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the commissioner, which related solely to the sale of pianos and conversations between Cameron and Smith concerning the sales. The district attorney contended that this testimony was competent in order that the jury might get some sort of comprehensive idea as to what the man testified to, and, in view of that statement and the expressed view of the court that anything that threw light on the event was admissible, the testimony was admitted. It is contended that it was competent as showing the relations of Cameron to Smith and to identify Smith, but there was no question in the case as to who Smith was. He was a witness called to establish the charge of perjury and he was the person with whom it was charged the fraudulent dealings in pianos was had by the bankrupt. The testimony offered as to what Cameron swore to before the examiner, while not tending to establish the charge of perjury based upon testimony in that instance, did contradict the testimony which he had given before the referee, and directly tended to establish the charge under that indictment. We think to permit the use of the testimony for that purpose was to permit the testimony given in the one instance to be used in a criminal proceeding based upon testimony given in the other instance, and therefore to violate the immunity given in § 860 of the Revised Statutes, then in force.

Other errors are alleged, and it is contended that there was no adequate proof of the charges made, but these questions were submitted to the jury and cannot be reexamined here. We are of the opinion that error was committed in the use given to the testimony taken before the commissioner in the manner we have stated and for that reason the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of Cameron in the court below should be reversed.

Reversed and remanded to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

281 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

RADFORD v. MYERS.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.

No. 251. Submitted December 3, 1913.-Decided January 5, 1914.

Whether due effect was given by the state court to a judgment rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States presents a Federal question which gives this court jurisdiction to review the judgment of the state court, and to determine the question this court will examine the judgment in the Federal court, the pleadings and the issues and, if necessary, the opinion rendered.

Where the suit in which the former judgment is set up is not upon the identical cause of action the estoppel operates only as to matters in issue or points controverted and actually decided in the former suit. Judgments become estoppels because they affect matters upon which the parties have been heard, but are not conclusive upon matters not in question or immaterial. Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254. In a suit in which two of the parties successfully unite in asking the court to award the fund to one of them against a third party claiming it under an assignment, the judgment is not, as between the two so uniting, res judicata so that the one to whom it is awarded is not obligated to account therefor to the other under an agreement so to do if the record does not show that such question was also at issue and determined.

167 Michigan, 135, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the effect to be given by the state court to a former judgment in a suit between some of the parties rendered by the Circuit Court of the United States and the extent to which such judgment was res judicata of the matters in controversy, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Thomas A. E. Weadock for plaintiff in error:

Whether a state court has given due effect to the decision of a United States court is a Federal question. Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130; Embry v. Palmer, 107

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

231 U. S.

U. S. 3; Pendleton v. Russell, 144 U. S. 640; Central Bank v. Stevens, 169 U. S. 432; Hancock Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640; Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 390; National Foundry v. Oconto Supply Co., 183 U. S. 216.

Matters in issue and decided by the judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter of the suit are conclusively settled, and cannot be litigated again between the parties to that suit or any of their privies. 23 Cyc. 1215; Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109; Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351; Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U. S. 252; Southern Pacific Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1.

A right, question or fact once put in issue and decided is concluded in any future action between the same parties or their privies, whether the subsequent action is for the same or a different cause of action. New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371.

A judgment is a bar to any future action between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action. Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351; Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327; Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 390.

Or as this last rule has more recently been very aptly stated-a judgment is conclusive as to all the media concludendi. United States v. California Land Co., 192 U. S. 358; American Exp. Co. v. Mullins, 212 U. S. 312; United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 U. S. 565; Troxell v. D., L. & W. R. Co., 227 U. S. 434; 2 Black., Judgm. (2d ed.), § 506.

Those are held to be parties who have a right to control the proceedings, to make defense, to adduce and crossexamine witnesses, and to appeal from the decision. 2 Black., Judgm. (2d ed.), p. 808; 23 Cyc. 1240.

Matters which follow by necessary and inevitable inference from the judgment itself are equally covered by the estoppel as if they were specifically found in so

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many words. 23 Cyc. 1306; Nat. Foundry Co. v. Oconto Co., 183 U. S. 216; Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 390; Winona Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526; Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U. S. 165.

The estoppel covers matters which were actually determined, whether technically put in issue by the pleadings or not. 23 Cyc. 1304; 2 Black., Judgm. (2d ed.), § 614.

There need be no pleadings between co-parties in order that they may, as between themselves, be bound by the judgment, if they were essentially adversary parties, or their respective rights were in issue. Baldwin v. Hanecy, 204 Illinois, 281, affirming 104 Ill. App. 84; Kohly v. Fernandez, 133 App. Div. (N. Y.) 723; affirmed 201 N. Y. 561; Corcoran v. Ches. & Ohio Canal Co., 94 U. S. 741; Louis v. Brown Township, 109 U. S. 163.

This is also the Michigan rule. Waldo v. Waldo, 52 Michigan, 91, 93; Scripps v. Sweeney, 160 Michigan, 148, 177.

The Federal decision is a bar to this litigation between the plaintiff in error and Col. Myers as to the half of the judgment paid by Luzerne County into the United States

court.

No counsel appeared for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

Elijah E. Myers brought this suit in the Circuit Court of Wayne County, State of Michigan, against George W. Radford, the plaintiff in error herein, for an accounting and for a decree for the balance due him from a judgment in a suit of the former in which the latter acted as one of his attorneys and received the amount of the judgment. Myers having died during the pendency of the action, it was revived in the name of his executrix, the defendant in error. The decree of the Circuit Court in favor of the

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defendant in error was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan (167 Michigan, 135), and the case comes here on error.

The record discloses that Myers had entered into a contract with the County of Luzerne, State of Pennsylvania, to furnish the plans and specifications for a courthouse and had certain claims against the County arising therefrom. Counsel had been employed and suit commenced, but little progress made. Myers had assigned a one-half interest in the contract to his son, George W. Myers. In this state of affairs the elder Myers employed the plaintiff in error, who had theretofore been his attorney and to whom he was indebted, to prosecute the court-house claim. To secure his indebtedness to Radford, Myers assigned his remaining one-half interest in the claim to the plaintiff in error. Later, April 2, 1900, George W. Myers assigned his one-half interest to the plaintiff in error, the latter to account to him for the proceeds after deducting a $1,000 attorney's fee and one-half of the costs, to which assignment Elijah E. Myers gave his written assent; and shortly thereafter, April 11, 1900, George W. Myers, in consideration of $150, transferred his interest in his prior assignment and in the assignment from his father to him to the plaintiff in error.

The plaintiff in error engaged local counsel in Pennsylvania, who commenced suit in the United States Circuit Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and prosecuted the court-house claim to a successful termination (Myers v. Luzerne County, 124 Fed. Rep. 436). Thereupon George W. Myers intervened in that suit, setting up his right to one-half of the judgment, claiming that his assignment to Radford had been fraudulently obtained; and one-half of the amount of the judgment was paid into court. Upon the petition of the plaintiff in error to remove the money, the jurat of which was signed by Elijah E. Myers, the court decreed that the

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