Page images

92 C. Cls.


See Contracts V, VI.


See Taxes LX, LXI.


See Contracts XIX, XX, XXI.


I. It is held that the plaintiffs, customs inspectors at the
port of Detroit from September 1, 1931, to August 31,
1937, are entitled to extra compensation as fixed by
Section 5 of the Act of 1911, as amended by the Act
of 1920, for services performed between the hours of
five o'clock postmeridian and eight o'clock antemerid-
ian, or on Sundays or holidays, and the Government.
is liable for such extra compensation. Myers et al., 447.
II. Where the statute plainly states that the services ren-
dered after five o'clock in the afternoon and before
eight o'clock in the morning or on Sundays and holi-
days shall be "overtime," no other meaning can be
given to the term "overtime." Id.

III. Where the statute provides that extra compensation due
to customs employees for overtime work at night or
on Sundays or holidays shall be paid to the collector
of customs by the owner, master, or consignee of such
vessel to which a special license or permit is granted
for lading or unlading at night or on Sundays or holi-
days; it is held that such provision does not relieve
the Government from liability for extra pay for serv-
ices during the periods fixed under the statute. Id.
IV. Where the statute gives to the collector of customs
authority to adjust the working day of customs em-
ployees to correspond with the customary daylight
working periods at certain ports, it is held that such
provision granting such authority does not affect or
alter the length of the working day for customs em-
ployees or the overtime pay fixed by the statute. Id.


See Taxes XX.


See Taxes LIV.


See Contracts VII, VIII.


See Contracts XXVII, XXVIII.

See Taxes XIII.


92 C. Cls.

I. Where plaintiff's petition alleges infringement of Patent
No. 1,559,311 granted to plaintiff September 6, 1926,
for a marine vessel, upon an application originally filed
June 14, 1923, because of the application to certain
warships of the United States of a structure extraneous
to the original hulls of the ships and placed thereon
primarily for protection against torpedoes, it is held
that the evidence submitted establishes that the
government structures complained of do not corres-
pond to the claims of the patent in suit and therefore
there is no infringement. Mar-De-Passy Corporation,

II. The defendant made no use of such a combination of
features as is described in the specifications of plain-
tiff's patent. Id.

III. There is nothing new in the plaintiff's patent unless
it be in the features that were not used by the defend-
ant; the evidence definitely shows that the defendant
made no use of the combination claimed by plaintiff
and that all the defendant did use in modernizing its
ships was old in the art of shipbuilding. Id.


I. Upon the proofs adduced it is held that plaintiff, a first
lieutenant in the Coast Artillery Corps, U. S. A., is not
entitled to recover rental allowance for an officer of
his rank, with or without dependants, from July 1,
1935, to June 12, 1936, and that plaintiff is entitled to
recover rental and subsistence allowances, on account
of dependent mother, for the periods from August 1,
1936, to March 1, 1937; June 1 to August 1, 1937,
and November 1, 1938, to May 1, 1939. Thorlin, 61.,
II. Where the plaintiff, an unmarried commissioned officer

in the United States Navy, lieutenant, junior grade,
maintained a household in which his mother acted as
housekeeper, and was not otherwise employed, it is
held that the evidence shows that the cost to plaintiff
of her necessary support exceeded the amount of her
independent income from property, and the plaintiff
was therefore her chief support, and was entitled to
rental and subsistence allowances on account of a
dependent mother for the period in question. Simons,

III. Where the mother of an officer has a small amount of
property the income of which is not sufficient to support
her, the law does not require that she should make
herself penniless by using up this fund before her son
can make a claim on account of her dependency. Id.

92 C. Cls.


IV. Where plaintiff, a lieutenant, junior grade, United States
Navy, on duty with aircraft squadrons at Coco Solo,
Canal Zone, and having a dependent wife and child,
was not assigned regular quarters at his base, no
quarters there being available, and where plaintiff
with the consent of the commanding officer at France
Field, an Army flying field, obtained and occupied
quarters at said France Field, which quarters had
been abandoned by the Army as living quarters for
its personnel; it is held that since plaintiff and his
dependents, during the period of his claim, resided
in Government quarters, there can be no recovery
for rental allowance. Byrne v. United States, 87
C. Cls. 241, cited. Hollister, 137.

V. Where plaintiff occupied Government quarters not in
the best of condition and made necessary repairs at
his own expense, it is held that he is entitled to recover
reasonable expenses which in his judgment it was
essential to expend on the quarters furnished. Id.

VI. Commutation of quarters is reimbursement to an officer
for expenses paid by him for private quarters when the
Government fails to furnish public quarters and is no
part of the pay of an officer. Odell v. United States,
38 C. Cls. 194, cited. Id.

