modity clause, which does not take property or arbitrarily deprive
the carrier of a property right, does not violate that Amendment.
Ib.
20. Hepburn Act; commodity clause; application and operation.
The commodity clause is general and applies to all shipments, even if
innocent in themselves, which come within its scope; its operation
is not confined to particular instances in which the carriers might
use its power to the prejudice of shippers. Supplies, purchased for
use in operating a carrier's mines, 75% of the product of which is
intended for sale and only 25% intended for the carrier's own use,
are not necessary for the conduct of its business as a carrier and
fall within the prohibition of the commodity clause of the Hepburn
Act. Ib.
21. Regulations of Commission; carrier not relieved from compliance by
agreements previously entered into.
A carrier is not relieved from complying with regulations properly
made by the Interstate Commerce Commission because of agree-
ments previously entered into; whatever had been done was sub-
ject to being displaced by the Commission under the powers con-
ferred upon it by Congress. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v.
United States, 423.
22. State interference with; effect of establishing intrastate railroad rates.
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, followed to the effect that the
establishment of railroad rates wholly intrastate by a State Rail-
road Commission is not an unwarrantable interference with, or a
regulation of, interstate commerce. Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co. v. Garrett, 298.
23. State burden on; taxation as.
While a State may not burden interstate commerce or tax the carry-
ing on of such commerce, the mere fact that a corporation is en-
gaged in interstate commerce does not exempt its property from
state taxation. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 68.
24. State burden on; taxation as.
While interstate commerce itself cannot be taxed, the receipts of prop-
erty or capital employed therein may be taken as a measure of a
lawful state tax. Ib.
25. State burden on; taxation; judicial interference.
Courts will not interfere with the exercise of the taxing power of a
State on the ground that it violates the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution unless it appears that the burden is direct
and substantial. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 394.
26. State burden on; license taxes; validity of § 4224, Kentucky Statutes,
1909.
The license tax imposed by § 4224, Kentucky Statutes, 1909, on persons
or corporations having representatives in the State engaged in the
business of inquiring into and reporting upon the credit and stand-
ing of persons engaged in business in the State, is not unconstitu-
tional as a burden on interstate commerce as applied to a non-
resident engaged in publishing and distributing à selected list of
guaranteed attorneys throughout the United States and having a
representative in that State. Ib.
27. State burden on; license taxes; incidental effect.
In this case held, that the service rendered in furnishing a list of guaran-
teed attorneys did not, except incidentally and fortuitously, affect
interstate commerce and that it was within the power of the State
to subject the business to a license tax. Ficklen v. Shelby County,
145 U. S. 1, followed. International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S.
91, distinguished. Ib.
28. State burden on; regulations in regard to insurance policies as.
After reviewing Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, decided by this court in
1868, and other cases in which that case was followed, this court
adheres to the decisions in those cases to the effect that the issuing
of an insurance policy is not commerce but a personal contract, and
that the regulations of a State in regard to policies delivered in the
State by non-resident insurance corporations and taxes imposed on
said corporations, are not, if otherwise legal, unconstitutional as a
burden upon interstate commerce. The Lottery Cases, 188 U. S.
321, and International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, distin-
guished. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge Co., 495.
29. Commission; constitutionality of power to establish methods of ac-
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194,
followed to the effect that there is no unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power by Congress to the Commission in giving it au-
thority to establish methods of accounts by the provisions of the
Hepburn Act amending § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce
in that respect. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. United States,
30. Commission; judicial review of orders of.
Where it appears that the Commission has acted fairly within the
grant of power constitutionally conferred upon it by Congress its
orders are not open to judicial review. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1–4;
HOURS OF SERVICE LAW;
SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 2, 6, 12, 29, 30;
JURISDICTION, F;
SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT, 3.
INTERVENTION.
See MANDAMUS, 2;
PARTIES, 3.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
See CONGRESS, Powers of, 2;
INDIANS, 7, 9.
JUDGES.
See COURTS;
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
JUDGMENTS AND DECREES.
Construction of decree; determination of nature and extent.
A decree is to be construed with reference to the issues it was meant
to decide; its nature and extent is not to be determined by isolated
portions thereof, but upon the issue made and what it was intended
to accomplish. Vicksburg v. Henson, 259.
See JURISDICTION, A 9; B; G 3;
The Judicial Code does not purport to embody all the law upon the
subjects to which it relates. Sections 292, 294 and 297 expressly
bear upon the extent to which the Code affects or repeals prior
laws and to which such prior laws remain in force. Street & Smith
v. Atlas Mfg. Co., 348.
