employers had been practicing all these things. These had become established practices in American industry, in order to prevent employees from organizing and bargaining collectively. Many investigations had established the facts, and there was much complaint against the unfairness and injustice of the practices.

Industrial managers had every opportunity to rid themselves of the practices. They would not do so, and the working people of the country turned to their Government to make them get rid of the practices. Certainly the workers did not act hastily in the matter. They waited patiently for many years, and only as a last resort did they use their votes to remove an intolerable condition. The fifth unfair labor practice makes it necessary that the employer shall know who is the true representative of the employees, duly designated or selected in accordance with the act. Section 9 deals with this problem. It provides that a majority of the employees in any unit appropriate for collective bargaining shall have the right to designate or select an exclusive representative of all the employees of such unit. Then it authorizes the Labor Relations Board to decide in each case whether the bargaining unit shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or a subdivision thereof. If a dispute arises as to the representation of employees, the Board may investigate and certify in writing the name of the designated or selected representative. In such an investigation the Board must provide for a hearing, may take a secret ballot, or use any other suitable method of ascertaining the choice of the employees.

These provisions of sections 8 and 9 are about all there is to the National Labor Relations Act. The rest is concerned mainly with procedures for carrying the provisions into effect. The Labor Relations Board is empowered to prevent employers from engaging in any of the listed unfair practices, and the Board is given authority to issue rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the Act. The procedures outlined in the law and elaborated in the Board's regulations work out in the following manner.

An employee, or group of employees, or a union, files a charge at any one of the 22 regional offices maintained by the Board, covering all parts of the country. The charge must be in writing, and the allegations that an employer has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practices must be sworn to. This charge is then assigned for investigation by the regional director to one of his subordinates, who is known as a field examiner. The employer is notified, and after the evidence in support of the charges has been canvassed, he is interviewed and given an opportunity to tell his side of the story. Quite often this brings about conferences, which results in a settlement of the case without further procedure.

In many cases the charges prove to be unfounded, and they are then dismissed by the regional director. Provision is made for an appeal from such a dismissal to the Board in Washington. If it appears, however, that the law has been violated and attempts to secure compliance are unsuccessful, a full report is prepared in the form of a request for authorization of a complaint, which is forwarded to the Board. In preparing this report the regional director has the assistance not only of the field examiner but also of attorneys on his staff, and the request for authorization of a complaint is signed by both the regional director and by the regional attorney who is in charge of the legal staff at the regional office.

This request is then reviewed in Washington, and if the Board finds that it has merit the regional director is authorized to issue a complaint and to provide for a hearing of the charges. A trial examiner is then assigned from Washington to conduct the hearing, and a record is made. On the basis of the record, the trial examiner issues an intermediate report, in which he makes findings of fact and recommendations as to what disposition should be made of the case. If Le finds that the employer has engaged in unfair labor practices, he recommends such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of

the act.

This intermediate report is then served upon all the parties to the If the employer complies with the trial examiner's recommendations, the Board ordinarily closes the case. Similarly, if the trial examiner finds that the employer has not engaged in unfair practices and no exceptions are filed, the case is considered closed. All parties are afforded an opportunity to file exceptions to the intermediate report and any party may request oral argument before the Board.

There is a review division in the legal department of the Board, which carefully reviews the whole record in the case as well as the findings of the trial examiner, the exceptions, and the briefs. On the basis of all this and the oral arguments, the Board makes its decision. But in its decision the Board has no authority to punish an employer or any of his agents. It may only order those whom it found to have violated the law to cease and desist from their violations. If, however, an employer has illegally punished employees by loss of employment or wages the Board may order reinstatement of such employees and refund to them the wages they have lost.

When the decisions and orders of the Board are issued, there are no penalties imposed on the employer if he does not obey them. He may disregard them if he sees fit. Then it becomes necessary for the Board to go to a circuit court of appeals, submit the whole record and all the statements in the case, and show the court that the decision is supported by substantial evidence. If the court so finds, it issues an enforcement order. Then, if the employer refuses to obey such order, he may be cited for contempt of court.

