husband's tax debt notwithstanding the wife's claim that she had a vested interest in half of those benefits under community property laws).

GERBER, COHEN, HALPERN, CHIECHI, HAINES, WHERRY, and KROUPA, JJ., agree with this concurring opinion.

VASQUEZ, J., dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion's holdings primarily because I believe they are contrary to the controlling statute and legislative intent. I. Whether Petitioner Is Entitled to a Refund

A. Statutory Interpretation and Construction

In interpreting section 6015, the Court should give effect to congressional intent. Ewing v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 494, 503 (2002); Fernandez v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 324, 329 (2000). Congress enacted section 6015 in the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3201, 112 Stat. 734, as a means of expanding relief to innocent spouses. See Hopkins v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 451, 458-459 (2003) ("section 6015 was enacted to provide spouses with broader access to relief from joint and several tax liabilities"); Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 159-160 (2003) ("We believe that Congress wanted to grant the broadest relief, while providing certainty in the settlement of tax refund claims"); H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 249-255 (1998), 1998–3 C.B. 747, 1003-1009; S. Rept. 105-174, at 65, 68 (1998), 1998–3 C.B. 537, 601, 604; H. Rept. 105-364 (Part 1), at 60-62 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 373, 432-434. "Moreover, we are mindful that section 6015 was designed 'to correct perceived deficiencies and inequities', and it is well settled law that 'curative legislation should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose."" Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 155-156; see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes); Piedmont & N. Ry. Co. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311 (1932) (remedial legislation should be given a liberal interpretation).

B. "Application of this section"

Section 6015(g)(1) provides that "credit or refund shall be allowed or made to the extent attributable to the application of this section." In Fernandez v. Commissioner, supra at 331, in determining whether the Court has jurisdiction to review a request for relief under section 6015(f), we stated: "It is our view that Congress intended the term 'under this section' to include all subsections of 6015 in their entirety." See Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 290 (2000); see also Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 22-23 (1999). Accordingly, the Court must apply all subsections of section 6015, including subsection (a), to determine the amount of a taxpayer's refund pursuant to subsection (g).

C. Section 6015(a)

1. The Flush Language

The flush language at the end of section 6015(a) provides: "Any determination under this section shall be made without regard to community property laws." The majority invents a narrow definition of "determination" despite strong indications to the contrary in the statute.

A section 6015 "determination" is not merely that a spouse is entitled to relief from joint and several liability. Contra majority op. p. 60. The amount that the Commissioner determines the electing spouse must pay towards the tax liability attributable to the nonelecting spouse1 and the amount of any refund are part of the determination. Sec. 6015(e)(1)(A) ("the individual may petition the Tax Court *** to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section"); Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 145 (holding we have jurisdiction under section 6015(e)(1) to review all relief afforded by section 6015); Rooks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-127 (analyzing the Commissioner's determination and deciding whether taxpayer was entitled to a refund pursuant to section 6015(g)).

Thus, the flush language of section 6015(a) requires that community property laws be disregarded in determining the

1I note that in the notice of determination respondent determined the amount of relief petitioner was entitled to pursuant to sec. 6015(b), not just that petitioner was entitled to relief, and that respondent clarified his determination by stipulating the amount of petitioner's liability for the years in issue after application of sec. 6015(b).

amount of a taxpayer's refund pursuant to section 6015(g). See Estate of Capehart v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 211 (2005) (accepting and applying the parties' stipulations which disregarded Nevada community property law for purposes of allocating the liability pursuant to section 6015(d)).

2. Section 6013 Compared With Section 6015

Contrary to the view of the majority, the evolution of former section 6013(e) into section 6015 shows that Congress intended to disregard community property laws with respect to all of section 6015 and not to limit disregarding community property laws to determining whether an electing spouse is entitled to relief pursuant to section 6015(b), (c), or (f). Former section 6013(e)(5)—before its repeal by RRA 1998, sec. 3201(e), 112 Stat. 740-provided: "For purposes of this subsection, the determination of the spouse to whom items of gross income (other than gross income from property) are attributable shall be made without regard to community property laws." In contrast, section 6015(a) is broader than former section 6013(e)(5), providing: "Any determination under this section shall be made without regard to community property laws."

