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GLOBE SURETY COMPANY, OF KANSAS CITY-CERTIFICA

TION AS AN ACCEPTED SOLE SURETY.

The Globe Surety Company, of Kansas City, Mo., having the power to

guarantee the fidelity of persons holding positions of public or private trust and the power to execute and guarantee bonds and undertakings in judicial proceedings, possesses appropriate corporate powers to entitle it to certification as a sole surety under the provisions of the acts of Congress of August 13, 1894 (28 Stat. 279), and of March 23, 9110 (36 Stat. 241).

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 2, 1910. Sir: I have the honor to reply to your letter of the 11th ultimo, in which you ask my opinion as to whether the Globe Surety Company, of Kansas City, Mo., possesses appropriate corporate powers to entitle it to certification as an accepted sole surety under the provisions of the acts of Congress of August 13, 1894 (28 Stat. 279), and March 23, 1910 (36 Stat. 241).

Assuming that the document inclosed with your letter is, as it purports to be, a true copy of the charter of this corporation, and assuming that such powers as were acquired under that incorporation have not been lost, I am of opinion that it is entitled to the certificate.

The powers which the said acts of Congress require a corporation to possess as a condition precedent to the issue of certificate are, first, "the power to guarantee the fidelity of persons holding positions of public or private trust;” and, second, "the power to execute and guarantee bonds and undertakings in judicial proceedings."

The statute under which this corporation was organized, "An act relating to insurance other than life," R. S. Missouri, 1899, sec. 7945, Art. VI, chap. 119, divides its subject into four classes of powers, and no corporation is permitted to exercise the powers of more than one class. The particular corporation in question was formed under the third of these classes of powers, which is as follows:

“Third, to make insurance upon the health of individuals, and against personal injury, disablement, or death, resulting from traveling or general accident by land or water; to insure the fidelity of persons holding places of public and private trust, and also to receive on deposit and

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insure the safe-keeping of books, papers, money, stocks, bonds and all other kinds of personal property, and to do any and all other kinds of legitimate insurance business."

The first of the two powers required by the acts of Congress, namely, the power to guarantee the fidelity of persons holding positions of public and private trust, is authorized by this clause explicitly, in so many words.

The other required power, namely, the power to execute and guarantee bonds and undertakings in judicial proceedings, is not explicitly mentioned in section 7945, but it is, nevertheless, in my opinion, authorized under the clause "and to do any and all other kinds of legitimate insurance business.” Even if the rule of ejusdem generis should be applied, I should consider the power in question to be included, but that rule is held not to be applicable to the clause. (State v. Phelan, 66 Mo. App. 548.) The general language is therefore unrestricted. I think, moreover, that the existence of this power is put beyond question by section 7946 of the Missouri Revised Statutes of 1899, being the section next following that under which the company was organized. This section provides as follows:

“Sec. 7946. Any company having a paid-up capital of not less than two hundred thousand dollars, organized and incorporated under the laws of this * State for the purpose of transacting the business of becoming surety on the bonds or obligations of persons or corporations, or of insuring the fidelity of persons holding places of public or private trust,

may, on production of evidence of solvency satisfactory to the court, judge, become and be accepted as surety on the bond, recognizance, or other writing obligatory of any person or corporation in or concerning any matter in which the giving of a bond or other obligation is authorized, required or permitted by the laws of the State.”

The requisite powers being therefore available to Missouri corporations under the statute, the final question is whether the charter of this particular corporation has assumed them. On this question there appears to be no difficulty, inasmuch as the charter in terms enumerates all

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the powers, specific as well as general, which are authorized under the third class of section 7945, and also the particular powers to which section 7946 refers as qualifying the corporation to act as surety in judicial proceedings.

I am of opinion, therefore, that so far as its charter is concerned, this corporation possesses the requisite powers to entitle it to certification as acceptable sole surety under the provisions of the acts of Congress. I return the certified copy of the charter as requested. Very respectfully,

WINFRED T. DENISON,

Assistant Attorney-General. Approved: WILLIAM R. HARR,

Acting Attorney-General. The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

MINE-RESCUE WORK-PURCHASE OF LAND FOR EX

PERIMENTATION AND INSTRUCTION.

