not an action to enforce the terms of such arrangement. That combination may have been illegal, and yet the sale to the defendants was valid."

This decision furnishes a complete answer to your inquiry, unless its effect be modified by the later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Continental Wall Paper Company v. Voight & Sons Company (212 U. S. 227). This latter case was decided upon a demurrer to a defense set up in the answer to the petition of plaintiff in a suit brought by the wall-paper company to recover a balance of some $50,000 due on account for wall paper sold and delivered to the defendants. The defense averred that the plaintiff was a member of an illegal combination among manufacturers of wall paper, formed for the purpose of enhancing prices, stifling competition, and restricting the freedom of commerce between the States and with foreign nations, contrary to the common law and the Sherman Act; that the companies entering into the conspiracy effected the combination, which was to be carried out by jobbers and dealers signing agreements to buy their entire stock from the combination and at prices fixed according to the class in which such purchaser was arbitrarily placed; and that the defendants were compelled to become parties to the illegal combination by signing such contracts, and that the contract upon which the suit depended for price and terms of sale constituted one of the agreements going to make up the illegal combination represented by the wallpaper company. This defense was sustained by a majority of the court, who held that the combination was illegal and that the plaintiff could not have judgment for the amount of the account sued upon, because such judgment would, in effect, aid in the execution of the agreements which constituted the illegal combination. The court said (pp. 261, 262, 266):

66* * * The Continental Wall Paper Company seeks, in legal effect, the aid of a court to enforce a contract for the sale and purchase of goods which it is admitted by the demurrer was in fact and was intended by the parties to be based upon agreements that were and are essential parts of an illegal scheme. We state the matter in this way, because

the plaintiff by its demurrer admits for the purposes of this case the truth of all the facts alleged in the third defense. It is admitted by the demurrer to that defense that the account sued on has been made up in execution of the agreements that constituted or out of which came the illegal combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of both restraining and monopolizing trade and commerce among the several States.

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(* * * Stated shortly, the present case is this: The plaintiff comes into court admitting that it is an illegal combination whose operations restrain and monopolize commerce and trade among the States and asks a judgment that will give effect, so far as it goes, to agreements that constituted that combination, and by means of which the combination proposes to accomplish forbidden ends. We hold that such a judgment can not be granted without departing from the statutory rule, long established in the jurisprudence of both this country and England, that a court will not lend its aid, in any way, to a party seeking to realize the fruits of an agreement that appears to be tainted with illegality, although the result of applying that rule may sometimes be to shield one who has got something for which as between man and man he ought, perhaps, to pay, but for which he is unwilling to pay.

"In such cases the aid of the court is denied, not for the benefit of the defendant, but because public policy demands that it should be denied without regard to the interests of individual parties. It is of no consequence that the present defendant company had knowledge of the alleged illegal combination and its plans and was directly or indirectly a party thereto. Its interest must be put out of view altogether when it is sought to have the assistance of the court in accomplishing ends forbidden by the law. The adjudged cases all hold that upon the question whether the particular contract sought to be enforced arises out of an illegal transaction, the court will not be restricted to a partial statement of the facts but will consider all the circumstances connected with the transaction so as to ascertain its real nature."

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Mr. Justice Harlan in delivering the majority opinion distinguished that case from the case of Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Company as follows (supra, p. 260):

"The present case is plainly distinguishable from the Connolly case. In that case the defendant, who sought to avoid payment for the goods purchased by him under contract, had no connection with the general business or operations of the alleged illegal corporation that sold the goods. He had nothing whatever to do with the formation of that corporation, and could not participate in the profits of its business. His contract was to take certain goods at an agreed price, nothing more, and was not in itself illegal, nor part of nor in execution of any general plan or scheme that the law condemned. The contract of purchase was wholly collateral to and independent of the agreement under which the combination had been previously formed by others in Ohio. It was the case simply of a corporation that dealt with an entire stranger to its management and operations and sold goods that it owned to one who wished to buy them. In short, the defense in the Connolly case was that the plaintiff corporation, although owning the pipe in question and having authority to sell and pass title to the property, was precluded by reason alone of its illegal character from having a judgment against the purchaser. We held that that defense could not be sustained either upon the principles of the common law or under the antitrust act of Congress.

