tions of princes by the Popes could be accounted for all the more easily when, as in some instances, States had by special stipulation made themselves more or less feudatory dependents on the Papacy, instances of which were England, 10 Poland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Portugal and Naples. Then as regards the empire itself, insofar as in its spiritual institution it was a Papal creation, it owed a subjection to its Lord. With Fénelon's doctrine Bossuet substantially agreed, thus stating his own view as to the action of Pope Zachary in the substitution of Pepin for the fainèant Childeric: Non factum est ut Pontifex regnum adimeret aut daret, sed ut declararet adimendum vel dandum ab iis quibus id juris competere judicaset.11 Here it appears why the potestas directa and the potestas indirecta are repudiated by Bossuet; he considers both as acts of jurisdiction exercised over subjects, and he does not regard the civil State as such to be even indirectly thus subject. (3) The third theory is that maintained by Bellarmine, who may claim to be one of its prominent representatives. It is the potestas indirecta, whereby the Pope, not having direct power over the temporal affairs of princes, can sometimes overrule them indirectly in the interests of spiritual concerns which are his and to which worldly concerns are subordinate. Thus of the Pope deposed a King, it would not be directly as he would depose a Bishop: non eo modo quo deponit episcopos tanquam ordinarius judex.12 In the matter of some phrases Bossuet comes wonderfully near to a recent utterance of Leo XIII., he using suprema et absoluta where the Pontiff uses maxima. The words of the Pope are: Deus humani generis gubernationem inter duas potestates partitus est, scilicet ecclesiasticam et civilem, alteram quidem divinis, alteram humanis rebus praepositam. Utraque est in suo genere maxima.13 The utterances of Leo, made at a time when Christendom was hopelessly divided, are necessarily more restricted and more cautious than were earlier utterances made by Popes when doctrine had not been analyzed into its precise parts and when actual, or, as it is said nowadays, "factual" concessions went further than what was the constitutional right for all Christian ages. In deference of the strong terms used by Boniface VIII., it is urged that substantially his language was but that of his predecessors, coming down from Gregory VII. through Innocent III. and the succeeding Popes who had specially to contend with the Emperors. Yet even then Popes, while they did not expressly lay down the theory of the indirect power, nevertheless from time to time signified that the State had a direct power of its own which could be controlled by the Pontiff only on the ground of its inference with higher interests of religion, not on the ground of mere political supremacy. Gregory VII. addressed Henry IV. as one whom God had established on the throne-quem Deus in sumino rorum posuit culmine.14 Innocent III. observed that while his spiritual jurisdiction was unbounded (nullis terminis coarctata), his jurisdiction in things temporal was only in multis. 15 He called the Papal and the imperial powers distinct, yet so related that the Pope had great authority in civil affairs, but not the supreme authority as in spiritual-in spiritualibus habet summam, in temporalibus magnam a Deo potestatem. 16 To Philip the Fair Boniface signified that his own interference in French concerns of State was ratione peccati, because the King was sinning against God and His Church; otherwise the bull Unam Sanctam allowed that there were two powers, Church and State. The concession was not wholly negatived by the famous and ambiguous word instituere occurring in the clause, spiritualis potestas terrenam potestatem instituere habet et judicare. Here is one of those catch phrases which theologian after theologian repeated. The passage as read in Hugo of St. Victor1 ran thus: Instituere ut sit, where the addition ut sit seems to imply more than "instruction" or "guidance," and to suggest creation by the Pope. Egidius of Rome used this form: Spiritualis potestas instituere habet terrenam potestatem; et si terrena potestas bona non fuerit, spiritualis eam potest judicare.18 This was copied by Alexander of Hales in his Summa, with the substitution of constituere for instituere (IV., X., 3, 21). Well versed in the theologians, Boniface took from them his phrase instituere and other phrases besides which have occasioned complaint.

As to the special word instituere, while its meaning seems not to be fully satisfied by the rendering "instruct," yet it may be referred to the right of the Church to approve, anoint and crown Kings after having used a moral influence to determine their elections. All these acts may be expressed by instituere. Indeed, it would have been absurd on the part of Boniface VIII. to pretend that the Popes by their own power simply established monarchies and monarchs as they founded bishoprics and furnished them with Bishops. In the catch phrases of theology and canon law, as they pass from mouth to mouth and from pen to pen, we may expect in some instances an extravagant usage avoided by the more careful. A flagrant instance of abuse occurred in the frequent repetition of the tanta est vis confessionis, taken from the "De Vera et Falsa Poenitentia" of the pseudo-Augustin and employed to enforce confession to laymen in defect of a priest. Hugo shows his sense of limitation to be put upon the phrase instituere ut sit by adding that the "spiritual power does not exist to do prejudice to the rights of the temporal," and that "the King or Emperor is head of the temporal government." Boniface VIII. also explained himself as not having intended to detract from the regal authority in its own distinct sphere so long as it abode within this sphere and made no encroachment on spiritual rights, in which case the King, of course, became like any other son of the Church, subject to its supreme jurisdiction. Bossuet says of the remarkable definition with which the Unam Sanctam ends that it is simply Catholic truth. Hoc tantum habet definitio: "Subesse Romano Pontifici omnem creaturam declaramus, dicimus, definimus, et pronunciamus omnino esse de necessitate salutis." This, observes Bossuet, is certain among Catholics when it is understood of the spiritual power, 19 and Boniface spoke of this spiritual power in its corrective right over the sins of a much sinning monarch whom no one can throughout defend20-Philip the Fair. The royal office instead of diminishing a King's liability to spiritual censures in one way, considerably increases their need. No doubt if Boniface had foreseen objections he would have toned down or stated more cautiously some of his propositions, but in the heat of strife language is apt to become strong, and even requires a certain strength. Furthermore, we should remember that Boniface included his historic de facto rights along with those which were simply de jure offici. It is not necessary that the Pope's actual rights should be exactly the same in every age; his position requires him to hold in check temporal princes when their conduct touches ecclesiastical immunities and prerogatives, but the requirements of such a position will allow of some alterations in shape to meet varying conditions of time. One of Boniface's predecessors clearly recognized that more might be contained in some validated custom than was found in the pure principle of jurisdiction. It was Alexander III. who in 1160 had written in reply to a question: "Quod quaeris, si e civili judice, ante judicium vel post, ad nostram audientiam appellatio teneatur, tenet quidem in his quae sunt nostrae temporali jurisdictioni subjecta; in aliis vero, etsi de consuetudine ecclesiae tenet secundum juris rigorem credimus non tenere.”21

