Another significant ingredient is reflected in the judicial attitude in respect of the interplay between Federal laws and State community property laws. This attitude is set forth in the following statement by the Supreme Court in Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989): Because domestic relations are preeminently matters of state law, we have consistently recognized that Congress, when it passes general legislation, rarely intends to displace state authority in this area. See, e.g., Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 628 (1987); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). Thus we have held that we will not find pre-emption absent evidence that it is "positively required by direct enactment". Hisquierdo, supra, at 581 (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)). The instant case, however, presents one of those rare instances where Congress has directly and specifically legislated in the area of domestic relations. [Emphasis supplied.] In light of the foregoing approach, the Supreme Court has decreed that Federal law supplants community property law only where the congressional intent to accomplish such a result is clear and unequivocal. Mansell v. Mansell, supra (military retirement pay and veterans' disability benefits); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (military retirement pay); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (railroad retirement benefits); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (deceased army officer's life insurance); In re Marriage of Hillerman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1980) (Social Security benefits). * * In addressing the question of whether there is "clear and unequivocal" congressional intent to supplant established reference to State law, the legislative history of the predecessor of section 6015(g) and the wording of the refund provision in section 6015(e)(3) following the 1998 technical correction are helpful. In 1998, the refund authority in section 6015(e)(3) was tied specifically "to the extent attributable to the application of subsection (b) or (f)”, or in the words of the House report, was exercisable when the Tax Court "determines the spouse qualifies for relief and an overpayment exists as a result of the innocent spouse qualifying for such relief." H. Rept. 105364 (Part 1), supra at 61, 1998-3 C.B. at 433. Given this history, we see an intent to create refund authority tied specifically to a determination of relief from joint and several tax liability. However, we see no explicit intent to supplement that relief by revisiting the nature of prior payments under State community property laws. Had Congress intended courts to interpret section 6015 in the manner that petitioner suggests, it would have provided an alternative to State law to define property rights. Otherwise, there will be a void in the collection scheme. We find no congressional intent to create such a void, nor to have it filled by the judiciary. II. Other Problems and Inconsistencies That Would Result A. Disregarding Community Property Laws in the Context of Section 6015(g) Would Discriminate Against Married People Who File Separately If spouses file separate returns and only one spouse is liable for unpaid taxes, the Internal Revenue Service can collect out of community assets. See McIntyre v. United States, 222 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 2000); see also sec. 6321. However, under petitioner's section 6015 argument, if married spouses filed jointly, the Government could not collect out of community assets without some tracing mechanism when one spouse receives section 6015 relief. Without Congress's explicit rationale or statement of such an intent, we find this result to be inconsistent. B. Disregarding Community Property Laws in the Context of Section 6015(g) Would Create Potential Abuse We must avoid an interpretation of section 6015(g) that would create a potential for abuse by allowing community property laws to be disregarded during the collection process. Because section 6015 relief is often granted many years after the taxable year at issue, the timespan offers an opportunity to change the source of the payments that are otherwise community property. In an effort to avoid paying tax liabilities, married taxpayers in community property States could structure future payments so that ownership is attributable to the spouse requesting relief under section 6015, while continuing a jointly financed lifestyle. C. Did Congress Leave Open the Question of How To Divide Property Between Spouses for Collection Purposes? As stated previously, another problem with petitioner's position is the lack of legislative direction regarding how to divide the assets between spouses in community property States for collection purposes. If we adopt petitioner's interpretation of section 6015 and refrain from looking to State law, a question arises as to where courts should derive such guidance. In addition, petitioner's approach would lead to a very complex factual analysis to trace the acquisition of the assets used to make over 20 years of tax payments. It is likely that a married couple will continue to acquire assets throughout their relationship. Tracing the acquisition of those assets to ascertain what assets should be attributed to which spouse is an administrative nightmare that would severely impede collection and lead to layers of judicial