Bland, Theodore R Hepburn, William M..

S-12-38 to date.

$18.05.

EXHIBIT No. 10

[Inter-Office Communication, National Labor Relations Board]

To: Mr. Madden.

From: Wm. M. Leiserson.

Subject: Universal Pictures.

JULY 26, 1939.

This is in response to your note of the 25th regarding Universal Pictures and the Brackett telegram.

As the record now stands in the Universal Pictures case, collective bargaining negotiations between the Guild and the producers had proceeded to a point where the parties seemed to be in substantial agreement. There are memoranda in the file both from the Board's attorney and the trial examiner stating this to be the fact. The Guild rejected the proposal for a contract temporarily agreed upon because it was dissatisfied with three things, none of which involved unfair labor practices under the Act. All three matters dealt with subjects that must be settled by collective bargaining between the parties and do not require action by this Board. The record shows that the producing companies have expressed themselves as willing to negotiate further on these three points.

The Guild, however, insists on reopening the hearing. It was agreed that the hearing would be reopened on 48 hours' notice, but it is now proposed to reopen the hearing on the basis of an amended complaint. I have grave doubt as to whether the amended complaint is proper under the circumstances. Under date of May 2nd, counsel for the Guild wrote to our trial examiner, Batten: "Frankly, it is my legal opinion that there isn't an awful lot left of the Guild's collective-bargaining case, although I think the Board of Directors of the Guild was absolutely right in refusing to accept the contract offered to them because I believe the Guild members will be better off with no contract than to be shackled with the proffered contract."

Under date of May 6th the same counsel for the Guild wrote to Board's Attorney Alpert:

"As I told you before, I don't think the collective-bargaining case is worth anything; however, we still have a chance to knock out the Screen Playwrights' contract, which is important for us, and the most important thing is to air those 8-1 charges.

"Once the Producers are notified by the Labor Board that those charges are to be aired, there is a chance that we will get somewhere. If the producers can convince the Labor Board not to air such charges, frankly, we are sunk.

"We are writing Lillian Hellman to go to Washington immediately and have the Labor Board set down our case for reopening whenever your operation is concluded."

The Guild also notified the Board that it was sending Donald Ogden Stewart to Washington to urge the Board to reopen the hearing. When the producers asked the Board for an opportunity to be present when this request was made, we were notified that Stewart would not come.

There are also telegrams and memoranda in the file indicating that Alpert was called back to Washington by Halliday but that the Guild protested that he should remain, and a note from the Secretary secured postponement of Alpert's return to Washington. I think if you will read the file with an open mind you will get the impression that I have gotten that we are being asked to aid the Guild in matters of collective bargaining, which are no part of the duties of the Board, and that the Guild wants us to make an 8 (5) complaint in a case where collective bargaining has reached the point of substantial agreement and where the Guild itself refused to negotiate further. I am afraid that the amended complaint may look as if we are carrying out this purpose.

For these reasons and for the reason that my name figured so prominently in the conversation between Dubinsky and his representative in Detroit, as well as in the interesting conversation between Dubinsky and the Secretary, which he reported to the Board, I suspect that the Brackett telegram was inspired. In addition there is the changing of the order for a separate hearing in the Plymouth case at the request of the Secretary without a report or recommendation from the regional director, and I found nothing in the file to indicate that there was any need for rushing the matter on the basis of a telephone conversation, as you seemed to suggest.

-W. M. L.

EXHIBIT No. 29

[Confidential]

Mr. MADDEN.
LEISERSON.

JULY 20, 1939.

Here is the revision of my dissent in the Chrysler cases. I have tried to omit any implication of criticism of members of the Board. Your point is well taken in that respect, and if you find anything else of that nature in the revised version, I will be glad to eliminate it.

When I wrote the first draft I thought I was directing my criticism at the Secretary of the Board who I think mishandled these cases, as he has mishandled many others. In this connection I should like to direct your attention to the attached excerpts from the minutes of the Board. Here a formal order for an investigation and hearing of the Plymouth case only was ordered on March 27th. Then four days later another order was issued consolidating this with the other cases. Since the last case involving the question of a corporationwide unit was already in the hands of the Board on March 27th, I do not see why an order for the single plant was issued first and then changed four days later. This is the same sort of thing that has happened in the Consolidated Aircraft and the Chicago Malleable cases. To say the least, it is sloppy work.

[From Minutes of Executive Meeting of the Board]

W. M. L.

March 27, 1939, Present: The Board, Mr. Witt. "Chrysler Corporation, Detroit, Mich., VII-R-194.-The Board directed investigation and hearing."

March 31, 1939, Present: The Board, Mr. Witt.

"Chrysler Motors Co., New Castle, Indiana, R-1307, R-1308, Detroit, Michigan, VII-R-194.-The Board directed that the cases be consolidated."

