preferred claim, whereas they claimed as owners and partners; that the Supreme Court had decided in the former suit, No. 4017, that the Solers had a preferred credit for P. 9868.29, whereas the defendant knew that the decision in 4017 had not been pleaded or put in evidence; that the cause No. 5719 was brought upon the bond for the above sum together with damages, &c. P. 11068; the defendant knowing that the sheriff, acting sheriff, Martinez, and Riu were also defendants and that the first named sum alone was in issue and no damages proved; that the cause No. 5719 was instituted on October 1, 1907, well knowing that it was begun on August 22, before, not after the last decision (of September 14), in the former case; that the record in No. 5719 shows that the bond was given to the sheriff after the issue of an injunction in No. 4017, whereas it does not; and finally that the sureties on the bond had bound themselves thereby to respond to the Solers for the amount of the claim that the Solers had against Martinez and Riu, whereas the bond was given to the sheriff and the Solers were not parties to it.

The declaration goes on to allege that with the same intent the defendant did not discuss the actual questions or evidence; that he obtained the signatures of the other judges upon his representation that the decision set forth an impartial and fair statement of the case, he knowing the contrary; and further that Justice Elliott who sat at the hearing did not sign the decision and was not informed of it. It further alleges that defendant omitted the names of Martinez and Riu and directed the clerk to enter judgment against the other defendants only, knowing who were parties and what had been the judgment below. Thereafter on February 8, 1910, pursuant to the decision and defendant's orders, judgment was entered against Alzua and three others for P. 11068 with interest, on the ground that the Solers were creditors of Martinez and Riu and preferred to Alzua; although, it is said, Mar

tinez and Riu were absolved by the judgment. Averments are reiterated that the defendant performed all the acts alleged in relation to Nos. 4017 and 5719 wrongfully with intent to injure the plaintiff with knowledge of the facts set forth and that such knowledge appears from inspection of the decisions in Nos. 4017 and 5719. Execution issued and the present plaintiffs paid the judgment in 5719, but to do so had to sell their property at a great sacrifice. The plaintiffs therefore seek judgment for the actual value of the property sold, the income that would have been realized, and punitive damages; P. 115000 in all. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained by both courts below, and the plaintiffs being unable to better their case by amendment, judgment was entered and the complaint dismissed.

Abridged once more this complaint is that the defendant without jurisdiction entered a judgment against the plaintiff contrary to an order of the full court, and in the opinion by which the full court ratified the change made a false statement of fact; that in the opinion of the full court in a second suit he inserted various false statements, including one attributing to the first judgment an effect that it could not have in the circumstances, all with full knowledge and intent to injure the plaintiff, which knowledge appears from inspection of the opinions, and that the plaintiff had to pay the second judgment at a sacrifice.

It is apparent that there are other difficulties beside the immunity of the judge in the way of such a suit. In the first place the Supreme Court of the Philippines decides that the judge had jurisdiction to make the change— a matter of local administration on which we should be very slow to revise the judgment. Gray v. Taylor, 227 U. S. 51, 57; Fox v. Haarstick, 156 U. S. 674, 679. Next, the judges, on inspection of the opinions and records which they regard as incorporated in the complaint and for which they were responsible by their assent, are of opinion that the statements in the former opinions were

correct and that the decisions were right, and of course reject the suggestion that they were deceived when they rendered the judgments. It might be added that the complaint hardly makes it clear that any of the alleged misstatements, some of which at least were irrelevant to the result, were the determining causes of the judgment of which the plaintiff complains.

