See Steamboat I, II, III, IV, V.
DAWES COMMISSION.
See Indian Claims XIII, XIV, XVIII.
DEBTS WORTHLESS AND CHARGED OFF.
See Taxes XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII.
"DECLARED VALUE”.
See Taxes XLI, XLIII, XLIV, XLVI, XLIX, LI, LII.
DELAY.
See Contracts XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIX, XXX.
DELAY DUE TO WEATHER.
See Contracts XXV.
DELAY IN DECISION.
See Contracts XXXV.
DEPRECIATION.
See Taxes VIII, IX.
DIFFERENT CONDITIONS.
See Taxes XV, XVII.
EMERGENCY.
See Contracts IX, X.
"ENGAGING IN BUSINESS”.
See Taxes LVI, LVII, LVIII, LIX.
ESTOPPEL.
See Taxes XXVIII.
EXTRA PAY FOR FLIGHTS.
See Pay And Allowances IX.
EXTRA COSTS.
See Contracts XXIV, XXIX, XXX.
EXTRA EXPENSE.
See Contracts IV.
EXTRA WORK.
See Contracts XXIV.
FAILURE TO PROTEST.
See Contracts XXI.
FAULTY PLANS.
See Contracts XXIX.
See Indian Claims I, II, III, IV, V, VI, XIII, XIV.
GOVERNMENT QUARTERS.
See Pay And Allowances IV, V, VII.
GOVERNMENT SALARIES.
See Pay And Allowances XII.
GRANTOR AS TRUSTEE.
See Taxes IV.
IMPLIED CONTRACT.
See Contracts XXXVI.
IMPLIED OBLIGATION.
See Contracts XX.
INADEQUACY OF PRICE.
See Indian Claims VI.
INCREASED EXPENSE.
See Contracts XXII.
INDIAN CLAIMS.
I. Where by an Act of the General Council of the Seminole
Nation a townsite commission was created, and said
commission under the authority of said act acquired
a tract of land which was divided into lots and offered
for sale; and where a number of lots were sold to
Brown, Principal Chief of said Nation; and where
said sale to Brown was not in accordance with the
provisions of said act in that in such sale Brown was
relieved of the requirement to erect a building or
buildings on said lots within six months thereafter,
but where said sale to Brown was later ratified and
confirmed by resolution of the Seminole General
Council, and said resolution was afterwards ratified
and confirmed by the Congress of the United States,
it is held that the proof submitted is insufficient to
show that said sale was a fraud on the plaintiff's
rights nor that the ratification of said sale by the Con-
gress in these circumstances amounts to a taking of plain-
tiff's land by the United States. Seminole Nation, 210.
II. The United States did not appropriate the land for its
own benefit nor did it appropriate it for the benefit
of another, unless the sale of the lots to Brown was
fraudulent and the United States was a party to the
fraud.
III. Where Congress in the passage of the Act conferring on
the Court of Claims jurisdiction in the instant case
failed to indicate by clear and explicit language its
intention that the court should inquire if one of the
former Acts of Congress was fraudulent, it is held
that no such intention can be inferred. Id.
IV. Jurisdiction to render judgment "in any and all legal
and equitable claims" cannot be construed to embrace
a claim founded upon an allegation that a former
act of Congress was fraudulent. Klamath Indians v.
United States (No. E-346) 81 C. Cls. 79; 296 U. S.
244. Id.
V. Where plaintiff to show fraud relies solely on the alleged
inadequacy of the price paid and the fact that the
purchaser was the Principal Chief of the Seminole
Nation, and that Congress when it passed the act
ratifying the sale was cognizant of these facts, it is
held that this falls short of sufficient proof of fraud
and far short of sufficient proof that the United States
was party to a fraud.
INDIAN CLAIMS-Continued.
VI. Mere inadequacy of price is insufficient to establish
fraud. Id.
VII. Congress possesses authority to determine the extent
and manner of distribution of tribal property among
the members of the Indian tribes and to legislate in
reference to tribal property in any manner and to
any extent it deems proper for the benefit of the
tribe. Cherokee Nation, 262.
VIII. The act of 1902 providing for the distribution of tribal
property among the members of the Cherokee Nation,
did not confer upon individual Indians born prior to
September 1, 1902, such a vested right as would pre-
clude Congress thereafter from including in the benefits
of distributions which had not been made members of
the tribe born subsequent to that date. Id.