These procedures, it seems to me, safeguard the rights of the employers at every step. They are the same procedures that Congress has provided for the elimination of unfair practices against shippers by the railroads, for the prevention of monopolistic practices and restraints of trade by combinations and trusts, and for the abolition of frauds and deceit in the sale of securities and foods and drugs. The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and many other administrative agencies are governed by the same kind of law that governs the activities of the National Labor Relations Board.

It is difficult to understand, therefore, why the procedures of this act should be subject to such furious attacks, as if they were new and unique in our system of law. When it is remembered, however, that the Interstate Commerce Act and the Federal Trade Commission law, in the early days of their existence, were subjected to exactly the same kind of attacks and criticisms, then perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that those who enjoy special privileges from the Government never learn anything from history.

Mr. TOLAND. Doctor, may I interrupt, please?

Dr. LEISERSON. Yes.

Mr. TOLAND. I hope you won't forget that you agreed that you would not read everything that is in your statement.

Dr. LEISERSON (resuming). They resent the loss of their privileges, and they always use the same argument against every effort of the Government to provide equal protection of the laws for all its citizens. I may say that I have already omitted a very valuable paragraph, of which I was very fond, when I wrote it.

Mr. TOLAND. Let us skip a couple more, Doctor, if you can.

Dr. LEISERSON. You see, other people may not think that this is quite as wise as I think it is; so you will forgive me.

If there is nothing in the labor relations law itself to justify the attacks on it, then is there anything in the administration of the act by the Board, and in the work of its staff of 900 people, that justifies any of the criticism? That there are faults and weaknesses in administration may be readily admitted. But it is a serious question if those who are opposing the law and demanding that it be revised are not more responsible for those defects than the Board itself. You will recall that after the act was adopted in July 1935 a national committee of 58 leading members of the American Bar took it upon themselves to declare the law unconstitutional. Well, you know all about that, and I will skip there.

This did not set the working people of the country a very good example of obedience to law, but it did accomplish the purpose of demoralizing the administration of the act. The effects of this demoralization are still being felt, and the obstructive policies of those who are opposed to the act are being continued. There is room for much improvement in the administrative methods of the Board, but the act cannot be made to work altogether efficiently until the opposition to the law itself and the attempts to weaken it by revision have ceased.

It seems strange to me that almost every day we should be reading of attacks on the Board and its personnel, but hardly anyone thinks of attacking or ever criticizing the conduct of those employers who have flouted the law of Congress and who have been found guilty of violations that the courts as well as the conscience of the American people have condemned. If we had a little more criticism of those who engage in unfair labor practices and who defy the law of the land, and a little less. criticism of those who are honestly trying to carry out their oath of office in enforcing the law, we would get a better perspective on the perplexing problems of labor relations with which the Government has been trying to deal by means of the National Labor Relations Act.

Chairman Madden and Edwin Smith, the other two members of the Board whom the committee is to hear later, can give you a better idea of the operations of the Board than I can. They set up the administrative organization, selected the personnel, and devised the necessary procedures. Their task was unusually difficult, because they had to do all these things and carry on all the other work of the Board while they were under fire. They were constantly being attacked and subjected to successive investigations by one congressional committee after another. I have been a member of the Board for only 6 months, and knowing the difficulties of the Board's prob

lems in these months of relative quietness, I must say that on the whole the other members of the Board are to be commended for the good job they have done under very trying circumstances.

It is no accident that out of 19 of the Board's cases that went to the Supreme Court, the decisions of the Board were upheld completely In 15. In 2 cases the Board's decisions were upheld with some modifications, and in only 2 cases were the Board's decisions reversed. In the circuit courts the Board's record has not been quite as good, but it has been excellent nevertheless, and a good many of the circuit Turt decisions against the Board have been reversed by the Supreme Court. This record is due to careful and efficient work on the part of the Board and its legal and field staff, and a devotion to duty of the personnel that should receive public commendation instead of the brickbats they have been getting. I do not know of any other Government agency that has had a better record of approval of its work by the higher courts.