The acts of May 16, 1910 (36 Stat. 369), establishing a Bureau of Mines,

and of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 742), making appropriation for its main

tenance, do not authorize the purchase of land for mine-rescue stations. Lands, or interest in lands, acquired by the United States without con

sideration, or for a mere nominal sum, do not evidence a purchase

within the meaning of section 355 of the Revised Statutes. Moneys appropriated for the maintenance of the Bureau of Mines may

be expended in the erection of temporary structures on land acquired

by the United States for mine-rescue work. The validity of the titles to the lands proposed to be acquired for minerescue work should be submitted to the Attorney-General.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 15, 1910. Sir: Your communication of September 9, 1910, was duly received. You submit therein for my inspection three instruments, one of which is a proposed lease without a consideration for a parcel of land described therein, from the city of Evansville, Ind., to the United States, for a designated period of ninety-nine years, the lessee, however, to have the right to abandon same at any time upon thirty days' written notice.

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The second instrument is a proposed lease of a tract of land from the Huntington Land Company, of Huntington, W. Va., a corporation, to the United States. This lease is for the nominal compensation of $1.66 per month, and provides that the lease may be terminated at the end of any calendar month upon giving thirty days' written notice, that any buildings, fixtures, appurtenances, and improvements may be removed therefrom upon the termination of the lease, and it also contains an option of purchase during a period of time specified therein.

The third instrument is a proposed absolute conveyance of a certain tract of land, lying in Birmingham, Ala., from J. H. Woodward to the United States, for the nominal consideration of $1.

You state that it is the desire of the Bureau of Mines that the said instruments shall be accepted by the United States, and that temporary structures be placed thereon, to be used by said bureau for experimentation and instruction in mine rescue work, as provided for in the statute creating said bureau. And you ask my opinion upon the following questions:

“1. Do the acts of May 16, 1910, establishing a Bureau of Mines in the Department of the Interior, and of June 25, 1910, making appropriation for its maintenance, authorize the purchase of land for mine rescue stations?

“2. Do the proposed instruments of conveyance herewith submitted evidence a purchase by the United States within the meaning of section 355 of the Revised Statutes, and if they do evidence such purchase, may moneys appropriated for the maintenance of said Bureau of Mines be expended in the erection of public buildings upon said lands?

“3. Would short term leases of land for the purpose of erecting temporary structures thereon for the uses of the Bureau of Mines amount to a purchase within the meaning of said section, and may such short term leases be entered into for lands as to which a duly authenticated abstract of title has been submitted and the validity of the title established to the satisfaction of the AttorneyGeneral?”

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There is a preliminary question whether under section 3736 of the Revised Statutes, the instruments in question can be accepted by the United States. This section provides that “No land shall be purchased on account of the United States except under a law authorizing such purchase.” Neither the act creating the Bureau of Mines nor the act making appropriation for its maintenance authorizes the purchase of lands; and whether or not the lands, or interest in lands, designated in the above instruments, fall within the provisions of this statute depends upon the meaning of the word "purchase” as used therein. There are many authorities which hold that this word in its most enlarged sense signifies the lawful acquisition of real estate by any means whatever except by descent; yet its meaning has often been restricted because the context of the Statute or instrument in which it appears clearly indicated that it was intended to be used in a narrower sense.

For illustration in City of Enterprise v. Smith (62 Kansas 815), it was held that the word "purchasing” in the caption of an act which authorized cities to obtain water by purchasing or constructing waterworks was used in its popular and restricted sense “of acquisition of property by voluntary agreement, for a valuable consideration;" and that therefore the section of the act which undertook to authorize the condemnation of such property was unconstitutional and void, because such power was not embraced in the caption.

In Kohl v. United States (91 U. S. 367, 374), it was said by the Supreme Court of the United States that

the words 'to purchase' might be construed as including the power to acquire by condemnation; for, technically, purchase includes all methods of acquisition other than that of descent. But generally in statutes as in common use, the word is employed in a sense not technical, only as meaning acquisition by contract between the parties, without governmental interference.”

In Purczell v. Smidt (21 Iowa, 540, 546), it was held that the word “purchase” under a statute which conferred upon a certain class of aliens the right to acquire real estate by

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