say what the consideration of the note was, and whether it had wholly failed or not.-Richards v. Thomas, 1 C., M. & R. 772.

3. (Proof of consideration, on whom.) In an action on a promissory note, the defendant pleads that there was no consideration for the note; the plaintiff replies that there was a good consideration. The issue is on the defendant to show that the note was given by way of accommo. dation and without value. - Lacey v. Forrester, 2 C., M. & R. 59.

4. (Plea of want of consideration.) In assumpsit on a promissory note by payee against maker, the defendant pleaded that he made the note without any value or consideration whatever for his so doing, or for his paying the amount, or any part thereof: Held, on special demurrer, that the plea was bad. (1 C., M. & R. 798.)-Stoughton v. Earl of Kilmorey, 2 C., M. & R. 72.

SET-OFF.

A defendant can only set off debts which were due to him from the plaintiff as well at the time of action brought as at the time of plea pleaded. Therefore, a plea of set-off on a bill of exchange, payable to the defendant's order and accepted by the plaintiff, is not supported by proof or a bill answering to the description in the plea, which at the time of action brought was in the hands of a third party, although before plea pleaded it had got back into the defendant's hands. --Braithwaite v. Coleman 4 Ν. & Μ. 654..

SETTLEMENT.

1. (By renting-Divided occupation.) Since the passing of the 1 W. 4, c. 18, no settlement can be gained by the renting and occupation of a tenement by a party who allows an under-tenant to have the exclusive occupation of any portion of the tenement, for however short a period such occupation may continue, and however small may be the sum paid in consideration of it. (5 B. & Ad. 219.)

Sect. 1 of that statute, though prospective only, applies to cases in which the occupation had commenced, but was not complete, at the time of the passing of the act. (4 B. & Ald. 681.)-The King v. Inhabitants of St. Nicholas, Colchester, 4 N. & M. 422.

2. (Contract of service-Volunteer.) A person inrolled as a member of a volunteer corps, is not sui juris so as to be able to make a valid contract of service for a year. (Burr. S. C. 753; 1 Dowl. 391; 3 M. & S. 229.) And it is not necessary, in order to make a man inrolled as a volunteer an effective member of his corps, that he should have taken the oath of allegiance required by the Volunteer Act, 44 G. 3, c. 54, s. 20.-The King v. Inhabitants of Witnesham, 4 N. & M. 447.

3. (By Estate) A., B., C., and D., are next of kin to an intestate. A. takes out administration, and then all four join in a mortgage of a leasehold tenement formerly the property of the intestate, and divide between them the money advanced. B. afterwards verbally agrees with C., in consideration of a sum of money then paid, to sell him all his interest in the tenement, and, after a lapse of some time, joins A. & D. in a release

of all their interest to C.: Held, that B. did not, by residence in the parish wherein the tenement was situated, for 40 days between the making of the agreement and the execution of the release, gain a settlement by estate in that parish. - The King v. Inhabitants of Cregrina, 4 Ν. & Μ. 455.

4. (By apprenticeship-Payment of premium by public charity-Stamp.) A. was apprenticed for seven years to B., a tinman, by the trustees of a charitable fund, and the premium paid out of that fund. He served B. three years, when, at his request, B. verbally, and without the trustee's knowledge, consented that A. should serve the rest of his time with C., a plumber, and agreed to give C. 61. as part of the 15l. paid as a premium on the binding of A., for taking him: Held, that the 61. was not a consideration paid by the public charity, but that the transfer to C. was in the nature of a new binding out, and was void for want of a stamped assignment, under the 55 G. 3, c. 184. The King v. Inhabitants of Fakenham, 4 N. & Μ. 553,

5. (By office.) An act of parliament authorized the justices of the county of Chester to appoint constables for townships for such period as the said justices should think expedient. A person appointed to one of these offices, who served it for a year, was held not to gain any settlement; for it could not be deemed an annual office, although the salary was regulated according to a stated annual amount.-The King v. Inhabitants of Middlewich, 4 N. & Μ. 682.

6. (Exceptive hiring.) A hiring, under which the servant was to work ten hours a day, from five in the morning till six in the evening, leaving off in the middle of Saturday, so as to make up the ten hours a day, held to be an exceptive hiring. (9 B. & C. 925; 2 B. & C. 114; 4 B. & Ad. 216.)-The King v. Inhabitants of Norton-Bavant, 4 N. & M. 687.

