indorsement was presented to him. He was asked by the officer in command of the squad of soldiers if he was the person who had written said indorsement. He replied that he was. He was then informed that he was under arrest and must go to jail, where he arrived at about 12 o'clock noon, and was lodged in jail with all the common criminals of the town. He then asked to be taken before the prefect for a hearing. He was informed that he must remain in jail until the prefect sent for him. Through the efforts of the American consul and some of his friends, the said T. J. Culliton was called before the prefect about 3.30 p. m. the same day, and informed by the prefect that his having written a reply upon the letter of the pre7843-VOL 22, PT 1——3

fect constituted a grave insult to the said prefect's dignity and authority, and for this reason and for no other he had been placed in jail, where he would have to remain until 5 p. m. Between 4 p. m. and 5 p. m. he was released."

Your Department having, through our minister at Bogota, presented to the Government of Colombia the claim for indemnification of Mr. Culliton in the sum of $25,000, that Government, through its minister of foreign affairs, responds, in a communication dated February 25, 1897, insisting, among other things:

First. That Culliton's case is not one which carries a right to pecuniary indemnity. His imprisonment lasting only five hours, neither his property interests nor his health could have been damaged. His only suffering was of a mental character, which can not be appreciated and satisfied in money. The treaty between this country and Colombia (see article 13), while it guarantees to citizens of the United States in Colombia the same protection as that which is given to natives, does not guarantee indemnity for treatment such as Culliton suffered.

Second. That as a general principle of international law, governments are not responsible for trifling injuries inflicted by government agents, but the national responsibility ceases as soon as the proceeding of the offending functionary has been condemned and necessary measures taken to prevent a repetition of the abuse.

Upon these two objections to the Culliton claim, urged by the Colombian Government as matters of law, you desire the opinion of this Department.

* * *

* * *

The seventh article of the treaty between this country and Colombia stipulates that "it shall be wholly free for all merchants, and other citizens of both countries, to manage their own business in all the ports and places subject to the jurisdiction of each other," while, in the eleventh article, "both contracting parties promise and engage formally to give their special protection to the persons and property of the citizens of each other, of all occupations, who may be in the territories subject to the jurisdiction of one or the other."

Under this treaty it was wholly free for Culliton, as a

citizen of the United States, to manage his own business in the town and port of Colon, and he was guaranteed special protection by the Government of Colombia to his person and property while there. Nevertheless, an officer of the Government of Colombia, in flagrant disregard of these guaranties, arrested Culliton without cause, dragged him from his business, thrust him into a common jail and kept him there, in the company of common criminals, for five hours, until forced by the American consul and an American admiral to release him. And now it is contended that Culliton suffered no injury which can be measured in money. Perhaps not adequately so measured; but he suffered damages which, under our laws and the laws of civilized countries are compensated in money. The loss of time, the absence from business, the personal humiliation, the bodily and mental suffering, resulting from a wrongful arrest and imprisonment, are grounds for compensatory damages. The precise amount required to make the wronged citizen whole is determined in a suit at law by a jury, and in this case must be fixed through negotiations.

In a damage suit by a passenger for expulsion from a train Judge McIlvaine, of the supreme court of Ohio, said (23 O. S., 10, 18):

"That physical pain caused by an act of trespass on the person constitutes a legitimate ground for compensatory damages no one disputes. And why should not mental suffering as well? Is it more endurable than physical suffering? Is it a less probable consequence of a trespass against the person of another? Is the mind an object of less concern in the judgment of the law than the body? Is it any less a part of the person? Is compensation in money for mental suffering more difficult to estimate than for physical pain? I can find no good reason for affirming any of these distinctions.”

In a case of wrongful arrest under humiliating circumstances, Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said (147 U. S., 101, 111):

"In the case at bar the defendant's counsel having admitted in open court that the arrest of the plaintiff was wrongful, and that he was entitled to recover actual dam