There is, however one instance of an apparent contempt for temporal power by a great Pope which needs a word of explanation, but first a few preparatory remarks. St. Paul says that the law is set not for the just, but for the unjust, and certain fathers of the Church dwell on the fact that it is sin and the fall of mankind from Paradise that render necessary the restraint by human governors. The purely repressive side of government was what most struck some minds which paid little attention to its power of promoting good. The Stoics, with not a little truth, observed that civil laws were prohibitions for bad subjects, not stimulations for the good. To this day we have few laws that reward virtue. Gerson said of the civil authority, "The efficient cause was sin, the final cause was peace." And by the side of this utterance we may place the analogical case of property, about which J. S. Mill said that "it did not owe its origin to those considerations of utility which plead for the maintenance of it when established; for enough is known from history to show that tribunals were established not to determine rights, but to repress violence and end quarrels. With this purpose in view they naturally enough gave legal effect to just occupancy. The preservation of peace, which was the original object of civil government, was thus attained."23

Spencer's theory of the negative function of government to prevent injustice is well known. Newman often dwells rather on the reproving than on the approving voice of conscience. Plato describes the various arts of life as means to supply human wants or deficiencies. With the law of physical nature contrasts human law as a restraining, repressive force. Here are examples of negative, depreciatory views.

We are prepared now to hear St. Gregory VII. assign the origin of civil government to the devil, for we know the limitation of the aspect from which he was regarding the institution. "Who is unaware," he wrote, "that Kings and rulers held their powers from those who, heedless of God and at the instigation of the devil, have assumed over their equals a domination prompted by cupidity and pride?"24 As a matter of fact, many dynastics thus came into power; if afterwards they were legitimated, at least their beginnings were bad. Moreover, Gregory would have remembered the Scripture account of the Jewish Kings, how the people, as it were, forced the hand of God to anticipate His plan that the Jews might "have a King like as the Gentiles"-too much like, for it tended to upset the idea of the theocracy. Much later the French legalist Bodin remarked that the origin of monarchy was not contract, but usurpation. 25 In various ways, therefore, the disparaging remark of Gregory VII. on the actual origin of civil governments, which were rarely quite just and often very unjust, is reconcilable with his orthodox acceptance of the New Testament teaching that kingly power is from God.

The sins of contemporary governments were also much before the mind of Boniface VIII. when, like Gregory, he spoke bitterly of the temporal estates, for he had seen a great deal of the ambitions and the rivalries between secular princes-conflicts between Genoa and Venice, between the Aragonese rulers of Sicily and the representatives of the house of Anjou, between Adolf of Nassau and a competitor with him for the German throne, between Edward I. of England and Philip of France, and again between Edward and the Scots. The Pope himself had to struggle at Rome against the rebellious Colonna family, as in France against the anti-Papal monarchy. Some writers take the view that Boniface VIII. by his high claims struck a blow at the temporal power from which the Papacy never recovered, though the final extinction was delayed till the conquest of King Victor Emmanuel. By the Reformation a condition of affairs was brought about quite incompatible with the mediæval conception of an allied Papacy and empire. It was the function of Luther and Zwingli, of Anglicans like Whitgift and Hooker to transfer to the State most of the prerogatives that had belonged in the Middle Ages to the Church. Or rather that had belonged in the Middle Ages to the Church. Or rather what happened was this: The limits of society were narrowed to the nation or territory, while its nature was more that of a State than of a Church. The mediæval mind conceived its universal Church-State, with power ultimately fixed in its spiritual head, 26 bounded by no territorial frontier; the Protestant mind placed all ecclesiastical authority below and subject to the control of the Godly prince.27 Such Godly princes were Henry VIII. and Elizabeth and Cromwell. Certainly it is agreed that in shaking off the Papacy the reformed Churches took to themselves temporal masters, who did not mitigate the yoke of subjection and who provoked dissenters to rise against the new combination.

Hooker was a well-known defender of one Anglican theory about the national Church. He regarded Episcopacy as if not absolutely