agreements, by which they were bound by any payment to the country powers, and in exciting disturbances among all the neighbouring princes. Stimulating their ambition, and fomenting their mutual animosities, they sold to them reciprocally their common servitude and ruin.

The governor-general, Mr. Hastings, and the council, tell the directors, "that the supply for the investment has arisen from casual and extraordinary resources, which they could not expect always to command." In an earlier minute he expresses himself still more distinctly; he says, "If the internal resources of a state fail it, or are not equal to its occasional wants, whence can it obtain immediate relief but from external means?" Indeed, the investment has not been for any long time the natural product of the revenue of Bengal: when by the vast charge, and by the ill return of an evil political and military traffic, and by a prodigal increase of establishments, and a profuse conduct in distributing agencies and contracts, they found themselves under difficulties, instead of being cured of their immoral and impolitic delusion, they plunged deeper into it, and were drawn from expedient to expedient for the supply of the investment into that endless chain of wars, which this House, by its resolutions, has so justly condemned. At home these measures were sometimes countenanced, sometimes winked at, sometimes censured, but always with an acceptance of whatever profit they afforded.

At length the funds for the investment, and for these wars together, could no longer be supplied. In the year 1778, the provision for the investment from the revenues, and from the monopolies, stood very high. It was estimated at a million four hundred thousand pounds; and of this it appears, that a great deal was realized. But this was the high flood-tide of the investment; for in that year they announce its probable decline; and that such extensive supplies could not be continued. The advances to the board of trade became less punctual, and many disputes arose about the time of making them. However, knowing that all their credit at home depended on the investment, or upon an opinion of its magnitude, whilst they repeat their warning of a probable deficiency, and that their "finances bore an unfavourable aspect," in the year 1779 they rate the investment still

higher. But their payments becoming less and less regular, and the war carrying away all the supplies, at length Mr. Hastings, in December, 1780, denounced sentence of approaching dissolution to this system, and tells the directors, that "He bore too high a respect for their characters to treat them with the management of a preparatory and gradual introduction to an unpleasing report. That it is the only substantial information he shall have to convey in that letter." In confidence therefore of their fortitude, he tells them without ceremony, "That there will be a necessity of making a large reduction, or possibly a total suspension, of their investment; that they had already been reduced to borrow near £700,000. This resource (says he) cannot last; it must cease at a certain period, and that perhaps not far distant."

He was not mistaken in his prognostic. Loans now becoming the regular resource for retrieving the investment, whose ruin was inevitable, the council enabled the board of trade, in April, 1781, to grant certificates for government bonds at 8 per cent. interest for about £650,000. The investment was fixed at £900,000.

But now another alarming system appeared. These new bonds overloaded the market: those, which had been formerly issued, were at a discount; the board of trade was obliged to advance, therefore, a fourth more than usual to the contractors. This seemed to satisfy that description of dealers. But as those, who bought on agency, were limited to no terms of mutual advantage; and the bonds on the new issue falling from 3 to 8, 9, and 10 per cent. discount, the agents were unable to furnish at the usual prices. Accordingly a discount was settled on such terms as could be made; the lowest discount, and that at two places only, was at 4 per cent.; which, with the interest on the bonds, made (besides the earlier advance) at the least 12 per cent. additional charge upon all goods. It was evident, that as the investment, instead of being supported by the revenues, was sunk by the fall of their credit, so the net revenues were diminished by the daily accumulation of an interest accruing on account of the investment. What was done to alleviate one complaint thus aggravating the other, and at length proving pernicious to both, this trade on bonds likewise came to its period.

Your committee has reason to think, that the bonds have since that time sunk to a discount much greater even than what is now stated. The board of trade justly denominates their resource for that year, "the sinking credit of a paper currency, labouring, from the uncommon scarcity of species, From this under disadvantages scarcely surmountable." they value themselves "on having effected an ostensible proFor 1783 nothing apvision, at least for that investment." pears even ostensible.

