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unimportant concession; for they were since some time occupied by the French and were no longer in his power. But he positively refused to bind himself to enter into any federation or to contract any obligation to consider the friends and enemies of France as his friends and enemies. That would lead him into a war and would be incompatible with the independence of the Holy See. Cardinal ed Bayane was therefore instructed to discuss this demand and make stipulations concerning it in order that the Emperor's intentions should be clearly defined; for if anything more than the closure of the ports were demanded, the Pope declared that he should be unable to ratify the treaty.15

When Cardinal de Bayane arrived at Fontainebleau on October 30, he found that the Emperor showed no desire to receive him immediately. Napoleon, in fact, had already decided on the course he intended to follow, and de Champagny, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, told the Cardinal that it was a matter of indifference to the Emperor whether his demands were granted or not, as he had made up his mind. Whatever, indeed, may have been the motive which impelled him to seek to negotiate with the Holy Father, it is certain that preparations had already been made for the annexation of three Papal provinces. He had written to Prince Eugène on September 25 to send General Duhesme's division from Cività Vecchia to Ancona and to form there an army destined to take possession of the provinces of Urbino, Macerata, Fermo and Spoleto, in order to assure his communications with the Kingdom of Naples. He added that all these French troops quartered in the Papal States were to be fed, clothed and paid by the Pope, which he thought that the Prince would find to be a very great economy. 16 Even while Cardinal de Bayane was on his way to Paris the Emperor sent General Lemarois to Prince Eugène to be invested by him with the command of all the troops, both Papal and French, quartered in those provinces, so that as soon as he got the order he might take possession of them, seize their revenues and establish a provisional administration.17 By subsequent despatches Prince Eugène was instructed to order the general to employ the Papal troops in suppressing brigandage and to arrest any of the Papal Governors or agents who refused to submit to his authority. Another letter of November 23 informed the Prince that the Papal representatives were still nominally the administrators of the country, but that General Lemarois was to have the command of the troops and of the police. The general had, indeed, already begun to make use of the powers conferred on him. He soon found that the functionaries named by the Holy See refused to obey any orders except those issued by the Pope, and being unable to overcome their resistance he caused several of them to be arrested, among others Mgr. Pandolfi, Governor of Ascoli, and Mgr. Rivarola, Governor of Macerata, the latter of whom he imprisoned in the fortress of Pesaro. Although in his interview with Mgr. Arezzo Napoleon had assured him that the only concession he would demand from the Pope was the closure of the ports of his States to English shipping, the draft of a much more extensive treaty, consisting of ten articles, was presented to Mgr. de Bayane on his arrival in Paris and was sent by him to Pius VII. By the terms proposed in this agreement the naval and military forces of the Sovereign Pontiff were to be united to those of the Emperor. In every war against the English the ports of the Papal States were to be closed to their warships and to their commerce, and the guard of the ports of Ancona, Ostia and Cività Vecchia was to be confided to the Emperor's troops. The fortress of Ancona was to have a garrison of 2,000 men, to be maintained by the Holy See, but the other French garrisons in the Papal States were to be maintained by the Emperor. His Holiness was to acknowledge their Majesties Joseph Napoleon, King of Naples; Louis Napoleon, King of Holland, and Jerome Napoleon, King of Westphalia, as well as the Grand Duke of Berg (Murat), the Princes of Lucca and Piombino and all the changes which had been made in Germany and Italy. The Pope should also renounce all his claims opposed to the rights of the King of Naples as well as his sovereignty over Benevento and Pontecorvo, now made fiefs of the Empire. The number of the Cardinals belonging to the French Empire was to be raised to one-third of the entire number of the Sacred College. The Concordat made with the Kingdom of Italy was to be extended to the various other States annexed to it as well as to the principalities of Lucca and Piambino, and no Bishop of the Kingdom of Italy was to be obliged to go to Rome to receive consecration. A Concordat was to be made without delay between the Holy See and His Majesty for the German States which form the Confederation of the Rhine.18

The Cardinals then present in Rome, to the number of over thirty, were again consulted by the Pope as to whether he could accept such

conditions, and if not, what course he should pursue. Of their answers, given in writing, no trace can be found, with the exception of the draft of that of Cardinal di Pietro, who pointed out the unjust and insidious character of the Emperor's proposals, the snares which they contained and the dangers to which their acceptance would lead. To quote a single example: If the Holy Father were to acknowledge all the "accomodamenti" (changes or arrangements) made by Napoleon in Germany and in Italy, it would render the other sovereigns of Europe hostile to him and tend to isolate him. It would also imply that he approved of the spoliation of the ecclesiastical Princes, of the chapters and of the monasteries of Germany, as well as of the many attacks on the possessions and the liberties of the Church which had taken place in Italy. The Cardinal, therefore, advised the rejection of these proposals, and that the Pope should make known to all Christendom by a strong, yet dignified protest, the excessive burdens which Napoleon sought to impose on the Holy See, and then implore the assistance of the Almighty by public prayers, and leave to Him the guidance of future events. 19 The Pope, therefore, when replying to Cardinal de Bayane on December 3, 1807, and again in another letter addressed to him by Cardinal Casoni on December 28, pointed out to him that if he were to consent to have the same friends and the same enemies as France, it would place him in a state of perpetual warfare absolutely incompatible with his character as a minister of peace, and that if he took part in hostilities against England, he should be deprived of all communication with the Catholics of that kingdom. The increase in the number of the French Cardinals, so strongly insisted on by the Emperor, would be subversive of the fundamental laws of the Holy See and of the Sacred College; it would also be an attack on the independence of the Holy See, and it would give rise to similar demands on the part of other Catholic powers. These conditions, therefore, as well as the others, which he also discussed, rendered it impossible that he should agree to a treaty which was incompatible with his liberty and independence as a sovereign, and if it were not withdrawn, the Cardinal should ask for his passports and leave Paris.