IX. Where legislation authorizing an action to be brought in
the Court of Claims by an Indian tribe by its express
terms permits only a suit by the tribe for the recovery
of a judgment, if it is entitled to judgment, for the
benefit of the whole tribe and not for certain individual
members of the tribe, it is held that the Court is with-
out jurisdiction to determine a dispute which concerns
only the relative shares of certain individuals as
members of the tribe.
X. Under the terms of the jurisdictional act in the instant
case any judgment, if rendered, would have to be
rendered in favor of the tribe, and clearly those mem-
bers born after September 1, 1902, and those members,
if any, to whom allotments may have been made
before April 26, 1906, could not under any theory
participate in a recovery for property which was
distributed to them. Id.
XI. Where in making allotments to members of the Creek
Nation, in accordance with surveys made by the
defendant, the allotments of lands bordering on the
Arkansas, Cimarron and Canadian Rivers were made
according to surveys which followed the meander lines
of the said rivers, it is held that in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary it was not the intention of the
parties to reserve to the Creek Nation title to the
river beds of the streams, or to any of its lands, but
that it was intended to convey title to the adjoining
landowners to the thread of the stream, as decided in
United States v. Hayes, 20 Fed. (2) 873. Creek Nation,
269.
INDIAN CLAIMS-Continued.
XII. Proof that riparian rights were not discussed when the
allotments were made is the strongest indication that
there was no intention on the part of the grantor to
reserve such rights. Id.
XIII. Where, under the Curtis Act, the "Dawes Commission"
undertook to determine who were citizens of the plain-
tiff tribe and to make up rolls thereof, and where under
said Curtis Act, the defendant undertook to abolish the
tribal government of said plaintiff tribe and to assume
full administrative control of all tribal property and
affairs, and where acting under two agreements with
said plaintiff tribe the defendant undertook to divide,
and did divide, said tribal property among those law-
fully entitled to participate in its distribution; it is
held that as long as said Dawes Commission without
fraud or intentional misconduct proceeded in accord-
ance with said agreements between the parties, said
commission was acting under the jurisdiction conferred
by the agreements and its decrees were final. Creek
Nation, 346.
XIV. Where plaintiff's petition does not allege want of juris-
diction or fraud or any other ground of equitable inter-
ference but merely alleges errors and irregularities, it is
held that such allegations of errors and irregularities
are not sufficient to set aside a judgment when attacked
collaterally and are therefore insufficient to form a
basis for holding the decrees of the Dawes Commission
to be void. Id.
XV. Where the plaintiff does not set out in its petition the
agreements which it claims were violated nor does it
state what were the acts which constituted violations,
it is held that such allegations are legal conclusions.
Id.
XVI. Where the agreements are found in the statutes, the court
takes judicial notice of what said agreements contain,
and it is held that an examination of said agreements
shows that the defendant merely agreed to make up
rolls of the citizens of the plaintiff nation.
XVII. An allegation to the contrary of a matter of which the
court takes judicial notice must be disregarded. Id.
XVIII. The jurisdiction of the Dawes Commission did not
depend upon the plaintiff being given a hearing; juris-
diction was granted by the agreements which gave the
commission the right to hear and determine who would
be entitled to be enrolled as members of the tribe. Id.
INDIVIDUAL LOSSES.
See Taxes XIII.
INFORMER'S FEE.
Where the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval
of the Secretary of the Treasury, in accordance with the provi-
sions of Section 3463 of the Revised Statutes, issued an offer of
reward for information given by persons other than officers of
internal revenue "that shall lead to the detection and punish-
ment of persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws,"
and where said offer was to pay "such reward as the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue may deem suitable"; it is held that
there was no offer by the Commissioner to pay any definite sum
and, therefore, there has arisen no contract between the Com-
missioner and the plaintiff. Gordon, 449.
INFRINGEMENT.
See Patents I, II, III.
INTENT OF PARTIES.
See Contracts XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII.
INTEREST ON OVERPAYMENT.
See Taxes LIII.
INTERFERENCE.
See Contracts II, III.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
See Indian Claims XVI, XVII.
JURISDICTION.
See Title To Office I.
See Indian Claims IX, X, XIII, XIV, XVIII.
JURISDICTIONAL ACT.
KNOWLEDGE OF CONDITIONS.
See Contracts XXIII.
LABOR FROM RELIEF ROLLS.
See Contracts XVI.
LABOR STATUTE.
See Contracts VII, VIII.
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS.
See Indian Claims XV.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
See Contracts XXXVIII.
MODIFICATION.
See Contracts XII, XIV.
MUTUAL DELAYS.
See Contracts XXXVII.
MUTUAL MISAPPREHENSION.
See Taxes XXXV.
MUTUALITY.
See Contracts XI.
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