Argument for the United States. 231 U. S. punishment without judicial trial. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 323; In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 Fed. Rep. 437. The act is also an ex post facto law, so far as the present case is concerned, because the defendant is punished for acts committed prior to the enactment of the statute. A statute belongs to the class of ex post facto laws which, by its necessary operation, and in its relation to the offense, or its consequences, alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 351; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 386; Green v. Shumway, 39 N. Y. 418. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227, far from being adverse to this contention, practically sustains it. The appellant was entitled to a trial by jury, of the issues presented in the pleadings under the Seventh Amendment. See Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 432, 446; Knickerbocker Insurance Co. v. Comstock, 16 Wall. 258; Garnhart v. United States, 16 Wall. 162; The Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391; Morris v. United States, 8 Wall. 507; Elliott v. Toeppner, 187 U. S. 327. United States v. Mansour, 170 Fed. Rep. 671, does not apply. It has no application to a case where citizenship was unquestionably acquired through valid naturalization proceedings, and where it is sought to take away such right of citizenship because of an alleged change of residence or domicile subsequent to naturalization. In its essential nature such a proceeding seeks the imposition of a penalty or forfeiture, and therefore involves common law as distinguished from equitable rights. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Harr for the United States: Section 15 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, is constitutional, even as applied to certificates of naturalization procured under prior statutes. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227. The provisions of the second paragraph of the act of 231 U. S. Argument for the United States. 1906, making the taking up of permanent residence abroad within five years after an alien's naturalization prima facie evidence of a lack of intention on his part to become a permanent resident of the United States at the time of filing his application for citizenship, is valid and constitutional. The rule declared is only prima facie, and yields, as expressly provided by the statute itself and as held by the District Court, to countervailing evidence. Congress may establish such a presumption. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 42; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 238. The fact that the presumption applies to the trial of an issue to be determined by facts which occurred before the presumption existed is immaterial. Webb v. Den, 17 How. 576; Howard v. Moot, 64 N. Y. 262; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304. This is only a species of the general regulation of procedure which the legislature may always change, even when, as in the case of criminal statutes passed by the States, it is subject to the prohibition against ex post facto legislation. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574; Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380. How far back such an inference shall reach is a question of degree. Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 149. The provisions of the second paragraph of § 15 of the Naturalization Act of 1906 apply to persons who have secured certificates of citizenship under the provisions of previous acts. The second paragraph of the act of 1906 merely creates a rule of evidence which is equally applicable to certificates of naturalization secured under prior statutes, and Congress intended, as it said in the fourth paragraph, that "the provisions of this section" should apply as well to such certificates as to those secured under the act of 1906. For the purposes of this case, it is immaterial whether Argument for the United States. 231 U.S. the second paragraph of the act of 1906 applies to certificates of naturalization secured under prior statutes. The Government was forced to establish and did establish, not only that appellant had established a permanent residence in South Africa, but that he went there under such circumstances as to indicate that at the time of his naturalization he did not intend to reside permanently in the United States. A case of fraud is presented therefore independent of the prima facie rule declared by the second paragraph of § 15 of the act of 1906. The requisite fraudulent intent could be inferred, under such circumstances, without the assistance of that rule. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219; Commonwealth v. Rubin, 165 Massachusetts, 453; Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 149 (dissent). Even if the rule of evidence established by the second paragraph of § 15 of the act of 1906 be held not to apply to certificates of naturalization secured under prior acts, the provisions of the first paragraph nevertheless authorize their cancellation for fraud or illegality, by virtue of the express declaration of the fourth paragraph. The evidence shows that appellant took up his permanent residence in South Africa under such circumstances as to justify the presumption that he had no intention of residing permanently in the United States at the time of his naturalization. The District Court correctly construed the words "permanent residence" in the second paragraph of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, as meaning domicil. As to what facts are necessary to prove a change of domicil see Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 422; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 328; Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 706. Appellant was not entitled to trial by jury. A suit to cancel a certificate of naturalization on the ground of fraud in no wise differs from a suit to cancel a patent for lands, and is clearly an equitable proceeding. United States v. Mansour, 170 Fed. Rep. 671, affirmed 226 U. S. 604. MR. JUSTICE Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court. This appeal brings under review a decree setting aside and canceling, under § 15 of the act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596, 601, c. 3592, as fraudulently and illegally procured, a certificate of citizenship theretofore issued to George A. Luria by the court of common pleas of the city and county of New York. 184 Fed. Rep. 643. The petition was not carefully prepared, and yet it doubtless was designed to charge that the certificate was fraudulently and illegally procured in that Luria did not at the time intend to become a permanent citizen of the United States but only to obtain the indicia of such citizenship in order that he might enjoy its advantages and protection and yet take up and maintain a permanent residence in a foreign country. There was a prayer that the certificate be set aside and canceled because "procured illegally." The sufficiency of the petition was not challenged, and the case was heard and determined as if the issue just described were adequately tendered. In the opinion rendered by the District Court it was said, after observing that the petition was subject to criticism: "That point, however, was not raised, and I suppose the defendant does not mean to raise it." This view of his attitude passed unquestioned then, and it is too late to question it now. The case was heard upon an agreed statement and some accompanying papers, from all of which it indubitably appeared that Luria was born in Wilna, Russia, in 1865 or 1868 and came to New York in 1888; that he entered a medical college of that city the next year and was graduated therefrom in 1893; that he applied for and procured VOL. CCXXXI-2 the certificate of citizenship in July, 1894; that in the following month he sought and obtained a passport from the Department of State, and in November left the United States for the Transvaal, South Africa, arriving there in December; that from that time to the date of the hearing, in December, 1910, he resided and practiced his profession in South Africa; that he joined the South African Medical Association and served in the Boer war; that his only return to the United States was for four or five months in 1907, for the temporary purpose of taking a postgraduate course in a medical school in New York; and that when entering that school he gave as his address, Johannesburg, South Africa. From the facts so appearing the District Court found and held that within a few months after securing the certificate of citizenship Luria went to and took up a permanent residence in South Africa, and that this, under § 15 of the act of 1906, constituted prima facie evidence of a lack of intention on his part to become a permanent citizen of the United States at the time he applied for the certificate. In the papers accompanying the agreed statement there were some declarations which, if separately considered, would tend to engender the belief that he had not taken up a permanent residence in South Africa and was only a temporary sojourner therein, but the District Court, upon weighing and considering those declarations in connection with all the facts disclosed, as was necessary, concluded that the declarations could not be taken at their face value and that the residence in South Africa was intended to be, and was, permanent in character. We concur in that conclusion. In his answer, Luria interposed the defense that his presence in the Transvaal was solely for the purpose of promoting his health, the implication being that when he went there his health was impaired in such a way that a residence in that country was necessary or advisable |