tions). Therefore, we hold that the capital loss limitations of sections 1211 and 1212 apply in calculating a taxpayer's AMTI. See sec. 1.55-1(a), Income Tax Regs.; see also Allen v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 8 (holding that the wage-expense limitation of section 280C(a) applies to the calculation of AMTI where nothing in the sections relating to the wageexpense limitation or in the AMT provisions indicates otherwise). Accordingly, we find that petitioner cannot carry back his AMT capital loss realized in 2001 to reduce his AMTI in 2000. C. Net Operating Losses and Alternative Tax Net Operating Losses In an attempt to carry back his AMT capital loss, petitioner argues that the AMT capital loss entitles him to an ATNOL deduction under section 56. Generally, a taxpayer may carry back a net operating loss (NOL) to the 2 taxable years preceding the loss, then forward to each of the 20 taxable years following the loss.11 Sec. 172(b)(1)(A). Section 172(c) defines an NOL as "the excess of the deductions allowed by this chapter over the gross income," as modified under section 172(d). In the case of a noncorporate taxpayer, the amount deductible on account of capital losses shall not exceed the amount includable on account of capital gains. Sec. 172(d)(2)(A); sec. 1.172-3(a)(2), Income Tax Regs. The effect of section 172(d)(2)(A) is that net capital losses are excluded from the NOL computation. See Parekh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-151. For AMT purposes, section 56(a)(4) provides that an ATNOL deduction shall be allowed in lieu of an NOL deduction under section 172. An ATNOL deduction is defined as the NOL deduction allowable under section 172 and is computed by taking into consideration all the adjustments to taxable income under sections 56 and 58 and all the preference items under section 57 (but only to the extent that the preference items increased the NOL for the year for regular tax purposes).12 Sec. 56(d)(1). 11 In the case of NOLS incurred in 2001 or 2002, sec. 172(b)(1)(H) creates a 5-year carryback. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief from the 5-year carryback. However, because we conclude infra that petitioner is not entitled to an ATNOL, petitioner's argument is moot. 12 Sec. 56(d)(1)(A) also limits the amount of the allowable ATNOL deduction; this is not in Petitioner's net regular capital loss is excluded from computing his NOL deduction. See sec. 172(c), (d)(2)(A); sec. 1.172-3(a)(2), Income Tax Regs. For AMT purposes, petitioner's ATNOL is the same as his NOL, taking into consideration all the adjustments to his taxable income under sections 56, 57, and 58. See sec. 56(a)(4), (d)(1). No adjustments under those sections modify the exclusion of net capital losses from the NOL computation under section 172(d)(2)(A). Therefore, petitioner's net AMT capital loss is excluded for purposes of calculating his ATNOL deduction. As a result, petitioner's AMT capital loss realized in 2001 does not create an ATNOL that can be carried back to 2000 under sections 56 and 172(b). D. Petitioner's Other Arguments Petitioner raises various other arguments in an attempt to carry back his 2001 AMT capital loss to reduce his 2000 AMTI. Petitioner's additional arguments can be categorized into three groups: (1) Arguments premised on misinterpretations and misapplications of the Code sections outlined above; (2) arguments based on congressional intent; and (3) arguments based on equity and public policy. As outlined above, the applicable Code sections do not allow petitioner to carry back his AMT capital loss, and arguments misinterpreting and misapplying those sections will not be addressed individually. Petitioner asserts that "the intent of Congress in imposing an AMT tax on deferral preferences [including ISOS] was to accelerate the taxation of economic income without creating an additional tax liability." Petitioner argues that the only way to comply with congressional intent is to allow him to carry back his AMT capital loss. Throughout his opening brief and reply brief, petitioner focuses heavily on his interpretation of congressional intent to support various arguments. Petitioner relies on the Senate report to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, as authority for the asserted congressional intent. See S. Rept. 99-313 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 1. Petitioner does not offer a specific citation but instead cites the Senate report generally. The Senate report addresses the AMT provisions on pages 515540. Id. at 515-540, 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) at 515–540. The Senate report does not directly support petitioner's interpretation of congressional intent, and we find no language supporting an inference of such intent. See id. Therefore, we do not further consider petitioner's arguments based on his interpretation of congressional intent. Petitioner also advances several "policy and legal considerations". Essentially, petitioner is arguing that, under principles of equity, he should be allowed to carry back his AMT capital loss to reduce his AMTI. Petitioner feels that applying the capital loss limitations of sections 1211 and 1212 to the calculation of his AMTI results in harsh and unfair tax consequences. This Court has previously stated: The unfortunate consequences of the AMT in various circumstances have been litigated since shortly after the adoption of the AMT. In many different contexts, literal application of the AMT has led to a perceived hardship, but challenges based on equity have been uniformly rejected. *** ***"it is not a feasible judicial undertaking to achieve global equity in taxation * * *. And if it were a feasible judicial undertaking, it still would not be a proper one, equity