situation, that it has taught the servants rather to look to a superior among themselves, than to their common superiors. This evil, growing out of the abuse of subordination, can only be corrected by a very strict enforcement of authority over that part of the chain of dependence, which is next to the original power.

Powers given to the ministers of the crown.

That which your committee considers as the fifth and last of the capital objects of the.tet," and as the binding regulation of the whole, 'is. the introduction (then for the first time) of the ministers of the crown into the affairs of the Company. The state claiming a concern and share of property in the Com pany's profits, the servants of the crown were presumed the more likely to preserve, with a scrupulous attention, th the sources of the great revenues, which they were to adminis ter, and for the rise and fall of which they were to render an.

account.

The interference of government was introduced by this act in two ways; one by a control, in effect by a share, in the appointment to vacancies in the supreme council. The act provided, that his Majesty's approbation should be had to the persons named to that duty. Partaking thus in the patronage of the Company, administration was bound to an attention to the characters and capacities of the persons employed in that high trust.

The other part of their interference was by way of inspec tion. By this right of inspection everything in the. Com pany's correspondence from India, which related to the civil or military affairs, and government of the Company, was di rected by the act to be within fourteen days after the receipt. laid before the secretary of state; and everything that related to the management of the revenues, was to be laid ber fore the commissioners of the treasury. In fact, both de scriptions of these papers have been generally communicated to that board.

It appears to your committee, that there were Defects in the great and material defects in both parts of the plan. plan. With regard to the approbation of pet.. sons nominated to the supreme council by the court of di rectors, no sufficient means were provided for carrying to his Majesty, along with the nomination, the particulars in the

conduct of those, who had been in the service before, which might render them proper objects of approbation or rejec tion. The India House possesses an office of record capable of furnishing, in almost all cases, materials for judging on the behaviour of the servants in their progress from the lowest to the highest stations; and the whole discipline of the service, civil and military, must depend upon an examination of these records inseparably attending every application for an appointment to the highest stations. But in the present state of the nomination, the ministers of the crown are not furnished with the proper means of exercising the power of control intended by the law, even if they were scrupulously attentive to the use of it. There are modes of proceeding favourable to neglect. Others excite inquiry, and stimulate to vigilance.

Your committee, therefore, are of opinion, for the future prevention of cabal, and of private and Proposition to remedy them. partial representation, whether above or below, that whenever any person, who has been in the service, shall be recommended to the king's ministers to fill a vacancy in the council-general, the secretary of the court of directors shall be ordered to make a strict search into the records of the Company; and shall annex to the recommendation the reasons of the court of directors for their choice, together with a faithful copy of whatever shall be found (if anything can be found) relative to his character and conduct; as also an account of his standing in the Company's service; the time of his abode in India; the reasons for his return; and the stations, whether civil or military, in which he has been successively placed.

With this account ought to be transmitted the names of those, who were proposed as candidates for the same office, with the correspondent particulars relative to their conduct and situation: for not only the separate, but the comparative, merit probably would, and certainly ought to have great influence in the approbation or rejection of the party presented to the ministers of the crown. These papers should be laid before the commissioners of the treasury and one of the secretaries of state, and entered in books to be kept in the treasury and the secretary's office.

Appointment

&c.

appointment.

Stables.

These precautions, in case of the nomination of counsellors, of any who have served the Company, appear to be necessary from the improper nomination and Macpherson's approbation of Mr. John Macpherson, notwithstanding the objections which stood against him on the Company's records. The choice of Mr. John Stables, from an inferior military to the highest civil capacity, was by no means proper, nor an encouraging example to either service. His conduct, indeed, in the subaltern military situation, had received, and seems to have deserved, commendation; but no sufficient ground was furnished for confounding the lines and gradations of service. This measure was, however, far less exceptionable than the former; because an irregular choice of a less competent person, and the preference given to proved delinquency, in prejudice to uncensured service, are very different things. But even this latter appointment would, in all likelihood, have been avoided, if rules of promotion had been established. If such rules were settled, candidates, qualified from ability, knowledge, and service, would not be discour aged by finding, that everything was open to every man; and that favour alone did not stand in the place of civil or military experience. The elevation from the lowest stations unfaithfully and negligently filled to the highest trusts, the total inattention to rank and seniority, and much more the combination of this neglect of rank with a confusion (unaccompanied with strong and evident reasons) of the lines of service, cannot operate as useful examples on those, who serve the public in India. These servants, beholding men, who have been condemned for improper behaviour to the Company in inferior civil stations, elevated above them, or (what is less blamable, but still mischievous) persons without any distinguished civil talents, taken from the subordinate situations of another line to their prejudice, will despair by any good behaviour of ascending to the dignities of their own; they will be led to improve, to the utmost advantage of their fortune, the lower stages of power, and will endeavour to make up in lucre what they can never hope to acquire in station.