But however it may be as to the matters that we have stated, we regard it as fundamental that the immunity of the defendant from this suit is the same as that of judges in the United States, which is established beyond dispute. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335; Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523. Whatever may have been the Spanish law this is a principle so deep seated in our system that we should regard it as carried into the Philippines by implication as soon as we established courts in those islands. Vol. I, Acts of Philippine Commission Nos. 136, 222, pp. 252, 556. Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 1, 5, 32 Stat. 691, 692. Reasons somewhat analogous to those adverted to in Carrington v. United States, 208 U. S. 1, 7, make the rule perhaps more important in the Philippines than it is here. It is true that in Act No. 190, §9, of the Philippine Commission (1901), it is provided that "no judge, justice of the peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction," and it is argued that this imports that any judge shall be liable for a judgment rendered in bad faith. But without considering the question of power, we are of opinion for the reasons to which we have referred that this should not be construed to convey such an implication, at least as to judges of the Supreme Court. The section is shown to have had in mind inferior judges and the like by its mention of justices of the peace and assessors as to whom a different rule has been held to prevail.

Argument for Petitioners.

231 U. S.

We think it manifest that the question on which the decision of this cause depends needs no further argument and that the judgment should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY OF TEXAS v. UNITED STATES.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 439. Submitted October 24, 1913.-Decided November 10, 1913.

Under the Hours of Service Act of March 4, 1907, c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415, when several employés are kept on duty beyond the specified time of sixteen hours, a separate penalty is incurred for the detention of each employé although by reason of the same delay of a train. Each overworked railroad employé presents towards the public a distinct source of danger.

The wrongful act under the statute is not the delay of the train but the retention of the employé; and the principle that under one act having several consequences which the law seeks to prevent there is but one liability attached thereto does not apply.

An employé, who is waiting for the train to move and liable to be called and who is not permitted to go away, is on duty under the Hours of Service Act.

The penalty under the Hours of Service Act, not being in the nature of compensation to the employé but punitive and measured by the harm done, is to be determined by the judge and not by the jury.

THE facts, which involve the construction of the Hours of Service of Railway Employés Act, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Joseph M. Bryson, Mr. Cecil H. Smith, Mr. Alexander S. Coke, Mr. A. H. McKnight for petitioners:

The Hours of Service Act imposes a penalty for each act of requiring or permitting employés to work overtime, whether one or more employés be involved, and not a penalty for each employé required or permitted to work beyond the hours prescribed.

While it is clear that a penalty can be recovered for each and every violation, what constitutes a violation is the question at issue.

While in United States v. Chicago, M. & P. S. Ry. Co., 197 Fed. Rep. 624, and United States v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co., 197 Fed. Rep. 629, the trial court imposed a penalty for each member of a train crew, in none of them was the question of the right to impose a penalty for each employé discussed.

In B. & O. S. W. R. R. Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 94, reversing 159 Fed. Rep. 33, it was held that under the Cruelty Act a penalty was recoverable for each act of confinement beyond the statutory period.

For civil cases involving recovery of more than one penalty in state courts, see M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. State, 97 S. W. Rep. 724; Porter v. Dawson Bridge Co., 157 Pa. St. 367; Railroad Co. v. Green, 86 Pa. St. 427; Hill v. Williams, 14 Serg. & R. 287; People v. Spencer, 201 N. Y. 105; S. C., 94 N. E. Rep. 614; Sturgis v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. 446; Fisher v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 46 N. Y. 644; Cox v. Paul, 175 N. Y. 328; Griffin v. Interurban S. R. Co., 72 N. E. Rep. 513; State Board v. Bellinger, 138 App. Div. 12; Apothecaries Co. v. Jones, L. R. 1893, 1 Q. B. 89; Parks v. Railway Co. (Tenn.), 13 Lea, 1; Washburn v. McInroy, 7 Johns. 134.

Cumulative penalties are not recoverable unless the legislative intent to impose them is clear. State v. Wis. C. R. R. Co., 133 Wisconsin, 478.

As to the rule in criminal cases, see 12 Cyc. 289, 383; 25 Cyc. 61; 1 Bishop's New Crim. Law, §§ 793, 1061; Bishop on Stat. Crimes (2d ed.), § 1121, citing People v. VOL. CCXXXI-8