2. Relation to Circuit Court of Appeals Act.
While the Judicial Code supersedes the Circuit Court of Appeals Act,
references in other statutes to the latter act now relate to the corre-
sponding sections of the Judicial Code, as is expressly provided by
§ 292 of the Code. Ib.
3. Repeals by; effect of § 297 on § 18 of Trade-Mark Act of 1905.
Section 297 of the Judicial Code did not repeal § 18 of the Trade-Mark
Act of February 20, 1905. Ib.
§ 128 (see Jurisdiction, A 2): Street & Smith v. Atlas Mfg. Co., 348.
§ 237 (see Appeal and Error, 4): Bolens v. Wisconsin, 616 (see Jurisdic-
tion, A 11-14): Marshall v. Dye, 250; John v. Paullin, 583; Bolens
v. Wisconsin, 616; Straus v. American Publishers' Assn., 222.
§ 239 (see Practice and Procedure, 1): Stratton's Independence v. How-
bert, 399.
c. 299 (see Jurisdiction, C 2): Springstead v. Crawfordsville Bank, 541.
1. Of appeal from Circuit Court of Appeals.
Although the original bill depended solely upon diverse citizenship,
independent grounds of deprivation of Federal rights which existed
prior to the filing of the bill may be brought into the case by sup-
plemental bill, and if so, the jurisdiction of the District Court does
not rest solely on diverse citizenship and the judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals is not final but an appeal may be taken to
this court. (Macfadden v. United States, 213 U. S. 288.) Vicksburg
v. Henson, 259.
2. To review judgments and decrees of Circuit Court of Appeals under
Trade-Mark Act of 1905; certiorari only mode.
Judgments and decrees of the Circuit Courts of Appeals arising under
the Trade-Mark Act of February 20, 1905, are reviewable by this
court only on certiorari and not on appeal or writ of error; appeals
in such cases are not allowed under § 128 of the Judicial Code.
Street & Smith v. Atlas Mfg. Co., 348.
3. To review judgments and decrees of Circuit Court of Appeals under
Trade-Mark Act of 1905 and Judicial Code.
The intent of Congress, as indicated in the provisions of the Judicial
Code relating to the jurisdiction of this court, was to extend rather
than contract the finality of decisions of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. By the act of February 20, 1905, Congress placed trade-
mark cases arising under that statute upon the same footing as
cases arising under the patent laws as respects the remedy by
certiorari under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act. Ib.
4. Under Criminal Appeals Act; scope of review.
Under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, this court has
no power to revise the mere interpretation of an indictment by
the court below, but is confined to ascertaining whether that
court erroneously construed the statute on which the indictment
rested. United States v. Carter, 492.
5. Under Criminal Appeals Act; involution of construction of statute.
In this case the writ of error is dismissed as the ruling of the court
below that the counts which were quashed were bad in law did not
reasonably involve a construction of the statute but may well have
rested on the opinion of the court as to insufficiency of the indict-
ment. Ib.
6. Under Criminal Appeals Act; construction of statute not involved.
Where it does not appear that the judgment sustaining a demurrer to
the indictment turned upon any controverted construction of the
statute, this court has not jurisdiction to review under the Crim-
inal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907. United States v. Moist, 701.
7. Under Criminal Appeals Act; dismissal on non-appearance of ground
for sustaining demurrer.
In this case as it does not appear upon what ground the court below
acted in sustaining the demurrer the writ of error is dismissed. Ib.
8. To review judgment of Court of Appeals of District of Columbia; when
authority exercised under United States drawn in question.
Where the validity of regulations made by officers to whom power to
make them is delegated by the Food and Drugs Act of 1906 is
denied, an authority exercised under the United States is drawn in
question, and not merely the construction of the statute, and this
court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U. S.
543, followed, and United States ex rel. Taylor v. Taft, 203 U. S.
461, distinguished. United States v. Antikamnia Co., 654.
9. To review judgment of state court; involution of Federal question.
Whether due effect was given by the state court to a judgment ren-
dered in the Circuit Court of the United States presents a Federal
question which gives this court jurisdiction to review the judgment
of the state court, and to determine the question this court will
examine the judgment in the Federal court, the pleadings and the
issues and, if necessary, the opinion rendered. Radford v. Meyers,
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