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of the Court of Claims. Determination of this question is decisive of the case; and other questions were not considered.
The Supreme Court held that the contracts were not contracts of the United States.
Reviewing the contracts in the Algoma case as typical, the Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings had under the Act of 1910 and the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior thereunder, in pursuance of which the timber upon the designated lands within the Klamath Reservation was offered for sale; bids submitted by the Algoma Company were accepted, and contract of sale executed by the company and by the Superintendent of the Klamath Indian School, pursuant to departmental regulations, and approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior. Purchase payments by the Algoma Company, including the alleged overpayments, were made to the Superintendent for the benefit of the Indians, and moneys received from the unallotted lands, less expenses, were deposited in the United States Treasury in an account designated "Indian Moneys, Proceeds of Labor." The Supreme Court said:
The Klamath Reservation was set apart as tribal lands under the Treaty with the Klamath Tribe of February 17, 1870, 16 Stat. 383, from lands immemorially possessed by them. Under the provisions of the treaty and established principles applicable to land reservations created for the benefit of the Indian tribes, the Indians are beneficial owners of the land and the timber standing upon it and of the proceeds of their sale, subject to the plenary power of control by the United States, to be exercised for the benefit and protection of the Indians. The United States acquired no beneficial ownership in the tribal lands or their proceeds, and however we may define the nature of the legal interest acquired by the government as the implement of its control, substantial ownership remained with the tribe as it existed before the treaty.
The action of Congress in authorizing the sale of the timber, and the contracts prescribed under its authority by departmental regulations and approved by the Secretary, are to be viewed as the means chosen for the exercise of the power of the government to protect the rights and beneficial ownership of the Indians. The means are adapted to that end. Neither the United
States nor any officer purporting to act on its behalf is named a party to the contract. By its terms the contract is declared to be entered into "between the Superintendent of the Klamath Indian School, for and on behalf of the Klamath Indians, party of the first part" and the Lumber Company, “party of the second part.” It is thus on its face the contract of the Klamath Indians executed by the Superintendent, acting as their agent. The form of the contract and the procedure prescribed for its execution and approval conform to the long-established relationship between the government and the Indians, under which the government has plenary power to take appropriate measures to safeguard the disposal of property of which the Indians are the substantial owners. Exercise of that power does not necessarily involve the assumption of contractual obligations by the government. Their assumption is not to be presumed in the absence of any action taken by the government or on its behalf indicating such a purpose. See In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222, 227; Turner v. United States, 248 U. S. 354, 359. In this, as in any other case of a written contract, those who are parties to and bound by it are to be ascertained by an inspection of the document, and its provisions are controlling in the absence of some positive rule of law or provision of statute requiring them to be disregarded. * * *
As the Court of Claims found that the contracts for the sale of timber on allotted lands were entered into by individual allottees as prescribed by Section 8 of the Act of 1910, they stand on no different footing, as obligations of the United States, from the tribal contract or similar contracts entered into under the Act of 1889.
Since none of the contracts in suit were contracts or obligations of the United States, it is plain that receipt, by the Treasury of the United States, of payments made under them to the Superintendent for “the use and benefit” of the Indians, even though made under protest, gave rise to no contract for repayment implied in fact on the part of the United States, and that the cause of action, if any, is not within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Roberts took no part in the consideration of these cases.
I. An account stated not only contemplates an admission
by the debtor that a liability does exist but also that the amount owing is as stated in the account, together with a promise, either expressed or implied, on the part of the party owing the money, for the payment of the amount stated. Aluminum Company of Amer.
ica, 96. II. Where plaintiff joined in making a "joint audit” of items
and amounts claimed by defendant to be due, this does not set up an account stated in the absence of an admission by plaintiff that the results of the audit were
to constitute an admitted liability on its part. Id. See also Taxes XIV, XLVII, XLVIII. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION.
See Government Shipments II. AMBIGUITY.
See Contracts IX. ANNUAL LEAVE.
I. Where Government employee, on annual leave, was in
structed by his superior, to discontinue his automobile trip and to attend a hearing, in his official capacity, it is held that he was entitled to reimbursement for per diem subsistence and travelling expenses, thereby in
curred, without deductions. Thomas, 573.
II. Annual leave is a right granted by statute. Id. ARMY OFFICER, PROPERTY OF.
The Act of March 4, 1921, providing for recovery by Army officer
for personal property lost, damaged, or destroyed in the military service, restricts recovery to three contingencies—where officer is saving human life; saying property, belonging to the Government, which is in jeopardy at the same time his own property is lost, damaged, or destroyed; and where he is engaged in authorized military duties in connection with the catastrophe or event which caused his property to be lost, damaged, or
destroyed. Morrison, 606. ASCERTAINMENT OF LOSS.
See Taxes VI.
See National Industrial Recovery Act IV.
AUTHORITY OF COMMISSIONER.
See Taxes XV.
See Contracts X,
See Patent Cases Procedure II, III, IV.
I. The question raised by plaintiff in the instant case is
held to be the same as one of the questions certified to
Court (294 U. S. 330). Perry, 182.
breach of contract by the defendant, in pursuance of
which would support a different cause of action from
in cases on appeal by writs of certiorari. Id.
See Taxes LV.
See Contracts XVII,
See Post Office Lease I, II.
See Contracts XVII.
See Taxes LVII, LVIII, LIX, LX.