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Syllabus Where the language of the statute is ambiguous a statement of a Committee reporting the bill may properly be considered in determining its meaning, but in this case the statute is not ambiguous. It is direct, clear, and positive. The word "qualified” means "competent, fit, and capable.” The statement in the report upon which the opinion relies does not seem to have any relation to the bill. The effect ascribed to the report by the majority appears to me to contradict the bill instead of explaining it. A statement contained in a report cannot be used to nullify the language of the Act reported and make it of no effect.

The majority opinion holds that if the contractor got labor of such qualifications as would be expected from the relief rolls it had no right to recover, although the labor was incompetent and incapable; and that as the testimony showed that the plaintiff received just what would be expected from the relief rolls there could be no recovery on this item of plaintiffs' claim. If this construction is given the statute it will under no circumstances afford the contractors any relief. It becomes meaningless and useless, for the contractors will always receive the kind of labor that would be expected from relief rolls.

I think the statute has been misconstrued in the majority opinion and that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover on this item for damages.

W. G. DUNCAN, RECEIVER OF LEESVILLE COTTON SEED OIL MILL COMPANY V. THE UNITED STATES

[Congressional No. 17524. Decided October 7, 1940]

On the Proofs

Cotton linters; right of receiver to bring suit.-Where order of the

court appointing a receiver of the "Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company” stated that said corporation and the “Leesville Oil Mill” are one and the same corporation, or company, it is held that the said receiver is entitled to maintain the instant action originally brought in the name of the "Leesville Oil Mill," as listed in the Senate Resolution of Reference, and that plaintiff is entitled to recover, following the decision in Hazelhurst Oil Mill Co. v. United States, 70 C. Cls. 334.

92 C. Cis.

Reporter's Statement of the Case

The Reporter's statement of the case:

Benet, Shand & McGowan for the plaintiff. Mr. George R. Shields was on the briefs.

Mr. W. W. Scott, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea, for the defendant. Mr. F. J. Keating was on the briefs.

The court made special findings of fact as follows, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties :

1. By agreement of the parties all the facts upon which the case of Hazelhurst Oil Mill Co. v. United States, 70 C. Cls. 334, was decided are made part of the record herein so far as they are applicable, and it is further stipulated that

Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company was organized in 1902 as a corporation under the laws of the State of South Carolina. From that date until 1924, it was engaged in the manufacture of products derivative from cottonseed. During the year 1924 its entire business, except the claim involved herein, was sold to Charles D. Barr.

On February 17, 1940, the Court of Common Pleas, Lexington County, State of South Carolina, appointed W. G. Duncan receiver of Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company, and the order of that court appointing the receiver stated that Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company is the one and same corporation or company as Leesville Oil Mill. Neither the claim in suit nor any interest therein has ever been transferred or assigned.

The contracts in suit were entered into in the name of Leesville Oil Mill and the claim of Leesville Oil Mill was referred to the Court of Claims by Senate Resolution No. 448. On December 7, 1923, this action was instituted by Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company by the filing of a petition under that name.

2. On or about September 16, 1918, effective, however, as of August 1, 1918, Leesville Oil Mill entered into a contract with the DuPont American Industries, Inc., authorized and exclusive contracting agent for the United States for the sale of munition linters, known as “Seller's Contract of Sale No. 3399," by the terms of which it agreed to sell to the

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Reporter's Statement of the Case United States 1,000 bales (approximately 500,000 pounds) of linters, all as provided by said contract, a copy of which is attached to the petition herein as Exhibit No. 7 and made a part hereof by reference.

3. During the period January 1 to July 31, 1919, Leesville Oil Mill crushed a total of 3,235.113 tons of seed, which at $6.77 a ton of seed crushed would amount to $21,901.72.

Leesville Oil Mill received on account of the linters produced from such seed the following amounts: For linters sold to the United States.--

$1, 992. 17 For linters sold to others.

5, 117. 31

Total receipts----

7, 109, 48 By reducing its cut of linters after January 1, 1919, Leesville Oil Mill realized an additional hull production to the extent of 113.229 tons, which at $13.50 a ton amounts to $1,528.59.

The following is a correct statement of the account between the parties upon the basis of the foregoing facts and the application of a stipulation in Congressional No. 17,341 :

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4. A motion was filed by the plaintiff to substitute the name of W. G. Duncan, Receiver, as party plaintiff herein, which motion was allowed May 22, 1940, and the substitution made accordingly.

5. From all the evidence the court finds that there was no such corporation as the Leesville Oil Mill, and that the

92 C. Cls. Opinion of the Court contract which was entered into with the defendant was made for the use and benefit of the Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company, a corporation, which in transacting business used the name of Leesville Oil Mill, and that the Senate Resolution under which this suit was commenced, in listing the claim of Leesville Oil Mill, intended to refer to the claim arising under the contract referred to in the foregoing findings under which the defendant became indebted to the Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company in the sum of $13,263.65.

The court decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. GREEN, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

This case is similar to the case of Lamar, Trustee, v. United States, this day decided by the court, in that the matter in controversy is whether the plaintiff has any right to bring the action. But the facts in the instant case as stipulated by the parties show, we think, that plaintiff has a right to maintain the action and to recover herein. Like the Lamar case, supra, this suit is begun under the provisions of a resolution passed by the Senate March 3, 1923, referring a large number of claims to this court. These claims are commonly known as the cotton linter cases. Among the claims listed in the resolution referred to was that of the Leesville Oil Mill. The resolution does not contain the name of the Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company but this action was instituted December 7, 1923, by the filing of a petition under that name as plaintiff.

A contract was entered into with the defendant under the name of Leesville Oil Mill to manufacture and sell linters to the defendant, and under this contract the defendant became indebted to the Leesville Oil Mill in the sum of $13,263.65.

February 17, 1940, W. G. Duncan was duly appointed receiver of the Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company and the order of the court appointing the receiver stated that Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company is one and the same corporation, or company, as the Leesville Oil Mill. A motion was filed by the plaintiff in the Court of Claims to substitute the said W. G. Duncan as plaintiff herein and this

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Syllabus motion was allowed. The defense is that this receiver, who derives his rights from the Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company is not entitled to maintain action for the reason that the contract was not made in the name of the last named company and that it is not mentioned in the Senate Resolution.

We think this defense cannot be sustained. The Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company and the Leesville Oil Mill are shown by the order appointing the receiver to have been one and the same company and the proper corporate name was Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company. From the evidence we have found that there was no such corporation as the Leesville Oil Mill, and that in listing the claim of the Leesville Oil Mill the Senate Resolution intended to refer to the claim actually held by the Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company, which has passed to W. G. Duncan, Receiver. Leesville Oil Mill was only a name under which the corporation Leesville Cotton Seed Oil Mill Company transacted business.

It follows from what we have said above that the plaintiff is entitled to recover $13,263.65 and judgment will be rendered accordingly.

It is so ordered.

LITTLETON, Judge; and WHALEY, Chief Justice, concur. WHITAKER, Judge, took no part in the decision of this

case.

CARRIE HOWARD STEEDMAN AND EUGENIA

HOWARD EDMUNDS v. THE UNITED STATES

(No. E-563. Decided November 12, 1940]

On Motion to Read judicate

Estate tax; inclusion of real estate situated in Missouri; readjudica

tion.-Upon readjudication, it is held that under the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Orooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55, the real estate, situated in the State of Missouri, belonging to the estate of Kate M. Howard, was improperly included in her gross estate subject to the Federal estate tax. (See 63 C. Cls. 226.)

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