from committing the wrong which it was the purpose of the section to prohibit. It is not, however, necessary to fix the true meaning of the provision by a resort as an original question to its text, since its significance has been authoritatively determined contrary to the construction adopted by the court below. The section represents the first section of the act of March 3, 1823, c. 38, 3 Stat. 771, the title of which, "An act for the punishment of frauds committed on the Government of the United States," manifests the purpose which Congress had in mind in enacting it. As long ago as 1850, in United States v. Staats, 8 How. 41, the court was called upon to determine whether an indictment charging the transmission of a false (but not forged) affidavit touching a claim for pension was sustainable under the third clause of the section. The court fully analyzed the statute and while conceding that other clauses of the act dealt with forged instruments in a technical sense, concluded that the case was within both the letter and the spirit of the act and therefore that the acts charged in the indictment constituted an offense within the provisions of the law. When then the question before us is determined in the light of the text of the third paragraph and the context of the section, especially as elucidated by the ruling in the Staats Case, we think it clearly results that the court below was wrong in the construction which it gave the statute and therefore its judgment must be reversed. In saying this we do not overlook the fact that in the argument for the defendant in error it is insisted that even although it be found that the construction which the court below gave was an erroneous one, nevertheless its judgment should be affirmed because from other points of view, the statute, if rightly construed, would exclude the possibility of holding that the facts charged in the indictment were within its terms. But without going into detail on this subject, we content ourselves with saying that in our opinion all the propositions relied upon to sustain this result are so obviously unsound or so plainly concern the construction of the indictment as not to call for particular notice. Reversed. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. LARAMIE STOCK YARDS COMPANY. ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING. No. 570. Submitted October 14, 1913.-Decided December 1, 1913. The first rule of construction of statutes is that legislation is addressed to the future and not to the past. This rule is one of obvious justice. Unless its terms unequivocally import that it was the manifest intent of the legislature enacting it, a retrospective operation will not be given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights or by which human action is regulated. The right of way granted under the Land Grant Act of July 1, 1862, was a very important aid to the railroad, and was a present absolute grant subject to no conditions except those absolutely implied, such as construction and user. The act of June 24, 1912, c. 181, 37 Stat. 138, permitting state statutes of limitation to apply to adverse possession of portions of the right of way granted to the railroad company under the act of July 1, 1862, did not have a retroactive effect. Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596. Congress did not intend by the act of June 24, 1912, to exercise powers to alter and amend the charters of the railroad companies reserved by the acts of July 1, 1862, and July 2, 1864. This court will not assume that Congress intends to forfeit or limit any of the rights granted to the transcontinental railroads unless it does so explicitly. An amendment to an existing charter enacted under the reserved power to alter and amend will not be construed as having a retroactive effect as to vested property rights in absence of clear intent of the legislature enacting it. 231 U.S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. THE facts, which involve the construction and application of the Union Pacific Land Grant Act of July 1, 1862, the act of June 24, 1912, and the extent of rights claimed to have been acquired under the latter act by adverse possession in the railroad right of way, are stated in the opinion. Mr. John W. Lacey, Mr. N. H. Loomis and Mr. Herbert V. Lacey for plaintiff in error: Prior to the act of June 24, 1912, title to the right of way could not have been acquired by adverse possession. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267; Kindred v. Un. Pac. R. R. Co., 225 U. S. 582, 597; Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 171 U. S. 260, 275; Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Ely, 197 U. S. 1; Stuart v. Un. Pac. R. R. Co., 227 U. S. 353. Under the Wyoming statute of limitations (1910, § 4295) sufficient time had not elapsed since June 24, 1912, for the acquisition of title by adverse possession. Nor has title been acquired by adverse possession by virtue of the act of June 24, 1912. That act, in so far as it attempts to convey title by adverse possession, is not retroactive. It is apparent that the statute is intended to have a prospective and not a retrospective operation. Not only is the language subject to that construction, but no other reasonable construction is possible. The omission of any express declaration regarding the past is worthy of notice. Had Congress intended to give retrospective effect it would have been a very simple matter to have expressly recorded such intention in that part of the act. An act of Congress will not be construed as having a retrospective operation unless the language imperatively demands it. United States v. Burr, 159 U. S. 78, 82; United States v. Am. Sugar Co., 202 U. S. 563, 577; Twenty Per Cent. Cases, 20 Wall. 179, 187. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 231 U.S. This rule is always applied where the result of a retrospective operation would be to injuriously affect an existing status. United States v. Heth, 3 Cr. 413; Black's Const. Law, 2d ed., p. 627, § 286; Reynolds v. McArthur, 2 Pet. 417, 434; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johnson, 447, 503; Society v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105; S. C., 22 Fed. Cas. 756, 767; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Winfree v. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co., 227 U. S. 296, 301. If construed as retroactive, the act operates immediately and by virtue of itself alone, to take from the plaintiff its vested right and title to the property in controversy and transfer the same to the defendant without due process of law, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. Congress has not the power to accomplish this without the consent of the present owner of the property. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718; United States v. Un. Pac. R. R. Co., 160 U. S. 1, 33. See also Wallbridge v. Commissioners, 74 Kansas, 341. Titles vested under act of Congress could not, without the consent of the grantee or its successor, be legislated back to the United States, or legislated into the ownership of anyone else; nor could the title or tenure created by the grant of said lands or right of way be changed, without such consent, by subsequent act of Congress. Proprietors v. Laboree, 2 Maine (2 Greenleaf), 275, 288; Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 488; Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co., 10 Maryland, 129, 144; Osborn v. Jaines, 17 Wisconsin, 592; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87, 135; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 206; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 599; Herrick v. Boquillas Land Co., 200 U. S. 96, 102. From the cases cited the statute under consideration must be construed as prospective only, if that be reasonably possible. If the statute be found clearly retroactive, then, under the same authorities, it must be held unconstitutional, as taking from the plaintiff in error its property without due process of law. 231 U. S. Argument for Defendant in Error. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ely, 197 U. S. 1, is not in point. The statute in that case validated certain conveyances of the railroad company, and was held to operate retrospectively because it contained a provision that it should have no validating force until accepted in writing by the company, 33 Stat. 538, c. 1782. The railroad company did file written acceptance and could not claim that it was deprived of its property without due process of law, because it had accepted and assented to every transfer within the terms of the act. Mr. Roderick N. Matson and Mr. T. Blake Kennedy for defendant in error: The act in controversy is an alteration or an amendment of the original grants to the Pacific Railroad Companies, and as such violates no constitutional provision. Congress had the right to, and did take notice that these railroad companies had silently assented for long periods of time to the absolute and undisputed possession of large portions of this right of way, had removed in many instances their fences, making a right of way of fifty feet on each side of their main track, and in other cases erecting in the first instance their fences along a line fifty feet distant from either side of said track. The United States has by this act stated that those persons who have held portions of this right of way outside of a space fifty feet in width on either side of the main track for a period of time, which in the State where said controversy arises shall amount to adverse possession, that the title by adverse possession may be invoked as against such right of way. Congress has taken notice of the fact that the railroad companies to whom the original rights of way were granted, and their successors, have consistently and continuously used but one hundred feet of that right of way. The right of Congress to alter, amend and repeal VOL. CCXXXI-13 |