(U. S. C., Title 31, sec. 172), the employees of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing were allowed "leave of absence with pay "not exceeding thirty days in any one year. By the Act of August 29, 1916, c. 417, 39 Stat. 617 (U. S. C., Title 34, sec. 511), every "employee of the navy yards, gun factories, naval stations, and arsenals of the United States Government was granted "thirty days' leave of absence each year, without forfeiture of pay." The last of these statutes expressly left in force the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1909, c. 256, 35 Stat. 755 (U. S. C., Title 34, secs. 503, 512), under which the Secretary of the Navy is authorized to extend for not to exceed fifteen days the annual leave of absence of the clerical, drafting, inspection, and messenger forces at navy yards and stations in cases of illness.

These statutes represented the state of the law until the Act of June 30, 1932, Public No. 212, section 215 of which provided that "hereafter no civilian officer or employee of the Government who receives annual leave with pay shall be granted annual leave of absence with pay in excess of fifteen days in any one year," with a proviso, however, that "nothing herein shall be construed as affecting the period during which pay may be allowed under existing laws for so-called sick leave of absence." (47 Stat. 407.)

Thus, it appears that while Congress has provided in express terms for annual leaves of absence with pay to employees of the Government Printing Office, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, and the navy yards and arsenals, it has not provided for these employees, except as to the special classes of employees at navy yards and stations above mentioned, any additional leave on account of sickness, unless such employees may be regarded as within the sickleave provisions of the statute relating to employees of the executive departments. But the enactment by Congress of special provisions as to leave for employees of the Government Printing Office, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, and the navy yards and arsenals would seem to indicate clearly that Congress did not regard such employees as being within the general provisions of the departmental leave law.

This has been expressly held by my predecessor Attorney General Harmon with respect to employees of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. 21 Op. 338. Moreover, apart from this fact, most of the employees in question could not properly be held to be clerks or employees of an executive department. See 26 Op. 209.

In my opinion the express grant of sick leave with pay to employees of the executive departments and the failure, with certain specified exceptions, to grant such leave to employees of the Government Printing Office, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, and the navy yards and arsenals, indicates clearly the legislative intent that the employees last named should not receive sick leave. See 21 Op. 338, supra; 26 Op. 209, supra; 29 Op. 481; 26 Comp. Dec. 253; 23 Comp. Dec. 192; 21 Comp. Dec. 611. I am advised that this has been the uniform construction of the statutes in question by all the bureaus and organizations involved, except as to the administrative office force of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, which force has been allowed the same annual and sick leave which has been granted to employees of the Treasury Department proper. If there were any doubt as to the construction of the statutes, the administrative construction thereof by the organizations involved would seem to be controlling. 36 Op. 313, 513.

No additional authority with respect to the allowance of sick leave is conferred upon the President by the Act of June 30, 1932, Public No. 212, except that by section 215 of that Act the President is directed, "within the limits now authorized by law," to administer the so-called sick leave of absence under such regulations as to obtain, so far as practicable, uniformity in the various executive departments and independent establishments.

Accordingly, it is my opinion that the President is without authority to issue an Executive order granting sick leave of absence generally to all employees in the Federal service. Respectfully,

To the PRESIDENT.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

DISPOSITION BY TREASURY DEPARTMENT OF FOUND COUPON BOND AND COUPON NOTE

The Fifty Dollar Temporary Coupon Bond of the Third 44's which was found by Miss Katie L. Winters in an apartment at Chicago, Illinois, and submitted to the Treasury Department for payment, and the One Hundred Dollar Coupon Note of the Victory 44's which was left in a sack or box by a guest in a hotel operated by Mrs. Elnora Stewart at South Bend, Washington, and presented by her for collection to the United States National Bank of Portland, Oregon, should be retained by the Treasury Department subject to claim by the true owner or the States of Illinois and Washington, respectively.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 10, 1932.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to your letter of February 2, 1932, requesting my opinion as to the proper disposition to be made of a Fifty Dollar ($50.00) Temporary Coupon Bond of the Third 414's, No. 1,013,172, which was presented in a mutilated condition by Miss Katie L. Winters, of 34 West 42nd Street, Indianapolis, Indiana, with a letter stating it was found in a handkerchief between the sections of a radiator in an apartment at 5719 Prairie Avenue, Chicago, Illinois; and a One Hundred Dollar ($100.00) Coupon Note of the Victory 434's, which was forwarded to the Treasury Department under date of September 12, 1929, by the United States National Bank of Portland, Oregon, for collection on behalf of Mrs. Elnora Stewart, who states she found it in a sack or box containing certain War Savings Certificates registered in the name of John A. Johnson at the post office at Raymond, Washington, and other personal effects left in the storeroom of a hotel conducted by her at South Bend, Washington, by Johnson or some one using that name.