interpretation and analysis. We think Congress did not intend to create such a difficult factual issue in adopting section 6015. III. Concern With Denial of Effective Relief Petitioner suggests that our holding today will frustrate congressional intent by effectively denying section 6015 relief to persons in community property States. This suggestion appears to assume that the marital community continues after the year for which relief is sought, which is obviously not always the case. Nevertheless, we will examine the consequences of our holding where the spouse seeking relief remains married in a community property State after the taxable year in question, as in the present case. The Ordlocks remained married in California. They continued to accumulate assets and make payments on their joint tax liabilities for 1982, 1983, and 1984 for over two decades. If Mr. Ordlock had been personally liable to a nongovernment creditor, the community assets would have been a potential source of payment to that creditor. The question is whether Congress intended to place the Commissioner at a disadvantage concerning liabilities such as Mr. Ordlock's. As we have stated, we see no evidence of such congressional intent, nor do we see petitioner's position as advantageous to tax administration given the problems discussed previously. The nature of a marital community in California is to generally allow the individual debts of the spouses to be collected out of community assets. Cal. Fam. Code sec. 910 (West 2004); McIntyre v. United States, supra; Babb v. Schmidt, 496 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1974); Weinberg v. Weinberg, 432 P.2d 709, 713-714 (Cal. 1967); Grolemund v. Cafferata, 111 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1941).6 The policies behind the law can be debated, but a decision not to disrupt this rule for tax liabilities is sound. A marital community can involve many sources of income, many assets, and many expenses. How these expenses are paid, how the income is handled, and how assets are acquired are all choices of the spouses.7 Attempts to undo these choices and determine the sources of payments and asset acquisitions are inherently inconsistent with the concept of a continued marital community and obviously likely to disrupt that community. IV. Conclusion "Any determination" in section 6015(a) refers to determinations of whether an individual taxpayer is entitled to relief from joint and several tax liability under section 6015. This reading is consistent with the legislative history and statutory construction; a broader reading is not. The phrase "notwithstanding any other law or rule of law” in section 6015(g)(1) should not be read to ignore State law for purposes of defining property interests subject to a Federal tax lien under section 6321. We do not find that Congress intended for community property laws to be ignored under section 6015(g)(1) regarding payments made on tax liabilities. 6 The California Supreme Court in Grolemund v. Cafferata, 111 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1941), expressly distinguished California's community property law from the "community debt" and "separate debt" positions of Washington and Arizona. 7 Community property rights are equal regardless of which spouse acquires the property. The following describes the nature of the equal ownership: The equal ownership of the community property assets and acquisitions has never been dependent upon a calculus of labor or talent. Both man and woman equally are partners in the marriage; both equally share marital property, regardless of whether or not the actual asset was earned by one or the other. For example, if the wife is a highly paid attorney and the husband is a school teacher or works primarily at home, the differential in actual earnings or earning capacity is irrelevant to the ownership rights of each. The notion of marriage as a true legal partnership extends to all the property earned by either partner during marriage. In the common law states, if a husband earns $60,000 a year and the wife's role is that of a homemaker, whether she has the primary responsibility of raising the couple's children or not, she will be entitled only to a statutory fraction of her husband's estate on his death, one-half to one-third in most states. During the existence of the marriage she has no direct interest in his earnings, aside from her right to support. In the community property system, on the other hand, both spouses have a continuing half ownership of the marital earnings from the beginning of the marriage and from the time of acquisition of the property. Each party in the law today is an equal agent of the partnership, binding it if acting within the scope of his or her authority and if acting for the joint benefit of the family. The California community property system adds to joint ownership the right of equal management and control. Bassett, California Community Property Law, sec. 1:18 (2005 ed.). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a refund of an overpayment attributable to payments made from community property. To reflect the foregoing and concessions by respondent, Decision will be entered under Rule 155. Reviewed by the Court. GERBER, COHEN, HALPERN, CHIECHI, THORNTON, HAINES, WHERRY, KROUPA, and HOLMES, JJ., agree with this majority opinion. LARO, J., dissents. APPENDIX Payments applied to the Ordlocks' 1982 tax liability: |