The Court should not ignore (1) this statutory change eliminating the language modifying and limiting the term "determination" in former section 6013(e)(5); or (2) that this same limitation was not enacted as part of section 6015 even though the initial proposals to reform former section 6013 contained this same limitation. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 2676, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 321 (1997); see majority op. p. 53. Yet the majority does just that. The majority recognizes the statutory change, majority op. p. 53, and the controlling nature of the statutory language, majority op. p. 52, but then declines to give the statutory language effect, majority op. pp. 53-54.

D. Section 6015(g)(1)

1. Evolution of Section 6015(g)(1)

Section 6015(g)(1) first was enacted as section 6015(e)(3)(A). RRA 1998 sec. 3201, 112 Stat. 739. Section 6015(e)(3)(A) formerly provided: "Allowance of credit or

refund.-Except as provided in subparagraph (B), notwithstanding any other law or rule of law (other than section 6512(b), 7121, or 7122), credit or refund shall be allowed or made to the extent attributable to the application of subsection (b) or (f)."

On December 21, 2000, Congress moved the provisions of former 6015(e)(3)(A) to section 6015(g)(1). Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-554, sec. 313(a)(2), 114 Stat. 2763A-640. At that time, Congress added section 6511 to the list of exceptions in the parenthetical following the phrase "notwithstanding any other law or rule of law". Id.

2. “Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law”

Section 6015(g)(1) includes the phrase "notwithstanding any other law or rule of law". Accordingly, a credit or refund pursuant to section 6015(g) takes precedence over all other laws and rules of law that otherwise would restrict the refund or credit.

The only exceptions to this phrase are sections 6511, 6512(b), 7121, and 7122. Sec. 6015(g)(1). Congress did not include section 6321 in the list of exceptions. Sec. 6015(g)(1); see Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. at 160 ("the only limitations on the refund are those set forth in sections 6511, 6512(b), 7121, and 7122"). Contrary to the analysis of the majority, the Court should not add an exception to section 6015(g)(1) for section 6321. Section 6015(a) and (g) clearly requires State community property laws to be disregarded to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property and the amount of an electing spouse's refund.

The majority holds that "notwithstanding any other law or rule of law (other than section 6511, 6512(b), 7121, or 7122)" in section 6015(g) should not be read literally but never explains what the phrase means. See majority op. pp. 56-57. It must mean something-a fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give effect to all of the language of the statute. See Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233 (1928); Stanford v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 298, 308 (9th Cir. 1961), affg. 34 T.C. 1150 (1960).

a. Caselaw

Domestic relations are preeminently matters of State law, and the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that Congress rarely intends to displace State authority in this area. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989) (addressing the application of California community property law to military retirement pay). Accordingly, the Supreme Court stated: "we have held that we will not find preemption absent evidence that it is positively required by direct enactment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The plain and precise language of section 6015 evidences its preemption of State community property laws. Sec. 6015(a), (g); see Mansell v. Mansell, supra at 587, 590–591, 592. Section 6015(a) and (g) contains clear and unequivocal language expressing congressional intent to preempt State law. Mansell v. Mansell, supra at 587; Dunkin v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 180, 189 (2005).

Although not discussed in detail by the majority, majority op. pp. 51 n.5, 58, respondent relies on United States v. Stolle, 86 AFTR 2d 5180, 2000-1 USTC par. 50,329 (C.D. Cal. 2000), and McIntyre v. United States, 222 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that a Federal tax lien attaches to community property and that section 6321 takes precedence over section 6015. I disagree. I believe section 6015 is clear and the directives in section 6015(a) and (g)(1) take precedence over section 6321.

Stolle was a District Court order that dealt with the relationship between Federal tax liens and community property held in a revocable trust. United States v. Stolle, supra. The District Court concluded that a tax lien attached to community property for the tax debts of an individual and that community property held on behalf of the individual and his wife by a revocable trust could be used to satisfy the tax debts of the individual. Id.

Mrs. Stolle's entitlement to section 6015 relief was not at issue in the case. Id. The District Court, however, stated that, even assuming Mrs. Stolle was entitled to relief pursuant to section 6015, nothing in section 6015 prevents the Government from collecting against the community property. Id. I am not persuaded by the reasoning of Stolle because (1) the issue of Mrs. Stolle's entitlement to section 6015 relief