least as concerns Theodosius, Sozomen tells us that his enactments were not at all strictly enforced. "The Emperor had no desire to persecute his subjects; he only wished to enforce uniformity of view about God through the medium of intimidation."35 But whatever may have been the intentions of the civil authorities in their laws against heresy, the unanimous opinion of the greatest Bishops at the end of the fourth and in the early part of the fifth century was that while heretics deserved punishment, this punishment should be of a comparatively mild order. St. Martin stood for excommunication only, with its corollary, the expulsion of heresiarchs from churches in their possession. St. Augustine, while admitting in principle that heresy was the greatest of offenses against Christian society, and as such a capital crime, yet, as is clear from his protests quoted above against extreme severity, he was totally opposed to the infliction of capital punishment even in the case where religious dissent was closely connected with so grave a crime as murder. The reason for this attitude St. Augustine states in his letter to Marcellinus; as a Christian Bishop he could not entertain the idea that the shedding of blood for any offense, however grave, against religion would harmonize with the teachings of Christ. Yet at the same time he maintained that heresy in a Christian State is a capital crime. The future was destined to produce generations of Christians more logical, if less tolerant, than the great Bishop of Hippo.

Harrisburg, Pa.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

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C

THE NATURE OF SACRIFICE.

ATHOLIC theologians, in discussing the nature of sacrifice, usually take for granted the definition of this rite as "an oblation or offering of some sensible object to God by man." Differences of opinion between them exist in connection with the mode of offering and the precise ends for which the sacrifice is offered rather than with the fundamental notion. But according to the principles of those essentially modern branches of study, the sciences of anthropology and comparative religion, an entirely new way of regarding the rite has arisen and one that altogether upsets the traditional teaching on the subject, both Catholic and non-Catholic. According to this new theory the notion of offering is practically eliminated and a sacrifice is described simply as a sacred meal or banquet in which gods and men feast together as a sign of their

Eucharist and as a testimony to the felt need of human nature for a close and real union with the Divinity it worships a need that can be satisfied in the religion of Christ alone.

Other writers prefer to regard sacrifice as essentially a gift offered to the gods in token of homage, to obtain their favor or avert their wrath. The origin of this custom is, however, placed either in that of offering food and drink to the spirits of the dead (from whom all gods have been evolved) or simply in the notion that the gods, like men, need or are at least refreshed and pleased by the offerings of food and drink set before them by their human subjects.*

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Theories such as these are all based upon the same assumptionthat the early religious ideas of man must necessarily have been of a low material nature, an assumption entirely disregarding any idea of Revelation and one that is not in reality borne out by the evidence of facts. The earliest ideas of man regarding religion, as far as history can show us, are not by any means his poorest. The evolution of religion from fetichism, ghost-worship, totemism and all the other superstitions through which it is supposed to have passed, is an hypothesis in reality lacking in solid foundation. Superstitions such as these are degenerations of religion and not the lower phases through which it has crept up to higher things. The history of religion in general, apart from revelation, can only be judged by that of religions in particular, and in these, the religions of Israel and of Jesus Christ alone excepted, degeneration, not progress, seems to be the law. The older theories on the nature of sacrifice no doubt depend too much on a priori considerations and too little on those historical and critical. But, on the other hand, modern theories do not seem to be altogether free from this fault. Instead of theory being always dependent upon fact, as science proclaims it should be, the process is often reversed and fact is colored by preconceived theory. No one, in reality, is so dogmatic in his pronouncements, so intolerant in his opinions as the modern critic or man of science. In comparative religion and its sister science, anthropology, this is especially noticeable. Yet it cannot be denied that both these sciences have done much in the way of throwing light on the problems of the history of religion and all connected with it, such, for example, as the subject of the present paper.

The study of sacrifice and its ritual in the various religions of the world is a most valuable means of throwing light on sacrifice in general, and indeed a necessary means if a true idea of its nature

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creatures either animate or inanimate and destroying it in an appropriate manner, the nothingness of all creation as compared to its Creator and His power to dispose of everything, even life itself, as He wills, is symbolized in a striking way. Hence the essential point in the sacrifice is the slaying or destruction of the object as suchof course, for the symbolical reasons mentioned above.

According to the oblation theory, while destruction in some form is admitted as forming part, and an important part, of sacrificial ritual, this destruction is only the means whereby the end of sacrifice is attained, that end being the handing over and surrender of the oblation to God. The destruction of the offering takes effect as far as man is concerned, but it is thereby all the more effectually given up to the Divine Powers, being now removed entirely from the dominion of its human owner. In this we have but another example of the ultimate inadequacy of all human symbols. To destroy what belonged to him and thus render it useless for his own purposes, was the best way in which man could express his desire to give it up completely to God, since no man can actually approach Him. The essential point of sacrifice, in this view, is not the destruction of the oblation, but the offering of it to God, the entire surrender of it to Him. The slaying is preparatory to the sacrifice, the necessary condition, but it is not in itself the sacrifice. This consists in the outpouring of the life-blood on or about the altar or other place set apart for the purpose. In this action was symbolized the offering and surrender of the victim's life to God, since in accordance with ancient ideas the life was contained in the blood. It is a fact worth noticing in connection with this that in the sacrificial ritual of most religions, while the actual slaying could be performed by any one-either he who brought the sacrifice or some lay official appointed for the purpose-the outpouring of the blood and also the burning of the flesh on the altar, when this was done, were acts reserved to the priest alone. The offerer of the sacrifice had done his part in presenting the victim and in slaying it, thus surrendering his own right over its life. It was for the priest, the intermediary between God and man, to bring the victim near to God, to effect what the offerer desired, by presenting the "life in the blood" at the very altar itself which represented God or was even believed to denote His actual presence. In the case of offerings of bread, meal or wine, the whole act of sacrifice was contained in the burning and outpouring on or about the altar. But, as in the case of living victims, the object was not to destroy the offerings, but to convey them to God. This rite of burning symbolized partly the entire surrender of the offerings, partly their acceptance by God, for the sacrificial fire was really a symbol of His presence, while the