VII. Quarters furnished by the Government need not be

elaborate. Id.

VIII. Where plaintiff, a retired officer of the United States
Navy, receiving retired pay of his rank, $2,160 per
year, was employed as chief laundryman at the United
States Naval Academy, drawing a salary of $2,000 per
year, which salary was paid from the Naval Academy
Laundry Fund, said Fund being made up from
amounts received from officers, instructors, and mid-
shipmen, and not from appropriated moneys, and where
the said Naval Academy Laundry had been built,
equipped, and maintained by the United States Gov-
ernment, and was a facility owned and operated by
the Government, it is held that the plaintiff, although
not paid from appropriated funds, was paid from a
fund belonging to the United States Government,
derived from money collected for services rendered by
the said facility of the Government, and plaintiff ac-
cordingly was a "person holding a civilian office or
* * under the United States Govern-
ment" within the meaning of the Economy Act of
June 30, 1932. Sullivan, 154.


92 C. CIs.

IX. Following the decision in Dickerson v. United States, 310
U. S. 554, it is held that the Act of July 2, 1926, sec-
tions 2 and 6, providing extra pay for officers and
enlisted men of the Army and Navy, making aerial
flights, was, so far as it applies to Navy officers above
the rank of captain, suspended by the Act of April 26,
1938. Blakely, 204.

X. Where plaintiff, a lieutenant colonel in the United States
Army on active duty, from July 1, 1937, to June 30,
1938, during the first four months of said fiscal year,
did not occupy Government quarters and therefore
was entitled to pay and allowances, including com-
mutation of quarters, for an officer of his rank, with
dependents, and where the plaintiff during the last
eight months of said fiscal year occupied Government
quarters and therefore was not entitled to commu-
tation of quarters; and where during the first-named
period of four months the Finance Officer of the Army
withheld from the plaintiff all pay in excess of $600 a
month, interpreting Section 7 of the Act of June 10,
1922, placing a limitation of $7,200 a year on the pay
and allowances of any officer below the grade of
brigadier general, to mean a daily limitation of $20 or a
monthly limitation of $600, it is held that under the
provisions of the said Section 7 an officer of stated rank
is given the right to receive the full amount of base pay,
pay for length of service and allowances for subsistence
and rental of quarters so long as the total of all these
items, for the year, does not exceed the maximum
fixed in the statute. Koenig, 310.

XI. A daily or monthly computation of pay and allowances is

not mentioned in the statute. Id.

XII. All salaries of the Government are based on the fiscal year
and Congress appropriates for salaries on the fiscal-
year basis. Id.

XIII. Where plaintiff, an enlisted man in the United States
Marine Corps, having completed more than 20 years of
active service and having attained the rank of pay-
master sergeant, made application on December 21,
1928, to be transferred as of December 31, 1928, to
Class II (d) Fleet Marine Corps Reserve with the
rank of paymaster sergeant, and where on January 7,
1929, plaintiff not having been so transferred was
demoted to the grade of staff sergeant, and where on
January 22, 1929, plaintiff was transferred with rank
of staff sergeant, and on September 30, 1937, was re-

92 C. Cls.


tired with such rank of staff sergeant, it is held that
plaintiff is not entitled to recover the difference be-
tween the pay authorized for paymaster sergeant and
staff sergeant so transferred and retired. Blackett v.
United States, 81 C. Cls. 884, and Standerson v. United
States, 83 C. Cls. 633, distinguished. Wright, 459.


See Contracts XXVI.


See Taxes XXVIII.


See Taxes XIX.



See Taxes IX, X, XI, XXIX.


See Taxes XXII.


See Cotton Linters I.


See Indian Claims XI, XII.


See Steamboat IV.


See Taxes XIV, XVIII.


I. It is held that under the special jurisdictional act, on
the evidence adduced, plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages for injury to the steamboat Senator Cordill
and its cargo as a result of the boat's striking a sub-
merged wicket of the United States Dam No. 14 on
the Ohio River, February 5, 1934. Hubbard, 381.
II. A ship owner may sue in his own name for the benefit
of the owners of the cargo to recover damages thereto
as a result of the negligence of another. The Beacons-

field, 158 U. S. 303, 305, cited. Id.


III. Where it is necessary for a boat to be raised and examined
before the extent of the injuries may be determined,
the cost of raising her may be recovered, in a suit for
damages on account of the negligence of another.
Reno, 134 Fed. 555, and other cases cited. Id.
IV. Where plaintiff is entitled to the cost of salvaging the
cargo and the boat, in a suit for damages on account
of the negligence of another, the sale price of the boat
must be deducted from the gross amount of salvage
cost. The Shady Side, 21 Fed. Cas., 1137, cited. Id.

« PreviousContinue »