444, it does not at all follow, in my opinion, that this vests in the Secretary of the Interior such authority as will enable him to exercise in advance a general supervision over the operations and expenditures of the Census Bureau. His duty will be discharged when he is satisfied that the advance required or the payments made and to be approved are for lawful purposes, within the proper scope and meaning of the census act, and such as are proper to be approved and paid. The Director of the Census is given authority to employ the persons necessary to do the work, to purchase supplies and materials, and generally to incur the expenses for which the · appropriation is made. Such expenditures as he incurs within this limit are proper and lawful, and upon being satisfied as to their correctness, if it be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to approve them at all, it will be to do so as a ministerial act, and not as a matter within his judgment, or discretion as touching the mere wisdom or advisability of the expenditure incurred. Very respectfully, JOHN W. GRIGGS. The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. BONDS SURETY COMPANIES. The act authorizing the acceptance of bonds and undertakings of surety and fidelity companies does not permit the imposition of conditions and regulations by Government officials relative to the question of charges, etc. If the laws of a State under which a surety company is incorporated limits the amount of liability to a certain percentage of the capital, which can be incurred on account of any one partnership or association, and if a greater amount of liability is incurred it is to be secured by a collateral agreement of indemnity, such provision is thereby made a part of its charter, and to that extent is it restricted in its dealings with the United States. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: By letter of March 23, 1899, you submit copy of a communication from the chief of the Division of Appointments of your office, in which attention is called to a request of the Ætna Indemnity Company to be released as surety from the official bonds of Thomas A. Lake as collector and disbursing agent of internal revenue for the district of Connecticut, and you request my opinion upon four questions, which are by you stated as follows: "First. In view of the showing made in the table setting forth the aggregate liability on bonds in this office as compared with total assets of said company, does not the present surety seem to afford better protection on the bonds in question than the one proposed in substitution therefor? "Second. Should not a limit be fixed to the aggregate liability which any company may incur on the official bonds filed in this office, beyond which limit such company would not be considered acceptable as good and sufficient surety; or is the liability on such bonds to be considered of such a contingent nature as to warrant the acceptance of such company as surety for an indefinite amount? If the former, what ratio should such limit be to the paid-up capital of such company? "Third. Should a company be accepted as surety on any one bond, the penalty of which exceeds the capital stock of such company? If not, what percentage of the capital stock should be considered a safe limit to which such company might be accepted on a single bond? "Fourth. Would it be practicable and wise for the Government to fix a minimum premium rate upon official bonds executed to the United States by guaranty companies, all companies, to be excluded from Government business that accepted lower rates?" With reference to the first question, I suggest that it involves merely a matter of judgment and discretion, and not a question of law upon which it is proper for the Attorney-General to express an opinion. With reference to the second, third, and fourth questions, I suggest that they likewise contain matters which are entirely matters of judgment and discretion, in so far as any of them are permissible under the law which governs this subject. The act of Congress which allows the acceptance by officials of the United States of bonds and undertakings of surety and fidelity companies (28 Stats., 279), does not give either to the Attorney-General or to the officers authorized to accept such bonds any discretion to impose the conditions and regulations suggested by the last three questions contained in your letter. The act directs that every such company, before transacting any business thereunder, shall deposit with the Attorney-General a copy of its charter and a statement of its assets and liabilities, and that if the Attorney-General is satisfied that the company has authority, under its charter, to do the business provided for in the act, and that it has a paid-up capital of not less than $250,000 in cash or its equivalent, and is able to keep and perform its contracts, he shall grant authority to such company to do business under this act. Practically the two questions to be decided by the Attorney-General before admitting a company as qualified to give bonds to the United States are, that the company has appropriate corporate power, and, that the company is solvent. I do not think he is justified in saying that because a company has entered into bond to an amount greater than the capital stock of the company it is therefore insolvent; nor do I think he is authorized to fix a limit of percentage of capital stock to liability beyond which the company may not go upon a single bond; nor do I think that he has power to prescribe the rates which such company shall charge for such insurance. With reference to the provision found in the laws of several of the States, relating to surety companies, to the effect that no such company shall incur in behalf or on account of any one person, partnership, association, or corporation, a liability for an amount larger than one-tenth of its paid-up capital, unless it shall be secured from loss thereon beyond that amount by suitable and sufficient collateral agreements of indemnity, I have to remark that if such provision is contained in the act under which any particular surety company is incorporated, and is thereby made a part of its charter, then to that extent it restricts the corporate power of such company in its dealings with the United States Government. If, however, such State statute refers, not to the charter powers, but to the general powers of all companies transacting surety business within the limits of such State, then it is not operative beyond the limits of such State, and would have no effect in transactions with the Federal Government. Very respectfully, JOHN W. GRIGGS. The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. CONTRACTS-COURT OF CLAIMS. A claim for profits and expenses incurred in the construction of a pier in the Aqueduct Bridge, Georgetown, D. C., under a contract which was annulled for lack of diligence in prosecuting the work, involves disputed facts, and possibly controverted questions of law, and is properly referable to the Court of Claims under the first clause of $1063, Revised Statutes. A claim being one which might have been originally commenced in the Court of Claims by the voluntary action of the claimant, is not covered by the proviso to §1063, Revised Statutes. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of the 28th instant relative to the claim of the Houston Construction Company v. The United States, now pending in your Department. You state the facts and circumstances of the claim as follows: That on May 27, 1897, the claimant company entered into a contract with the United States for the reconstruction by the company of Pier No. 4 of the Aqueduct Bridge, Georgetown, D. C. That after the company had expended considerable money in and about the work agreed to be done, it was decided by the United States engineer in charge that the company had failed to prosecute the work faithfully and diligently, in accordance with the contract, and therefore the contract was thereupon annulled, pursuant to a provision of the same giving the engineer in charge power to annul the contract if, in his judgment, the party of the second part had failed to prosecute the work faithfully and diligently. That subsequent to such annulment the company presented the Secretary of War a statement of the amount of money so expended by it before said annulment in and about the work agreed to be done, claiming the same to be $34,058, and requested to be reimbursed this amount, together with reasonable profits. That the company claims that prior to the said annulment of the contract the United States engineer in charge ordered that the work be suspended, and that that gave it a right to said reimbursement, with reasonable profits; but the engineer officer denies that he ordered the work to be suspended, or even asked that the whole of it be suspended, though he admits that he requested the company to suspend one part or branch of it, claiming that the contract empowered him to dictate or determine in what order the different branches of the work should be done. That the Secretary of War rejected the claim on the ground that he had no jurisdiction or authority to adjust or pay the same, and that then the company asked that the matter be transmitted by the Secretary to the Court of Claims, under sections 1063 and 1064, Revised Statutes. And thereupon you request my opinion on the following questions: "1. Is the matter one so pending in the War Department as to give the Secretary of War power to refer it to the Court of Claims under the said sections on the application of the claimant? "2. Is it one that the Secretary of War is not prohibited from sending to the Court of Claims by the proviso to the said section 1063, to the effect that 'no case shall be referred by any head of a Department unless it belongs to one of the several classes of cases which, by reason of the subjectmatter and character, the said court might under existing laws take jurisdiction of on such voluntary action of the claimant?"" From the foregoing statement it is clear to me that the claim under consideration involves disputed facts and in all probability controverted questions of law, and as the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000, it is properly referable by you to the Court of Claims under the provisions of the first clause of section 1063, Revised Statutes, to which you refer. The claim is furthermore one which might have been originally commenced in the Court of Claims by the voluntary |