7. (By office.) A party was appointed pinder for the town of F., at a Court held within and for a manor not extending over the whole town. There was no special custom warranting such appointment: Held, that he gained no settlement, by the execution of such office, in the parish of F., with which the town was co-extensive. - The King v. Inhabitants of St. Mary, Newmarket, 4 N. & M. 693.

SHERIFF.

(Return of fi. fu. by.) A sheriff was, under special circumstances, compelled to return a writ of fi. fa., though he had been three years out of office, and had, by leave of the Court, withdrawn from the possession of the property seized.-Wilton v. Chambers, 3 D. P. C. 333.

And see EXECUTION IN CRIMINAL CASES; INTERPLEADER ACT.

STAMP. See SETTLEMENT, 4.

TAXES. See DISTRESS, 1, 3.

TRESPASS.

1. (Pleadings-Replication de injuria-Excess.) To trespass for assault and false imprisonment, the defendant pleaded that he was in lawful possession of a house, and that the plaintiff was unlawfully therein, and had been requested to depart, but had refused, whereupon the defendant gently laid his hands on him to remove him; that thereupon the plaintiff assaulted him in the presence of a policeman, wherefore he caused him to be taken to a police office. Replication, de injuria. The defendant proved all the matters of the plea, except the assault by the plaintiff: Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for the imprisonment, and was not bound to have replied excess.-Reece v. Taylor, 4 N. & Μ.

469.

2. (Pleadings-Description of close.) In a declaration qu. cl. fr., the plaintiff's close is described by abuttals. Plea, seisin in fee in the defendant, and issue thereon. The plaintiff is entitled to recover for a trespass done in a close in his lawful possession, answering to the description in the declaration, although the defendant has also a close answering to the same description. And that, even where the abuttals are stated with such generality that the declaration would have been bad on special demurrer, and it is only by reason of such generality of description that the plaintiff's close comes within the description: as where the locus in quo was described as abutting, in the direction of the four cardinal points, towards certain closes, and the plaintiff proved a trespass on a close of a triangular shape abutting towards such closes. (1 B. & C. 489; 9 D. & R. 495.)Lempriere v. Humphrey, 4 N. & Μ. 638.

3. (Right of private person to give affrayers into charge of constablePleadings.) Trespass for assault and false imprisonment, and taking plaintiff to a police-station. Plea, that defendant was possessed of a dwelling-house, and that plaintiff entered the dwelling-house, and made a great disturbance and affray therein, and insulted, abused, and illtreated the defendant and his servants therein, and greatly disturbed them in the peaceable possession thereof, in breach of the peace; whereupon the defendant requested the plaintiff to cease his disturbance, and depart out of the house, which the plaintiff refused to do, and continued in the house making the said disturbance and affray therein; that thereupon the defendant, to preserve the peace, and restore good order in the house, then and there gave charge of the plaintiff to a policeman, &c., and the policeman took him into custody and conducted him out of the house to the police-station, for examination, and to be dealt with according to law.

The facts proved were these:--The plaintiff entered the defendant's shop to purchase an article, when a dispute arose between him and the defendant's shopman: the plaintiff refusing on request to leave the shop, the shopman endeavoured to turn him out, and an affray ensued between them: the defendant came into the shop during the affray, which continued for a short time after he came in; the defendant then requested the plaintiff to leave the shop quietly, but he refusing to do so, the defendant gave him in charge to a policeman, who took him to the station house.

Held, first, that these circumstances justified the defendant in giving the plaintiff into custody, to prevent a renewal of the affray. But,

Secondly, that the plea was not substantially proved, inasmuch as the alleged assault on the defendant himself, which was the only breach of the peace which appeared by necessary implication from the plea to have been committed in the defendant's presence, was not proved.-Timothy v. Simpson, 1 C., M. & R. 757.

4. (Irregular process of outlawry.) Trespass for false imprisonment. The defendant justified under process of outlawry. The plaintiff replied that there was no affidavit of debt made and filed, &c., and the defendant rejoined that there was such affidavit, and set out an irregular affidavit. The plaintiff demurred: Held, that the defendant was entitled to judgment, trespass not being maintainable where the process is irregular merely, and not void.-Riddell v. Pakeman, 2 C., M. & R. 30.

