desecration was considered not only irreligious, but ill-omened. For that very reason Bale determined that on that day his household should go forth to the hay-making. "Five of my household," he tells us, "went out to make hay. And as they were come to the meadow cruel murderers to the number of a score leaped out of their lurking bushes and cowardly slew them. They then feloniously robbed me of all my horses, to the number of seven, driving them before them." But that this shocking outrage was chargeable neither to the townsfolk nor to the peasantry is proved by Bale's own admission as to the people's prompt and generous expedition to his rescue. He relates it with real gratitude and a touch of his usual vanity. The crime was undoubtedly the work of that band of lawless marauders sheltered by the great nobles of whom Bale himself gives elsewhere a graphic account. The unsettled state of the country gave them immunity. Bale's provision of horses supplied the temptation, while the general aversion in which he was held no doubt guided their choice. The sky was black and darker clouds were gathering. To prolong his apostolate until it would be crowned by martyrdom was no part of John Bale's vocation to Ireland. He had come to Kilkenny with little ceremony; he left it with less. Disguised at night, and with only his wife as companion, he shipped to Leighton Castle; thence, aided by the English, who were eager to be rid of so dangerous an ally, he hurried to Dublin. His old grudge against Archbishop Brown was embittered by that prelate's resolution to give him neither succor nor hospitality. "As the epicurous Archbishop had knowledge of my being there, he made boast upon his ale-bench, with cup in hand, as I heard the tale told, that for no man's pleasure would he let me preach in his city. But this needed not! He had then become of a dissembling proselite, a most pernicious Papist." After an anxious delay of some weeks in the unfriendly city of Dublin, poor Bale was able at last to watch a merciful sea broadening between him and the accursed shore which he never touched again. But, alas, a final and malicious practical joke of his enemies prolonged his misery for a month more. The little merchantman which had taken him as a passenger was bound for Scotland. She was boarded by a Flemish man-of-war hovering on the coast, and Bale was seized, put in irons and carried off as a captive, while the craft from which he had been dragged was permitted to pursue her way unmolested. Time and the peculiar treatment to which he was subjected opened the heart of the mystery. The Irish pilot, whom Bale suspected to be in "a complot with his enemies," had confidentially apprised the Flemish commander that the suspicious looking character, of whom he gave an exact description, was a Frenchman in disguise carrying a vast sum in gold, to be employed in his own country's war against Spain and Flanders! In vain the distracted traveler assured his stolid captors that he was no Frenchman, carried no gold and had no designs against Flanders, a country which he sincerely loved and honored. In vain he gave his name, explained his position, related his sorrows. It was all to no purpose. The Flemings either doubted him or affected to do so. Sometimes the stranger was harshly dealt with; at others he was treated with a certain distrustful indulgence. Only when the leader was convinced that no ransom would be forthcoming did he land his captive in Flanders, restoring such goods as the sailors had taken for booty. Through Flanders the balked apostle made his way to Germany, in which country he found spiritual comfort and temporal assistance. He settled in Geneva, and neither hoped nor desired to return to Great Britain, where he had found his cake "dough on both sides." But Elizabeth succeeded to the throne and rejoiced the right thinking by her mighty upholding of the truth and her powerful dealing with the ungodly. Old Bale thought it best to gather up his goods and go home. He was well received by the Queen, was appointed Prebend of Canterbury and thenceforth basked in the royal favor until the day of his death. The nightmare of his vocation to Ireland had passed away, and "his persecuciones in ye same." He had been granted "finalle delyveraunce therefrom." Chicago, Ill. M. A. DUNNE. I THE SPIRITUAL AND THE TEMPORAL POWER. III. LEGAL THEORIES ON THE TWO POWERS. T WAS inevitable during the contests between the Papal and the imperial sovereignty that theories should arise as to their interrelation, and an extremest view for the Papal claim was, at least in suggestion, put forth by John of