if included at all it is under the general term "similar establishments."

They attempt to apply in construing this oft-repeated phrase the principle of ejusdem generis, and insist, in effect, that the general expression has no meaning whatever, and can include no establishment which can not be considered as belonging to one of the classes particularly named.

The last case in which consideration to this question was given by the Supreme Court is that of United States v. Mescall (215 U. S. 26, 31), in which it was insisted by the defendant that a statute which provides a penalty against "any owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person" who shall make or attempt to make any entry of imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, etc., should be restricted in its application to the persons who were concerned in the importation, and that the words "other person" did not embrace a government weigher in the customs service. The Supreme Court, however, held to the contrary, and in its opinion quoted with approval the following from National Bank of Commerce v. Ripley (161 Missouri, 126, 132):

* *

"But this (the principle of ejusdem generia) is only a rule of construction to aid us in arriving at the real legislative intent. It is not a cast-iron rule, it does not override all other rules of construction, and it is never applied to defeat the real purpose of the statute, as that purpose may be gathered from the whole instrument *. Whilst it is aimed to preserve a meaning for the particular words, it is not intended to render meaningless the general words. Therefore, where the particular words exhaust the class, the general words must be construed as embracing something oustide of that class. If the particular words exhaust the genus there is nothing ejusdem generis left, and in such case we must give the general words a meaning outside of the class indicated by the particular words, or we must say that they are meaningless, and thereby sacrifice the general to preserve the particular words. In that case the rule would defeat its own purpose."

However, the expression here used, "similar establishments," is more narrow than the words "other person

used in the statute considered in the Mescall case; and the character of every establishment subject to inspection must be similar to those which are mentioned in express terms; but the holding of the court in that case that a general phrase following special designations must be given some meaning is here in point. Moreover, it is clear from the repeated use of this expression that Congress did not intend that it should be taken as entirely meaningless; and when considered in connection with the purposes and requirements of the act, and the duties imposed upon the inspectors, it can not be doubted that it was intended to include all establishments which are not specifically mentioned, in which the animal is slaughtered or the carcass or meat is prepared, or in which the meat food product is manufactured.

Consequently, whether or not this act applies to the lard substitute in question and to the establishments of these manufacturers, depends after all upon the meaning of the words "meat food product." If this term is applicable to this lard substitute, then such lard substitute and also the establishments in which it is manufactured are subject to inspection under the provisions of the act.

If this term has such a well-defined meaning that a court will take judicial knowledge thereof, or if it is so clearly defined in the act as to render its meaning not doubtful, then whether or not the lard substitute is subject to inspection is a question of law; but if the meaning thereof must be determined by commercial usage, then it presents a question of fact which will not be passed upon by this department.

An examination of authorities fails to disclose any case wherein an attempt has been made to define what a "meat food product" is, or, in fact, the meaning of the word product" when used in a similar connection; and while the provisions of the act indicate that it is not to be construed in a restricted sense, yet it is not there defined with any degree of accuracy.

That there is a distinction between the terms "meat product" and "meat food product" is clearly shown in the

third paragraph of the act, wherein it is provided that the preceding provisions shall apply to

"all carcasses or parts of carcasses of cattle, sheep, swine, and goats, or the meat or meat products thereof which may be brought into any slaughtering * * * establishment, etc.;"

and, further, that before the carcasses or parts thereof shall be allowed to enter into any department wherein the same are to be "treated and prepared for meat food products,' an examination and inspection shall be had; thus showing that "meat food products" are manufactures of meat or "meat products."

I think is is not warranted as a matter of law to hold that the term "meat food product" is intended to embrace nothing but a food which consists wholly of the meat of the animal. The language just referred to indicates to the contrary, and such an interpretation would greatly restrict the beneficial effects of the act.

Since, therefore, Congress has not seen proper to define the meaning of this expression, and since its definition is essential to a proper enforcement of the act, and Congress has expressly vested in the Secretary of Agriculture the power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the efficient execution of the provisions of the act, the power to determine what manufactures are "meat food products" rests in the Secretary of Agriculture, such power being restricted, of course, to the adoption of a reasonable definition of the term, and not a definition that would be clearly and unquestionably outside the intent of the act.

This power of the Secretary is upheld by numerous authorities, one of the later cases being Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne (194 U. S. 106, 109), where the question was whether the Postmaster-General had the power to decide whether a musical publication was a monthly magazine or whether each issue was complete within itself; and the court, after a review of the authorities, summarized the rule as follows:

"That where the decision of questions of fact is committed by Congress to the judgment and discretion of the

head of a department, his decision thereon is conclusive; and that even upon mixed questions of law and fact, or of law alone, his action will carry with it a strong presumption of its correctness, and the courts will not ordinarily review it, although they may have the power, and will occasionally exercise the right of so doing.'

The application of this rule in a case presenting a similar question to the one here under consideration, was made by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit in Coopersville Cooperative Creamery Co. v. Lemon (163 Fed. 145, 147), Mr. Justice Lurton (then circuit judge) delivering the opinion of the court. It was there held that the Secretary of the Treasury had a right to determine that butter containing 16 per cent of moisture was adulterated butter under the terms of the act there construed, the court saying:

"That the delegation of authority to add to or take from a law would be to delegate legislative power must also be conceded. But that Congress may enact a law and delegate the power of finding some fact or state of things upon which the operation of the law is made to depend is equally clear. (Citing numerous authorities.)

"The authority to make all needful regulations not inconsistent with the law is not a delegation of power to add something to an incomplete law nor a grant of judicial power. It is only an authority to determine the fact upon which the operation of the law is made to depend."

In view of these authorities, I am constrained to hold that the definition of a meat food product, as given by the Secretary of Agriculture in Regulation 3, section 8, to wit:

"A meat food product, within the meaning of the meatinspection act and of these regulations, is considered to be any article of food intended for human use which is derived or prepared in whole or in part from any edible portion of the carcass of cattle, sheep, swine, or goats, if the said edible portion so used is a considerable and definite portion of the finished food,"

is a valid one, and that it is a question of fact for the Secretary to determine whether or not the lard substitute in question is a meat food product within the meaning of this regulation, and whether it and the establishments in which it is manufactured are subject to inspection.

I will not, therefore, undertake to pass upon the first question propounded by you, and answer the second in the affirmative.

Respectfully,

J. A. FOWLER, Acting Attorney-General.

The SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.

PURCHASE OF SUPPLIES FOR THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS-BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING.

Detached bureaus or offices having a field or outlying service may, by permission of the head of the department, under section 4 of the act of June 17, 1910 (36 Stat. 531), order all their supplies directly from the contractor, whether needed for use in the city of Washington or elsewhere.

The word "him" in the last proviso of the above section refers to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the word "so" refers to the method of contracting for other supplies, which method is to be followed in contracting for telephone, electric light and power service.

Section 4 of the act of June 17, 1910 (36 Stat. 531), supersedes the acts of January 27, 1894, and April 21, 1894 (28 Stat. 33 and 62), and prescribes the method by which the supplies mentioned therein should be purchased.

The Bureau of Engraving and Printing is subject to the provisions of section 4 of the act of 1894, and supplies for that bureau, of the character mentioned in that act, must be contracted for and purchased in accordance with its terms.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 25, 1910.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication of June 29, 1910, in which you ask the opinion of this department with reference to certain provisions of section 4 of the act of June 17, 1910, making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1911 (36 Stat. 531).

Said section reads as follows:

"That hereafter all supplies of fuel, ice, stationery, and other miscellaneous supplies for the executive departments and other government establishments in Washington, when the public exigencies do not require the immediate