It appears that the Solicitor of the Treasury Department has expressed an opinion that under the law of Illinois, Miss Winters can not acquire any right to the Fifty Dollar Temporary Coupon Bond and that the bond should be retained by the Treasury Department subject to claim by the State of Illinois or the true owner. The Solicitor expresses no opinion as to the right of Mrs. Stewart to the One Hundred Dollar Coupon Note but suggests that my opinion be requested in both cases in view of two opinions of my predecessors (32 Op. 80; 33 id. 59), which, he intimates, were

based upon the belief that there were no statutes in Colorado and Illinois regulating the disposition of lost property, whereas it now appears that both States had such laws at the time of those opinions.

In the first opinion referred to by your Solicitor (32 Op. 80), Acting Attorney General King held that where a Coupon Bond of the First Liberty Loan had been found in a post-office building at Denver, Colorado, by a post-office employee, and forwarded to the Treasury Department, it was the duty of the Treasury Department to hold the bond until it was claimed by the true owner. In support of this

conclusion he said:

"The maker of a negotiable instrument is not protected if he makes payment to the person presenting it with knowledge that he has no right to receive payment. (Chappelear v. Martin, 45 Ohio St. 126; Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pickering, 545, 552.) In the case of The Emblem (2 Ware 67, 8 Fed. Cases, No. 4434), the court said:

"The finder of a check or promissory note or other chose in action acquires no property in the note and has no right to demand the payment of it; and if the promisor pays it, after notice that it came into the possession of the holder by finding, he would not be protected against a demand by the owner.' (Citing McLaughlin v. Waite, 5 Wendell 404.)

"Conceding that the finder of the bond in question would have been entitled to retain possession of it as against everyone but the true owner, and receive payment of the bond and coupons at maturity, if the Government had had no notice that he was not the true owner, it does not follow that possession should be restored to him now. Under existing conditions, he is not entitled to the payment of either the interest or the principal of the bond, and I do not believe that the Treasury Department is justified in returning it to him, thereby giving him an opportunity to sell it to a bona fide purchaser who would be entitled to collect the interest and the principal."

This language recognizes that under the law of Colorado (section 6992 of Mills Annotated Statutes of Colorado makes the common law of England applicable in Colorado until repealed by legislative authority) the finder of lost property is entitled to ownership and possession of it against all others

except the true owner; but indicates that the finder of a check or promissory note or other chose in action acquires no property in the note and has no right to demand the payment of it (the Coupon Bond), and if the promisor (the Government) paid it after notice that it came into the possession of the holder by finding, it (the Government) would not be protected againts a demand by the owner.

The second opinion referred to by your Solicitor (33 Op. 59) involved certain certificates of indebtedness alleged to have been found by a Mrs. Jaggar, which had been presented for payment to the Federal Reserve National Bank of Chicago as fiscal agent of the United States. Attorney General Daugherty held this case was indistinguishable from the case involved in the opinion rendered by Acting Attorney General King (32 Op. 80), and, therefore, the Secretary of the Treasury should follow the latter opinion.

As your Solicitor points out, there are in Illinois and were at the time of the second opinion (33 Op. 59) laws regulating the disposition of lost property. (Sections 26-28, c. 50 Smith-Hurd, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1931.) Such laws require the finder, among other things, if the property be not reclaimed within a certain period, to deliver it to the Clerk of the County Court. The owner is then allowed a specified time within which to redeem it, and if he does not appear and claim the property within that time it becomes the property of the county.

In view of these Illinois statutes regulating the disposition of lost property, it is my judgment that the opinion of my predecessor in 33 Op. 59, should be modified so as to hold that where, as here, a coupon bond is found in Illinois and submitted to the Treasury Department for payment, it is the duty of that Department to hold the bond subject to claim by the true owner or the State of Illinois.

The same rule should be followed where, as here, a sack or box containing, among other things, a coupon note is left by a guest at a tavern in the State of Washington, since the laws of that State provide that if property left at a tavern is not reclaimed by the owner within a specified time, it shall be sold and the proceeds thereof applied to the school funds of the county in which the property is found. (Secs.