While Cardinal de Bayane was negotiating with M. de Champagny in Paris Napoleon had made a journey of inspection through North Italy, and when at Milan had met Cardinal Oppizoni, Archbishop of Bologna, and Cardinal Caselli, Archbishop of Parma, who had been charged by the Pope to make him a ceremonious visit. In his interview with them the Emperor again boasted of the services he had rendered to religion and complained of the proceedings of the Court of Rome, threatening that if it did not change its ways he 19 Rinieri, op. cit., p. 377.

would undo all that Charlemagne had done in favor of the Church. He again insisted on the expulsion of the English from the Papal States; on the acceptance by the Pope of the political changes which had taken place in Italy, and he ended by saying that he would wait for two months longer, after which, if he were not satisfied, he would take action.

On his return to Paris he expressed to Cardinal de Bayane, by a letter from de Champagny, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, the regret and the surprise which he felt that the Holy See, with which he ardently desired to be reconciled, should seek to avoid all agreement between the two powers; that it should refuse to unite with him against England and to arrest the Neapolitan brigands who had taken refuge in Rome; that it should persist in not recognizing the King of Naples, and to show the greatest obstinacy in refusing to augment the number of French Cardinals in proportion to the extent of the Empire. This refusal was most keenly felt by His Majesty. As protector of the clergy of his Empire, he saw with pain that the Holy See, from which the prelates of France might have expected to meet with favor and good will, rendered no justice to their intelligence, and that Cardinal de Bayane had been ordered to break off the negotiation and return to Rome. The Sovereign of Rome, therefore, does not wish for a reconciliation, but prefers a state of hostility against France; he wishes to risk an appeal to arms and to expose himself to the losses which may be the consequence. The Emperor sees it with grief and regret; for three years he has suppressed his just resentment, but the Pope's last refusals and the orders given to Cardinal de Bayane have exhausted his patience. Let the negotiation, therefore, be broken off, since the Pope wishes it. Let Cardinal de Bayane receive his passports and return to Rome.20

On the same day Cardinal Caprara was informed by M. de Champagny that if the Pope still refused to yield to the demands already mentioned, the Emperor would publish a decree, by which the provinces occupied by the French troops should be united to the Kingdom of Italy and the province of Perugia to Tuscany. The Ambassador at Rome, M. Alquier, would give the Pope five days to come to a decision. If His Holiness did not accept the conditions, the French embassy would leave at once and the French generals

would execute the orders about to be sent to them. The Emperor would most assuredly not yield; he would have all or nothing. That evening the Cardinal had an audience at the Tuileries, where Napoleon, who manifested much irritation, told him that although his patience was exhausted, yet if the Pope agreed to his requests he would restore to him the provinces occupied by his troops. If not, Generals Lemarois and Miollis would seize what remained of the Papal States and place a garrison in Rome. It was in vain that the Cardinal reasoned and implored. His arguments were either flung aside as representing antiquated ideas or were listened to in silence and left unanswered. His appeals to the Emperor's generosity seemed to strengthen his resolution not to yield.

The Emperor's demands, which reached Rome on January 22, were again submitted to the Sacred College and again rejected; but Pius VII. in his anxiety to make every effort to obtain peace consented, in a note addressed to Alquier, to grant some of them with regard to which his conscience could allow him to yield, and he refused only to take part in a confederation and to name as many French Cardinals as Napoleon demanded. But it was too late; the order for the occupation of Rome had been already issued, and any concession on the part of the Holy Father was useless. On January 10, the day after his interview with Cardinal Caprara, Napoleon wrote to Prince Eugène to order General Miollis to march upon Rome with 2,500 men from Tuscany and an equal number from Ancona, while Joseph Napoleon was directed to send 3,000 French and Neapolitan troops to Terracina, so as to support him if necessary. The greatest secrecy was to be observed with regard to this expedition, which was to march as though destined to join the army in Naples. On reaching Rome Miollis was to take possession of the Castle of Saint Angelo and to render the greatest honor to the Pope "tous les honneurs possibles." He was to announce that it was his duty to arrest the Neapolitan brigands who took refuge in Rome, and he was to seize King Ferdinand's Consul, the English Consul and the other English subjects in the city. He was not, however, to take part in the government, but he was to have the title of "commander-in-chief of the troops in the States of the Church" and to receive his orders only from the Emperor.21

On January 22 a despatch was sent to Alquier which should reach him two days before the arrival of General Miollis, in order to inform him that the general, though apparently marching upon Naples, was to stop in Rome and take possession of the Castle of