Salisbury. The view was that the keys given to Peter bestowed upon the Holy See spiritual and temporal jurisdiction over the whole of Christendom, so that Kings ruled only as delegates or ministers of the Pontiff. This was the fullest extension of the doctrine known as that of the Two Swords. Hunc gladium de manu ecclesiae accipit princeps, cum ipsa tamen gladium sanguinis omnino non habeat. Est ergo princeps Sacerdotii minister. The writer, with a limited scope, was speaking of the coercive power on behalf of spiritual interests in the State, but these words were easily extended by others to a wider sphere. St. Thomas of Canterbury, who also had before him the preservation of ecclesiastical liberties from royal encroachment, took up a like strain in his letters of remonstrance addressed to Henry I., and appealing to the text, "Thou art Peter," he made the inference, "It is certain Kings receive their power from the Church," and that they should try to obstruct the juridical acts of the Bishops he regarded as quite an inversion of right order. Non habetis episcopis praecipere absolvere aliquem vel excomunicare; judicare de ecclesiis vel decimis; interdicere episcopis ne tractent causas de transgressione fidei vel juramenti; et multa alia hujusmodi quae scripta sunt inter consuetudines vestras quas dicitis avitas. Here was at least a possibility offered for an ampler extension of the idea that Kings should be administers of Popes. The fullfledged theory of a universal supremacy sprang from the theologians Henry of Segusia, Cardinal Bishop of Ostia, Augustinus Triumphus and Alvarez Pelagius, writers of the fourteenth century, who were copied later by Bozio. To this extreme right was opposed an extreme left-Ockam, Marsilio of Padua, and his collaborator, John of Jaudan, often confounded with John of Ghent, so that the writings of the two are not now respectively distinguishable. When the opposition became strongest it substituted Aristotle's politics for canon law and for St. Augustine's "Civitas Dei," a democratic basis for Church authority, and it set nationality above Catholicity. There was some anticipation of the maxim which Abraham Lincoln propounded when he said: "No man is good enough to govern another man without that man's consent." The large deference shown in the early Church to popular approval of candidates for clerical office had nothing to say to the intrinsic powers of priestly orders and of jurisdiction, which were a Christian institution depending for their validity on the Founder's authority. Thus with careful restrictions it was possible in primitive ages of the Church to make application of the old dictum: Quod omnibus tangit, ab omnibus approbetur. Approval is not the same as grant of power. But the school of Ockam and Marsilio claimed much more than this for their popular and quasi parliamentary control over the Popes. The University of Paris was seething with the new liberalism in theological opinions when D'Ailly was there as a young student, imbibing errors which he afterwards handed on to Gerson and propounded in the Council of Constance. It is true that his doctrine of superiority of the General Council to the Pope was delivered at a time when the legitimate Pope was doubtful and when the seventy years of captivity at Avignon were being followed by forty years of schism, all tending to lower the previous ideas entertained upon the subject of Papal supremacy. 1 Policraticus, IV., 3. 2 Cf. S. Bernard, "De Consider," IV., 3, Ep. 256. Another lowering influence is said to have been the study of Roman law, which is reported to have kindled in some breasts a dangerous enthusiasm for a return to imperialism conceived on the grand old lines of Roman Cæsarism. It has been shown that this study was not a novelty; that it did not start from a sudden discovery at Anagni of the previously lost pandects; that it had not to await the rise of the legalist university at Bologna before it became an influence. At the University of Paris, which was meant to be theological rather than legal, Honorius III. and Innocent IV. put restrictions on the study of the civil code.. Denifle in his "History of the Mediæval Universities" says that the limit here placed was not a broad policy of repression, but only an exceptional precaution which allowed of dispensations in desirable cases; for example, in favor of clerics holding only simplices curas animarum Gregory IX. granted exemption. Before the time of the inculpated Honorius III. (1216) a Council of Clermont (1130), which was followed by another at Rheims (1131), made provision against the distractions