Handbook of Industrial OrganizationMark Armstrong, Robert H. Porter Elsevier, 2007 M10 5 - 942 pages This is Volume 3 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization series (HIO). Volumes 1 & 2 published simultaneously in 1989 and many of the chapters were widely cited and appeared on graduate reading lists. Since the first volumes published, the field of industrial organization has continued to evolve and this volume fills the gaps. While the first two volumes of HIO contain much more discussion of the theoretical literature than of the empirical literature, it was representative of the field at that time. Since then, the empirical literature has flourished, while the theoretical literature has continued to grow, and this new volume reflects that change of emphasis. Thie volume is an excellent reference and teaching supplement for industrial organization or industrial economics, the microeconomics field that focuses on business behavior and its implications for both market structures and processes, and for related public policies. *Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series *Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields *A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists |
Contents
Chapter 28 The Economic Analysis of Advertising | 1701 |
Chapter 29 Empirical Models of Entry and Market Structure | 1845 |
Chapter 30 A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in IO | 1887 |
Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects | 1967 |
Chapter 32 An Empirical Perspective on Auctions | 2073 |
Chapter 33 A Primer on Foreclosure | 2145 |
Chapter 34 Price Discrimination and Competition | 2221 |
Theory and Evidence | 2301 |
Chapter 36 Antitrust Policy toward Horizontal Mergers | 2369 |
Author Index | 1 |
| 25 | |
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Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3 Mark Armstrong,Robert H. Porter No preview available - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
adopters advertising algorithm American Economic Review analysis assume assumption auctions behavior bidders bottleneck brand collusion commitment competition computational consider constraint consumer surplus contracts customers demand differentiation discussion distribution downstream firms duopoly dynamic efficient empirical endogenous entry equilibrium estimate example expected firm’s fixed costs foreclosure full-information function incentive increase incumbent Industrial Organization investment Journal of Economics Journal of Industrial Klemperer Laffont literature lower marginal cost market share market structure merger monopolist monopoly Nash equilibrium network effects network externalities nomics number of firms offer oligopoly optimal outcome output Pakes penetration pricing period potential entrants price discrimination private information problem product differentiation profit RAND Journal regulated firm Regulatory Economics regulatory policy rent retail rivals Sappington Section signal social strategy studies submarkets sunk cost supplier Sutton switching costs symmetric theory tion Tirole variable vertical integration welfare zero