5. (Justification-Several assaults.) Where a plea justified two assaults (the declaration having charged only one) and no evidence was given of the second assault mentioned in the plea, and the jury found for the defendant: Held, that as it was unnecessary to have justified a second assault, it was unnecessary to prove it.-Atkinson v. Warne, 3 D. P. C.

483.

TROVER.

1. (For stolen goods-Sale in market-overt.) The owner of stolen goods, who has prosecuted the thief to conviction, is entitled to recover the value of them in trover from a person who purchased them from the thief, not in market-overt, and who resold them in market-overt after notice of the felony but before conviction. (5 T. R. 175; 1 Hale, P. C. с. 45, р. 546; 2 T. R. 750.)-Peer v. Humphrey, 4 N. & M. 430.

2. (Statute of limitations-Conversion beyond six years.) Where, in trover by bailor against bailee, the defendant pleads the statute of limitations, it is not sufficient for him to prove acts done more than six years before action brought, which the bailor might, at his option, have treated as acts of conversion; he must prove clear unequivocal acts of adverse ownership. Thus, where in trover for wine and bottles, the plaintiff showed that more than six years before action brought he deposited a pipe of wine and some bottles with the defendant, it was held that the defendant did not support a plea of the statute of limitations merely by showing that the wine was bottled while in his cellar, and a part of it drunk, more than six years before action brought. - Philpott v. Kelley, 4 N. & Μ. 611. And see PLEADING, 5.

USURY.

(Proof of day on which contract made.) In debt qui tam for penalties for usury in renewing and discounting of bills, it is necessary to prove that the usurious contract was entered into on the precise day which is laid in the declaration, even though it be laid under a videlicet. (R. & M. 153.)-Fox v. Keeling, 4 N. & Μ. 523.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

(Entry of contract by auctioneer's clerk.-Recovery of deposit, &c.) On a sale of lands by auction, a written contract was signed by the purchaser, whose signature was attested by the auctioneer's clerk, thus:" Witness, J. N." The clerk also signed a receipt for the deposit and a moiety of the auction duty, and afterwards paid over the deposit to the vendor, whose attorney subsequently wrote to the attorney for the purchaser that they could not make out a marketable title, and that they advised the purchaser to relinquish his purchase: Held, that the vendor was not bound by the contract: Held also, that the deposit-money and moiety of the duty might be recovered back by the purchaser; but not the expenses of investigating the title, nor interest on the deposit. (9 Ves. 234;4 Bing. 722; 1 D. & R. 32; 4 Taunt. 334.) - Gosbell v. Archer, 4 Ν. & Μ. 485.

VENUE.

1. (Bringing back, in libel.) In an action for a libel, the venue was laid in London, and the defendant moved to change it to Lincoln on the usual affidavit; and on a rule being obtained to bring it back, it appeared from the affidavit that the libel had been published in London as well as in Lincoln: Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to have the venue brought back to London, without entering into an undertaking to give material evidence there. Clements v. Newcome, 1C., M. & R. 776; 3 D. P. C. 425.

2. (Changing, in local action.) Semble, that the venue may now be changed in a local action. (3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 22.)-Briscoe v. Roberts, 3 D. P. C. 434. [The act seems, however, to do no more than authorize a direction that the issue may be tried in another county, which before could only have been done, in general, by consent.]

WARRANT OF ATTORNEY.

1. (Entering up judgment. Title of affidavit.) An affidavit in support of a motion to enter up judgment on a warrant of attorney, given when no suit is pending, need not be entitled in any cause.-Davis v. Stanbury, 3 D. P. C. 440.

2. (Entering up judgment.) Since the rules of H. T. 4 W. 4, (s. 1, rule 3,) it is not necessary, in order to sign judgment on an old warrant of attorney, to show that the defendant was alive within the term. (2 D. P. C. 816.-Robinson v. Lester, 3 D. P. C. 531.

WARRANTY.

(Of horse.) Where an unsound horse is sold with a warranty of soundness, the buyer may sue on the warranty, although shortly after the sale he discovers the unsoundness, and without giving notice of that fact to the seller, keeps and uses the horse as his own for months, and during that time administers physic to it, and uses other means to cure it. (1 H. Bl. 17; 1 C. & M. 207.)-Patteshall v. Tranter, 4 N. & M. 650.

Weights and Measures Act. See ILLEGAL CONTRACT.