It is true that Mr. Justice Holmes dissented from the judgment upon the ground that the case was controlled by Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Company, and that this decision in effect reversed that case; but the majority of the court thought otherwise, and the distinction seems to be clearly drawn, and, in effect, to establish that a court will not enforce a contract for the sale of goods when such contract is part of an arrangement by which a combination. in restraint of trade is effected, and where the enforcement of the contract would be, in effect, lending the aid of the court to the carrying out of the unlawful scheme or combination; but that the mere fact that a vendor is carrying on business in violation of the antitrust act will not operate

as a defense to one who deals with it by buying goods or otherwise, nor protect him from the enforcement of his contracts with such vendor. On the other hand, it would seem equally clear that the mere fact that a vendor of goods is a party to an unlawful trust or combination in restraint of trade would not protect him from an action to enforce a contract to sell and deliver goods.

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that you can not ignore the requirement of the joint resolution and executive order above referred to, to award the contract for the purchase of material and equipment for use in the construction of the Panama Canal to the lowest responsible bidder, simply because such bidder has been adjudicated to be a party to a combination in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.

An artisan or laborer employed by the United States in the construction of river and harbor work, who contracted a severe cold in the course of his employment resulting in pneumonia and which incapacitated him for duty for a period lasting more than fifteen days, is not entitled to compensation under the act of May 30, 1908 (35 Stat. 556).

The word "injury," as used in above statute, is in no sense suggestive of disease, nor has it ordinarily any such significance. Opinion of May 17, 1909 (27 Op. 346), reviewed.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 25, 1910.

SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, as follows:

"Application for compensation has been made under the act of May 30, 1908 (35 Stat. 556), by Mr. John Sheeran, an artisan or laborer employed by the United States in the construction of river and harbor work. Immediately prior to becoming incapacitated, Mr. Sheeran was em

ployed at St. Marys Falls Canal, Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., in cleaning a building, attending to the heating plant, and removing ashes. In the course of his employment, while removing ashes from the furnace room to a pile outside the building, he contracted a severe cold, which resulted in pneumonia, and was incapacitated for duty for a period lasting more than fifteen days. Mr. Sheeran's disability was in no way due to negligence or misconduct on his part. "Inasmuch as this is the first claim squarely presenting the question whether the word 'injury,' as used in the statute, is broad enough to include diseases contracted in the course of employment, and directly attributable to conditions of employment, or whether it should be limited to include only such cases of incapacity as may result from some wound or hurt received in the course of employment, I have the honor to request your opinion as to whether Mr. Sheeran is entitled to the benefits of the act."

The act of May 30, 1908 (35 Stat. 556), is entitled "An act granting to certain employees of the United States the right to receive from it compensation for injuries sustained in the course of their employment." The applicable provisions of the act are set forth in the opinion rendered you on May 17, 1909 (27 Op. 346), and therefore need not be repeated here.

There is nothing either in the language of the act or its legislative history which justifies the view that the statute was intended to cover disease contracted in the course of employment, although directly attributable to the conditions thereof. On the contrary, it appears that the statute was intended to apply to injuries of an accidental nature resulting from employment in hazardous occupations-not to the effects of disease. Thus, the report of the Judiciary Committee of the House accompanying this bill states (House Rep. No. 1669, 60th Cong., 1st sess.):

"The purpose of this bill is to compensate government employees engaged in hazardous occupations. Such employment is practically confined to arsenals, navyyards, manufacturing establishments (such as armories, clothing depots, shipyards, proving grounds, powder factories, etc.), to construction of river and harbor work, and