and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,"

shall suffer death; and in section 5341 it is declared that any person slaying another in any one of such places, without malice, is guilty of manslaughter. This homicide occurred upon a water within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and consequently falls precisely within the terms of the statute.

The district in which the accused should be arraigned for trial must be determined by a proper construction of section 730, Revised Statutes, which reads as follows:

"The trial of all offenses committed upon the high seas or elsewhere, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district where the offender is found, or into which he is first brought."

The words "or district" did not appear in the act of April 30, 1790, with which this provision originated, but, notwithstanding this fact, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court in Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75, 135, held that this section did not apply to offenses committed outside of a State but within Territories of the United States having regularly established courts competent to try those offenses. It was probably as a result of this opinion that in the act of March 3, 1825, and in section 730, Revised Statutes, the words "or district" were added after "State."

In Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212, the Supreme Court of the United States, in considering this section and section 5339, Revised Statutes, used the following language:

"Both these acts of Congress clearly include murder committed on any land within the exclusive jurisdiction. of the United States and not within any judicial district, as well as murder committed on the high seas."

Thus showing that the word "district" in this act means judicial districts as established by Congress.

However, in view of the construction given the statute in Ex parte Bollman, I am of the opinion that the word "district," as here used, includes every territory within which there are courts regularly organized and having

jurisdiction over offenses against the United States; such courts as are mentioned in section 1910, Revised Statutes, wherein it is provided that

"Each of the district courts in the Territories mentioned in the preceding section shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, as is vested in the circuit and district courts of the United States."

But the courts of the Philippine Islands are not vested with any such jurisdiction. In the first section of the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. 691), which is entitled "An act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands," it is provided that

"The provisions of section eighteen hundred and ninetyone of the Revised Statutes of eighteen hundred and seventy-eight shall not apply to the Philippine Islands." Said section 1891 reads:

"The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized Territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized as elsewhere within the United States."

Furthermore, it is now well settled that the Constitution and laws of the United States did not of their own force extend to the Philippine Islands. (Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138.) Since, therefore, the general laws of the United States are not in force in the Philippine Islands, there is no necessity for courts there to be vested with power to enforce them, and in fact no attempt has been made to confer upon their courts any such jurisdiction. Under their scheme of government they have a very complete system of courts (act No. 136, Ph. Com., vol. 1, pp. 252-269; 32 Stat. 691), but their criminal jurisdiction extends only to the trial of offenses against the Philippine government.

Therefore, the homicide in question, having occurred "out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district," the parties accused may be tried in any judicial district either in a State or a Territory of the United States into

which they shall be first brought. It should therefore be first determined in which district the trial can be had most expeditiously and with the greatest convenience and least expense to all persons concerned, including the Government, and the accused persons and the witnesses to the killing should be sent to that place, the accused delivered to the United States marshal of such district, and the witnesses to the act placed at the disposal of the United States. Attorney for the same district.

Respectfully,

GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

OFFICIAL BONDS-RATE OF PREMIUM-GUARANTEE COMPANIES.

The act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. 125), regulating the rate of premium to be paid on official bonds does not apply to bonds voluntarily given by an employee or officer of the United States to a superior officer, and consequently it does not apply to bonds given by deputy collectors of internal revenue to collectors.

The act of August 5, 1909, does apply to bonds running to the United States and which are accepted in each case by the properly designated officer of the United States.

Voluntary bonds of the character above described do not come within the purview of the act of August 13, 1894 (28 Stat. 279), which prescribes the character and qualification of guarantee companies which may be accepted on official bonds required by law.

The rate of premium paid by the incumbent of any particular office during 1908 on his official bond may be used as the base for computing the rate which shall be paid upon the bond of the incumbent of the same office under the act of August 5, 1909, provided such rate did not constitute an isolated instance of an unusual or extortionate premium.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 28, 1909.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, replying to the letter of this department of the 27th ultimo and inquiring further as to the proper construction to be placed upon the acts of August 5, 1909, and August 13, 1894.

NOTE. Opinion of October 27, 1909, to the President, may appear in a later volume.

The questions contained in your letter may be grouped

under three heads:

First. Referring to the letter of this department of the 27th ultimo (27 Op. 624), in which it was held that the act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. 125), as to the rate of premium to be paid does not apply to the bond of an acting or deputy disbursing clerk selected under the act of March 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1027), said bond not running to the United States but to the chief disbursing officer, you state:

"There are about 1,200 deputy collectors of internal revenue as well as a large number of other 'officers and employees' under this department from whom bonds are required by law, but which do not run directly to the United States, who would be deprived of the benefit of the rate law if this construction should control.

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"The clause, ‘any officer or employee of the United States,' contained in the act of August 5, 1909, defining its scope, has been construed by this department as including all bonds voluntarily given by officers or employees to their superiors as well as bonds required by law but not running directly to the United States

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You therefore inquire "whether your conclusion that the act of August 5, 1909, does not apply to the bonds of acting or deputy disbursing officers bonded under the act of March 4, 1909, is intended to apply to officers and employees under this department required by law to give bonds which do not run directly to the United States?"

The act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. 125), provides: "Until otherwise provided by law no bond shall be accepted from any surety or bonding company for any officer or employee of the United States which shall cost. more than thirty-five per centum in excess of the rate of premium charged for a like bond during the calendar year nineteen hundred and eight: Provided, That hereafter the United States shall not pay any part of the premium or other cost of furnishing a bond required by law or otherwise of any officer or employee of the United States."

Construing this act this department held in its letter of September 27, 1909, above referred to, that it did not apply to the bond of an acting or deputy disbursing clerk selected under the act of March 4, 1909. It is to be observed that prior to the act of March 4, 1909, there had been no provision for the giving of a bond by an acting disbursing clerk and, therefore, there was no rate for the year 1908 which could be used as a basis for computing the rate in that particular case.

The act relating to the giving of bonds by deputy collectors of internal revenue to a collector (20 Stat. 329) provides:

"That each collector of internal revenue shall be authorized to appoint, by an instrument in writing under his hand, as many deputies as he may think proper, to be compensated for their services by such allowances as shall be made by the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Allowances shall also be made in like manner for salary and office expenses of collectors, all of which shall be in lieu of the salary and commissions heretofore provided by law: Provided, however, That the salaries of collectors. shall be fixed at two thousand dollars each per annum where the annual collections amount to twenty-five thousand dollars or less, and shall, by the Secretary, on the recommendation of the commissioner, be graduated up to the maximum limit of four thousand five hundred dollars; which latter sum shall be allowed in all cases where the collections amount to one million of dollars or upward; and the collector shall have power to revoke the appointment of any such deputy, giving such notice thereof as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may prescribe, and to require and accept bonds or other securities from any deputy; and actions upon such bonds may be brought in any appropriate district or circuit court of the United States; which courts are hereby given jurisdiction of such actions concurrently with the courts of the several States. Each such deputy shall have the like authority in every respect to collect the taxes levied or assessed within the portion of the district assigned to him which is by law vested in the