...natural relation : either as a compari" son of two ideas, or an association be" tween them." " We may define a cause to be an " object precedent and contiguous to another, " and ivhere all the objects resembling the "former are placed in like relations of pre" cedency and contiguity...

...nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of existence should be attended with such an object. If we define a cause to be,' an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united \vith it in the imagination, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea...

...a compari" son of two ideas, or an association be" tween them." " We may define a cause to be en " object precedent and contiguous to another, " and...the objects resembling the '' former are placed in like relations of pre• *' cedency and contiguity to those objects that " resemble the latter. In...

...midst of vague language about the business or affair, as he calls it, of causes and effects, he defines a cause to be "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and...

...parison of iwo ideas or as an association betwixt them. We may define a cause to bo l an ol'jeet pmv: :' and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relati:-* precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter.' If tbi* definition...

...either as a comparison of two ideas or as an association betwixt them. We may define a cause to be l an object precedent and contiguous to another, and...all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter.' If this definition...

...power and the exercise of it, is equally without foundation." (3.) " That the necessity of a cause to every beginning of existence is not founded on any arguments either demonstrative or intuitive." (4.) "We can never l Treatise of Human Nature, vol i p. 216. 2 Page 219. 3 Page 219. have reason to...

...nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of existence shou'd be attended with such an object. If we define a cause to be, An object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it in the imagination, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea...

...nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of existence shou'd be attended with such an object. If we define a cause to be, An object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it in the imagination, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea...

...as a natural relation ; either ua comparison of two Ideas or as an association betwixt them. We may define a cause to be ' an object precedent and contiguous...all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter.' If this definition...