verdict should be for the plaintiff, and the only question for your determination is what amount of damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover by reason of the publication of said article."

This was error, since it was for the jury and not for the court to determine the meaning of ambiguous language in the published article. Where words are libelous per se the Judge can so instruct the jury, leaving to them only the determination of the amount of damages. Where the words are not libelous per se and, in the light of the extrinsic facts averred could not possibly be construed to have a defamatory meaning, the Judge can dismiss the declaration on demurrer, or, during the trial, may withdraw the case from the jury. But there is a middle ground where though the words are not libelous per se, yet, in the light of the extrinsic facts averred, they are susceptible of being construed as having a defamatory meaning. Whether they have such import is a question of fact. In that class of cases the jury must not only determine the existence of the extrinsic circumstances, which it is alleged bring to light the concealed meaning, but they must also determine whether those facts when coupled with the words, make the publication libelous. Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 5 Johns. 219. The meaning of the words was in dispute, and as that issue of fact was not submitted to the triers of fact, a new trial must be ordered. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the other questions in the case.

The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed and the cases are remanded to that court with directions to reverse the judgments of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and to remand the case to that court with directions to grant a new trial and for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

231 U.S.

Argument for Appellant.

WORK v. UNITED GLOBE MINES.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF

ARIZONA.

No. 46. Argued November 6, 1913.—Decided January 5, 1914.

The settled rule of this court is to accept the construction placed by the territorial court upon a local statute, and not to disregard the same unless constrained so to do by clearest conviction of serious error. Phoenix Railway Co. v. Landis, ante, p. 578.

Where, as in this case, it does not appear that manifest error was committed in the construction and application of the statute of limitation or in determining the sufficiency of a deed to the premises, the title to which was involved, this court will not reverse the judgment of the territorial court.

In refusing to reverse because no manifest error appears, this court does not intimate any doubt as to the correctness of the ruling, but simply abstains from deciding a purely local question in the absence of conditions rendering it necessary to do so.

12 Arizona, 339, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the validity of a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona establishing title to property in that Territory, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. A. L. Pincoffs for appellant:

Defendant, being a foreign corporation, cannot set up the statute of limitations. Larsen v. Aultmann, 86 Wisconsin, 281; Williams v. Metropolitan Co., 68 Kansas, 17; State v. Nat. Assn., 79 N. W. Rep. 223; Robinson v. Imperial Mining Co., 5 Nevada, 43; State v. Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 10 Nevada, 47; Barstow v. Union Mining Co., 10 Nevada, 386; Olcott v. Tioga R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 210; Clark v. Bank, 10 Arkansas, 516; 52 Am. Dec. 248, with long monographic note at page 256.

The deed from its grantors is insufficient to enable the defendant to set up the five years' statute of limitations (§ 2937, Rev. Stat., Arizona, 1901), because it gives notice to the defendant that its grantor had no title to the premises and because it did not purport to convey the fee.

It is admitted that at the time the assessment was made, plaintiff in error was and had been for twenty-five years a bona fide resident of New York.

This mortgage was not taxable in Arizona because it was owned by a non-resident.

Mortgages are only taxable in State of the owner's residence. Jack v. Walker, 79 Fed. Rep. 142; Holland v. Commissioners, 39 Pac. Rep. 576; Cleveland Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300.

A deed founded on a sale for taxes which on its face is absolutely void does not support adverse possession under a statute of limitations. Redfield v. Parks, 132 U. S. 239.

Under the laws of Arizona a mortgage of real property conveyed no title whatever to the mortgagee; he has merely a lien upon the property. A deed attempting to convey this alleged interest conveyed nothing.

While a deed, valid on its face, is sufficient for the purpose of the statute, even if it could be impeached by evidence aliunde, Elder v. Wood, 208 U. S. 226, it does not follow that the result is the same when the grantee has actual knowledge or notice that his grantor has absolutely no title to the premises he attempts to convey. See also Bradshaw v. Ashley, 180 U. S. 59· Saxton v. Hunt, 20 N. J. L. 487, 493.

In order successfully to invoke the statute, the defendant must claim under the deed, and no one can claim under a deed a greater interest or title than the deed conveys.

The ten years' statute of limitations (§ 2938, Rev. Stat..

1901) does not apply, because its operation is restricted to the recovery of lands held without deed, and also because no such limitation was in existence when plaintiff's cause of action accrued and the statute must be given a prospective operation. Redfield v. Parks, 132 U. S. 239.

If the statute is intended to have a retrospective effect, it would be unconstitutional. Gilbert v. Ackerman, 159 N. Y. 118; Price v. Hopkins, 13 Michigan, 318.

Mrs. Sarah H. Sorin for appellee.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the

court.

We confine our statement to so much of the case as is necessary to develop the matters for decision.

Work, the appellant, who was plaintiff in the trial court, sued the United Globe Mines, the appellee, to quiet his title to certain described mining property, averring that he had the fee simple title to the same and although defendant asserted some adverse right, it had no title or interest in the property. The defendant, averring itself to be a New York corporation having its principal place of business in Globe, Gila County, Arizona, in its answer besides traversing the averments of the complaint, alleged that it was entitled to the possession of the property sued for, and was the owner, because for more than five years before the commencement of the suit it had been "in the actual, continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, exclusive, open, notorious, hostile and adverse possession of said premises, and has been cultivating, using, enjoying and working the same, paying taxes thereon, and holding and claiming the same and the title thereto adversely to plaintiff and all the world, under a deed from William E. Dodge and D. Willis James conveying said premises to

this defendant, which deed is dated January 31st, A. D., 1893, and which said deed was duly recorded on the seventeenth day of February, A. D., 1893, in the office of the County Recorder of Gila County, said Territory, in book 3 Deeds of Mines, at page 299;

"And defendant alleges that the cause of action, if any, stated in the complaint herein, did not accrue within five years next before the commencement of this action."

In addition, as a second ground, the ownership of the property was asserted to have been acquired by a period of ten years' limitation, the benefit of which was expressly pleaded. The prayer of the answer was not only that the claim of the plaintiff be rejected, but that there be affirmative relief adjudging the title of the property to be in the mining company.

The case was submitted to the trial court upon an agreed statement of facts and was decided in favor of the defendant and a judgment of affirmance followed in the Supreme Court of the State to which the case was taken, that judgment being the one to which this writ of error is directed. The court, for the purpose of its consideration of the case, adopted the statement of facts acted upon by the trial court.

Three principal questions were decided: a, That the United Globe Mines, although a foreign corporation, was entitled to avail itself of the statute of limitations; b, that the deed which the United Globe Mines asserted as the basis of its claim to a right of ownership resulting from the five years' limitation under § 2937 of the Revised Statutes of Arizona for 1901, was adequate and hence the United Globe Mines was the owner of the property by limitation; and c, besides that, the facts proven as the basis of the ten year limitation under § 2938 of the Revised Statutes of Arizona for 1901 were adequate to bring the United Globe Mines within the embrace of the statute and therefore to additionally sustain its claim of owner