This does not mean that all the work of the Board is carried on efficiently, that no mistakes are made, that no wrong decisions are sed, that all the employees are efficient and fully qualified and trained for their jobs. On the contrary, the Board is fully aware of many deficiencies in operations, of troublesome mistakes, doubtful policies, and weaknesses in organization and personnel. The members of the Board, more than anyone else, are constantly criticizing and xamining methods, policies, and procedures for the purpose of searing improvements in administration and a more prompt and effective enforcement of the provisions of the act.

These memoranda about which Mr. Toland is to question me are to represent the method by which we try to improve our work.

Because I have had occasion to write some dissenting opinions, there have been public intimations that I was critical of the other renbers of the Board. As a matter of fact, my remarks have been no different than the criticisms that all three of us have always directed against our own work and that of the employees of the Board. Without internal skepticism of the policies we pursue and without such self-criticism of the work we do, no organization can be kept on its toes to meet the problems that arise every day in an effective manner. It is natural and healthy that the members of a quasi-judicial body should disagree on important problems, just as Courts disagree. Such disagreement is a basic condition for progressive improvement.

So far as the complaint cases are concerned, involving charges of violations of the law, there is no essential disagreement among the three members of the Board. At times, of course, we view details of evidence differently, but such disagreements are usually ironed out in conferences or by means of memoranda, so that dissenting opinions in these cases are rarely written. Most of the dissents occur in connection with representation cases and revolve around the question of the appropriate bargaining unit. That the problems raised by this question are extremely complex and bound to develop diverse views is evident from the fact that there have been as many separate concurring opinions as there have been dissenting opinions, and many also have concurred in part and dissented in part.

These problems are problems of democracy, and to some extent. they are bound to be with us as long as our working people will be

218054-40—vol. 1- -2

free to associate themselves in organizations for mutual benefit and bargaining in any manner they see fit. If we had industrial dictatorship or autocracy, the problem would disappear. If we want democracy in industry as well as in government, we must pay the price in possible disputes among free men as to what they consider best to promote their interests.

Among the unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor as well as among the independent railroad brotherhoods there have been for many years bitter jurisdictional controversies, and the disputes about bargaining units rise out of such differences regarding the jurisdiction of various labor organizations. When the Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935 we had a united labor movement, and if that condition had continued the difficulties of the Board in handling representation disputes would have been serious enough. But they would never have reached the proportions and they would not have developed the bitterness of feeling that has come since the split between the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O. I doubt if the opposition to the Labor Relations Act itself would have been taken as seriously as it is now if it had not been for this division in the ranks of organized labor.

I do not regard the problem as insoluble, however. That it is possible to get labor organizations which are fighting among themselves to accept a rule for deciding disputes as to bargaining units in good spirit, and to follow that rule uniformly in all cases involving choice of representatives is evident from the experience under the Railroad Labor Act, although the problems under that act are not as complex as they are in the vast field covered by the National Labor Relations Act. The essential requirement for satisfactory adjustments of disputes as to appropriate unit is, in my mind, that the Government shall not undertake to pass judgment on whether organization of employees along the lines of industrial unit is better than on craft lines, or that craft or plant units are preferable to industrial or other units.

The employees who organized themselves along one line or another believed that the units they preferred are the most effective for their purposes in collective bargaining. It is wrong, I think, for the Government to say that one structure or form of labor organization is more effective than another in accomplishing the purposes of collective bargaining. All forms have their advantages and disadvantages. But section 9 of the Labor Relations Act provides that in deciding disputes as to which unit is appropriate, the Board shall make its decisions "in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of the act." This wording is rather broad; it appears to leave it to the judgment of the members of the Board to decide what form of unit is best to insure the right of selforganization and will best effectuate the purposes of collective bargaining. I do not think Congress intended by this wording to give such large powers to the Board. The intent was rather, it seems to me, that the customs and practices of the employees in establishing their forms of self-organization and collective bargaining relationships with their employers would reveal the preferences of the employees themselves as to the most effective bargaining units, and that the Board would make its decisions accordingly.