The temporary appointment by parliament of the supreme

council of India arose from an opinion, that the Company, at that time at least, was not in a condition, or not disposed to a proper exercise of the privileges, which they held under their charter. It therefore behoved the directors to be particularly attentive to their choice of counsellors on the expiration of the period, during which their patronage had been suspended. The duties of the supreme council had been reputed of so arduous a nature as to require even legislative interposition. They were called upon, by all possible care and impartiality, to justify parliament at least as fully in the restoration of their privileges, as the circumstances of the time had done in their suspension.

But interests have lately prevailed in the court of directors, which, by the violation of every rule, seemed to be resolved on the destruction of those privileges, of which they were the natural guardians. Every new power given has been made the source of a new abuse; and the acts of parlia ment themselves, which provide but imperfectly for the prevention of the mischief, have, it is to be feared, made provisions, (contrary without doubt to the intention of the legislature,) which operate against the possibility of any cure in the ordinary course.

In the original institution of the supreme council, reasons may have existed against rendering the tenure of the counsellors in their office precarious. A plan of reform might have required the permanence of the persons, who were just appointed by parliament to execute it; but the act of one thousand seven hundred and eighty gave a duration, co-existent with the statute itself, to a council not appointed by act of parliament, nor chosen for any temporary or special purpose: by which means the servants in the highest situation, let their conduct be never so grossly criminal, cannot be removed, unless the court of directors and ministers of the erown can be found to concur in the same opinion of it. The prevalence of the Indian factions in the court of directors and court of proprietors, and sometimes in the state itself, renders this agreement extremely difficult: if the principal members of the direction should be in a conspiracy with any principal servant under censure, it will be impracticable; because the first act must originate there. The reduced state of the authority of this kingdom in Bengal may

be traced in a great measure to that very natural source of independence. In many cases, the instant removal of an offender from his power of doing mischief is the only mode of preventing the utter and, perhaps, irretrievable ruin of public affairs. In such a case, the process ought to be simple, and the power absolute in one, or in either hand separately. By contriving the balance of interests formed in the act, notorious offence, gross error, or palpable insufficiency, have many chances of retaining and abusing authority, whilst the variety of representations, hearings, and conferences, and possibly the mere jealousy and competition between rival powers, may prevent any decision; and at length give time and means for settlements and compromises among parties, made at the expense of justice and true policy. But this act of one thousand seven hundred and eighty, not properly distinguishing judicial process from executive arrangements, requires in effect nearly the same degree of solemnity, delay, and detail for removing a political inconvenience, which attends a criminal proceeding for the punishment of offences. It goes further, and gives the same tenure to all who shall succeed to vacancies, which was given to those whom the act found in office.

Another regulation was made in the act, which has a tendency to render the control of delinquency, or the removal of incapacity, in the council-general, extremely difficult, as well as to introduce many other abuses into the original apProvisional appointment of counsellors. The inconveniencies pointment for of a vacancy in that important office, at a great vacancies. distance from the authority that is to fill it, were visible; but your committee have doubts, whether they balance the mischief, which may arise from the power given in this act, of a provisional appointment to vacancies, not on the event, but on foresight. This mode of providing for the succession has a tendency to promote cabal, and to prevent inquiry into the qualifications of the persons to be appointed. An attempt has been actually made in consequence of this power, in a very marked manner, to confound the whole order and discipline of the Company's service. Means are furnished thereby for perpetuating the powers of some given court of directors. They may forestall the patronage of their successors; on whom they entail a line of supreme