in taxation being a political rather than a jural concept." "***the solution must be with Congress. [Speltz v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. at 176 (quoting Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001), affg. 114 T.C. 399 (2000)).] See also Alexander v. Commissioner, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995–51; Okin v. Commissioner, 808 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo. 1985-199; Warfield v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 179 (1985); Huntsberry v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 742, 747-753 (1984). Petitioner's equity and public policy arguments offer no relief from the tax consequences of the AMT Code sections, as outlined above. On the basis of the above, we hold that petitioner cannot carry back his AMT capital loss realized in 2001 to reduce his AMTI in 2000. In reaching our holdings, we have considered all arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned, we conclude that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit. To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of the parties, Decision will be entered under Rule 155. MICHAEL A. ZAPARA AND GINA A. ZAPARA, PETITIONERS v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT* Docket No. 9480-02L. Filed April 25, 2006. R moved for reconsideration of our Opinion reported in Zapara v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 223 (2005) (Zapara I). Finding that R failed to comply with Ps' written request to liquidate Ps' levied-upon stock accounts as required by sec. 6335(f), I.R.C., Zapara I held that Ps were entitled to a credit for the value of their seized stock as of the date by which it should have been sold under the statute. R contends that Ps' citation of sec. 6335(f), I.R.C., on reply brief constituted the untimely raising of a new issue and that the evidence does not show that Ps made sufficient written request pursuant to sec. 6335(f), I.R.C. R also contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to order the relief provided in Zapara I, which R characterizes as an award of damages pursuant to sec. 7433, I.R.C., which R contends is the exclusive remedy for a violation of sec. 6335(f), I.R.C. Held, Ps' citation of sec. 6335(f), I.R.C., on reply brief did not raise a new issue but appealed to the correct application of law. Held, further, Ps' request to sell the stock complied with the requirements of sec. 6335(f), I.R.C. Held, further, the relief provided in Zapara I was not an award of damages but specific relief to provide Ps the credit to which they would have been entitled if R had complied with Ps' request to sell the stock. Held, further, by failing to adhere to the statutory mandate of sec. 6335(f), I.R.C., R frustrated Ps' ability to use the stock to defray their tax liabilities and increased their risk with respect to the stock; accordingly, R is treated as assuming the risk of loss with respect to the stock. United States v. Barlows, Inc., 767 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985), and United States v. Pittman, 449 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1971), followed; Stead v. United States, 419 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2005), distinguished. Held, further, sec. 7433, I.R.C., does not preclude the specific relief provided in Zapara I. Michael A. Zapara and Gina A. Zapara, pro sese. *This Opinion supplements our prior Opinion in Zapara v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 223 (2005) (Zapara I). SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION THORNTON, Judge: Respondent has moved for reconsideration of our prior Opinion in Zapara v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 223 (2005) (Zapara I). In Zapara I, we held, among other things, that in this action pursuant to section 6330(d) to review respondent's jeopardy levy of certain stock accounts, petitioners are entitled to a credit for the value of their seized stock as of the date by which the stock should have been sold under section 6335(f); i.e., 60 days after petitioners requested respondent in writing to sell the stock and apply the proceeds to their outstanding tax liabilities.2 We remanded the case to the Appeals Office for the purpose of establishing the value of the stock accounts as of 60 days after August 23, 2001.3 Background We adopt the findings of fact in Zapara I. For convenience and clarity, we repeat here the facts necessary to understand the discussion that follows, and we supplement the facts as appropriate. On June 1, 2000, respondent made a jeopardy levy with respect to certain nominee stock accounts held on petitioners' behalf. Respondent's Collection Division took the position that these stock accounts had a value of approximately $1 million-more than enough to pay off fully petitioners' thenoutstanding 1993-98 tax liabilities of about $500,000. By letter dated June 21, 2000, petitioners requested a section 6330 Appeals hearing with respect to the jeopardy levy. During the pendency of their Appeals Office case, petitioners became concerned about a possible decline in the value of their levied-upon stock (the stock). Petitioners' then representative, Steven R. Mather (Mr. Mather), requested respondent's revenue officer to liquidate the stock accounts and apply the proceeds to petitioners' outstanding tax liabilities. The revenue officer directed Mr. Mather to get the Appeals officer's approval for the stock sale. Consequently, on August 23, 2001, Mr. Mather faxed to the Appeals officer a 2 Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure; all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue. 3 After receiving respondent's motion for reconsideration, we stayed our Order remanding this case to the Appeals Office. |