Mr. William M. Leiserson, dissenting in part and concurring in part: The evidence does not justify a finding that the 14 plants of the company constitute a single appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining. The existing contracts between the corporation and the labor organizations are specifically membership contracts, i. e., the organizations represent only such employees as are their members and do not represent all the employees within a definite bargaining unit. The record shows clearly that the company has been bargaining with more than one labor organization on this basis. It dealt with the International Association of Machinists as the representative of the machinists who belonged to that organization at the same time that it recognized the U. A. W. as the representative of employees, including machinists who were members of this organization. It has been carrying on negotiations both with the A. F. L.-U. A. W. and the C. I. O.-U. A. W. Under these circumstances, it seems to me to be going directly in the face of the facts to hold that there is any experience, custom, or practice to establish the 14 plants of the corporation as one bargaining unit.

Further, it appears that at the Kokomo plant there has been no collectivebargaining practice. No organization has been designated as representative for collective bargaining by the employees of that plant, and the existing membership contracts of the U. A. W. have not been extended to include the Kokomo plant. I think it is improper to include the unorganized employees at Kokomo in a single bargaining unit with the organized employees at the other plants and thus enable the larger numbers in these other plants to impose their choice of representatives on the smaller number at Kokomo. The effect of the majority decision is to deprive the Kokomo employees of an opportunity to exercise a free choice of the representation they desire for collective-bargaining purposes. The majority opinion cites the corporation's "bible" and its general policies of maintaining more or less uniform management practices in all its plants. This reference is clearly to management policy and not to collective bargaining policy. Companies that deal with two or more unions, or partly with unions and partly on a nonunion basis, try to maintain as nearly uniform wages, hours, and working conditions as possible. This does not mean, however, that a single collective bargaining unit is appropriate. Circumstances may develop industrial bargaining units in some plants and craft units in others, and the craft units may be on a company-wide basis while the industrial units are on a plant basis, or vice versa.

The decision certifies the representatives of the die sinkers' craft on a plant basis only. The argument about the company's uniform management policy is disregarded with respect to the die sinkers. There is evidence in the record to show that the company employs die sinkers at its Dodge plant as well as in New Castle. If uniform management policies justify a corporation-wide unit, as the prevailing opinion argues, then it would appear that all the die sinkers employed by the company in all its plants ought to be voted in a single bargaining unit. But the ruling is that a plant unit for the die sinkers at New Castle is appropriate. This seems to me plainly contradictory.

There may also be other crafts of employees, such as electricians, pattern makers, etc., working in other plants of the corporation under circumstances similar to those of the die sinkers in New Castle. If that is true, the Board may later be required to hold that the corporation-wide unit found in the present case was not appropriate and that separate craft units by plants are appropriate.

I think the proper finding in this case, aside from the die sinkers, is that the production and maintenance employees at each plant constitute a separate bargaining unit, except the Kercheval and Jefferson plants which together make up a single unit since they are managed as such. If one organization wins the election in all the plants it may by a collective bargaining agreement with the company unite them all in one corporation-wide unit. If different organizations win in the different plants the corporation will, of course, have to deal with the different organizations for the plants they represent. And any organization representing more than one plant may by a collective bargaining agreement with the company merge the several plants it represents in a single bargaining unit.

As to the die sinkers, I am of the opinion that an election should be ordered for these men, as is done for all the other employees; but I concur in the finding that the die sinkers at the New Castle plant constitute an appropriate bargaining unit. I concur also in the finding the C. I. O.-U. A. W. and the A. F. L.-U. A. W. are two separate labor organizations.

That the Board is in error in merging all fourteen plants of the company into one bargaining unit is further made evident by the order and manner of handling the four separate cases that are covered by the decision.

The first case filed was that of the International Association of Machinists, involving the die sinkers at the New Castle plant. The date of the filing was October 21, 1938.

The second was that of Local 371 of the United Automobile Workers, and the dispute in this case was also confined to the New Castle plant, but covered all "production and nonproduction" employees at the plant. The petition was filed December 13, 1938, and the case is numbered R-1307, the earlier case being numbered R-1308.

Formal investigation of these two cases was not ordered by the Board until January 25, 1939, when the two cases were consolidated for hearing and other purposes. The hearing was held in New Castle, Indiana, March 6 and 7, 1939, and the record was then closed.

On February 23, 1939, the petition in the third case was filed (No. R-1397) by Local 51 of the United Automobile Workers. This petition requested certification of representatives of the "production and maintenance employees" at the Plymouth plant of the Chrysler Corporation, located in Detroit, Michigan.

None of the petitions in these three cases made any claim as to a corporationwide unit, and the requests for certification were confined to the New Castle and the Plymouth plants respectively. It was not until March 14, 1939, five months after the petition in the first case was filed, that the question of a corporationwide unit was formally presented to the Board. On that day the C. I. O.-United Automobile Workers filed a petition in which it claimed that the appropriate bargaining unit consisted of "production and maintenance employees within the categories covered by a contract between the Chrysler Corporation and the International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, executed on or about April 1, 1938." In this connection it is to be noted that the record shows that this contract was not extended to include the employees at the Kokomo plant. The question may well be raised, therefore, as to whether the decision does not go beyond the petition when it includes the Kokomo plant together with the others in a single bargaining unit.

The Board did not order a separate investigation and hearing in the first case, that filed by the International Association of Machinists. It combined this with the second case, involving the New Castle plant. But for the third case, that of