occasioned to the clergy by the study of law and medicine, and not only by the study, but also by the subsequent practice with a view to lucre. The decrees last mentioned affected all clerks regular and all monks who had taken their vows. A like precaution was adapted by a council held in London in 1268. It appears, then, that there were reasons for restriction quite other than the mere rivalry of civil law to canon law or to the theology of Papal claims. Apart from other connections, the Justinian code might have done little to make students disloyal to the Sovereign Pontiff, especially as in it was embodied the principle of Church authority: Maxima quidem in hominibus sunt dona Dei, a suprema collata clementia, sacerdotium et imperium. There is, furthermore, a conservatism in law which on the whole would make for the preservation of the Church's rights such as had been established before the calamities of the fourteenth century caused the obscuration of principles in regard to the Papal position. 3 A Pope said: Nullas invites et non petentibus ordinetur. 4 John of Salisbury, Ep. 138, observed that the study of the law did not contribute to the spirit of compunction. Roger Bacon complained that the clever students were drawn from theology to law, and thereby secularized. 5 Under Alexander III., 1176, the third Lateran Council (Canon 12) limited clerical pleaders to the defense of their own Church or of needy persons, who could offer no temptation to cupidity. A council of Paris, 1212, distinguished between beneficed and non-beneficed clergy, allowing the latter to take moderate remuneration for their advocacy: "ne immoderata salaria exigere praesumant." Greater strictness appeared in the decretals of Gregory IX., who made the prohibition absolute, "excepta defensione orphanorum et viduarum," Libr., III., Tit. 50. Causes of life and limb were declared unsuitable, as appears in the rule of Boniface VIII., "nec criminalium causarum potest quisquam clericus judex fieri, nec judex qui fuit in clericum coöptari." See Thomassinus, Part I., Liv. I., с. 69. As the disputes continued and showed themselves in practical life it became urgent to find some technical terms which would give precision to the title whereby the Popes claimed to control secular princes. Three phrases especially were found: (1) First, there was the potestas directa as it appeared in the teaching already described of Augustinus Triumphus and others." (2) There was the potestas directiva, a term which Fénelon attributes to Gerson and thus formulates in clear language: Haec non juridica et civilis est, sed directiva tantum et ordinativa potestas, quam approbat Gersonius. It might seem that a directive power would be far too little to account for the facts of history, but Fénelon makes up the deficiency by explaining how princes in a Christian State entered upon office, sometimes with an oath to that effect and sometimes on the tacitly understood condition to rule as Christian sovereigns, in subjection to the Church's canons and to her living Bishops, and that if they broke the engagement, it belonged to the Pope especially to declare the breach and to proclaim their authority forfeited. Such a right to arbitrate or to give a decision as in case of conscience, when vested in the prince of pastors, might suffice to meet all needs. Potestas directiva in eo consistit quod Papa, utpote princeps pastorum, utpote praecipuus in majoribus moralis disciplinae causis ecclesiae director et doctor, de servando fidelitatis sacramento populum consulentem edocere teneatur. In this way the various deposi 6 In England Grosseteste affords us a good illustration. By anti-Papalists he is often claimed as notably on their side, for he resisted some Papal presentations and taxations. He did so where he thought it right, but zeal for pure religion under the Pope's supreme authority was his most remarkable characteristic. He set wide apart the Bishop's proper office in spiritual and his participation in the judicial and magisterial work of the State; for himself he rejected the proffered compliment that he possessed "a universality of legal knowledge." From Gregory IX. he received authorization to take proceedings against ecclesiastics who acted as justiciaries or as sheriffs. He told a prelate that even if this dignitary's secular business were removed, his Church duties would still be too large for him. 7 These same extremists, with Egedius of Rome, denied that pagan peoples had a right to their territory, or that the Pope could grant it away to Christians. 8 Dissert. De Auctoritat. Sum. Pontif., cap. 39. 9 Id., cap. 27. |