By this failure a total revolution ensued of the most extraordinary nature, and to which your committee wish to call For the councilthe particular attention of the House. general, in their letter of the 8th of April, 1782, after stating, that they were disappointed in their expectations, (how grounded it does not appear,) "thought, that they should be able to spare a sum to the board of trade"-they tell the court of directors, "that they had adopted a new method of keeping up the investment by private subscribers for eighty lacks of rupees, which will find cargoes for their ships on the usual terms of privilege at the risk of the individuals; and is to be repaid to them according to the produce of the sales in England." And they tell the directors, that "a copy of the plan makes a number in their separate despatches over land.” It is impossible, in reporting this revolution to the House, to avoid remarking with what fidelity Mr. Hastings and his council have adhered to the mode of transmitting their accounts, which your committee found it necessary to mark and censure in their first report. Its pernicious tendency is there fully set forth. They were peculiarly called on for a most accurate state of their affairs, in order to explain the necessity of having recourse to such a scheme, as well as for a full and correct account of the scheme itself. But they send only the above short minute by one despatch over land, whilst the copy of the plan itself, on which the directors must form their judgment, is sent separately in another despatch over land, which has never arrived. A third despatch, which also contained the plan, was sent by a sea conveyance, and arrived late. The directors have, for very obvious reasons, ordered by a strict injunction, that they should send duplicates of all their despatches by every ship. The spirit of this rule, perhaps, ought to extend to every mode of con

veyance. In this case, so far from sending a duplicate, they do not send even one perfect account. They announce a plan by one conveyance, and they send it by another conveyance, with other delays and other risks.

At length, at nearly four months distance, the plan has been received; and appears to be substantially that which had been announced, but developing in the particulars many new circumstances of the greatest importance. By this plan it appears, that the subscription, even in idea or pretence, is not for the use of the Company; but that the subscribers are united into a sort of society for the remitting their pri vate fortunes: the goods indeed are said to be shipped on the Company's account, and they are directed to be sold on the same account, and at the usual periods of sale; but, after the payment of duties, and such other allowances as they choose to make, in the 11th article they provide " that the remainder of the sales shall revert to the subscribers, and be declared to be their property, and divided in proportion to their respective shares.' The compensation, which they allow in this plan to their masters for their brokerage, is, that if (after deducting all the charges, which they impose) "the amount of the sales should be found to exceed two shillings and twopence for the current rupee of the invoice account, it shall be taken by the Company." For the management of this concern in Bengal they choose commissioners by their own authority. By the same authority they form them into a body; they put them under rules and regulations; and they empower them also to make regulations of their own. They remit, by the like authority, the duties, to which all private trade is subject; and they charge the whole concern with 7 per cent. to be paid from the net produce of the sales in England, as a recompence to the commissioners; for this the commissioners contract to bear all the charges on the goods to the time of shipping.

The servants having formed this plan of trade, and a new commission for the conduct of it, on their private account,it is a matter of consideration to know who the commissioners are. They turn out to be the three senior servants of the Company's board of trade, who choose to take upon them to be the factors of others for large emoluments, whilst they receive salaries of two thousand pounds, and fifteen hundred

pounds, a year from the Company. As the Company have no other fund than the new investment, from whence they are to be paid for the care of their servants' property, this commission and those salaries being to take place of their brokerage, they in effect render it very difficult, if not impossible, for them to derive advantage from their new occupation. As to the benefit of this plan: besides preventing the loss which must happen from the Company's ships returning empty to Europe, and the stopping of all trade between India and England, the authors of it state, that it will "open a new channel of remittance, and abolish the practice, by precluding the necessity, of remitting private fortunes by foreign bottoms; and that it may lead to some permanent mode for remittance of private fortunes, and of combining it with the regular provision of the Company's investment. That it will yield some profit to the Company without risk; and the national gain will be the same as upon the regular trade."

As to the combination of this mode of remittance with the Company's investment, nothing can be affirmed concerning it until some satisfactory assurance can be held out, that such an investment can ever be realized. Mr. Hastings and the gentlemen of the council have not afforded any ground for such an expectation. That the Indian trade may become a permanent vehicle of the private fortunes of the Company's servants is very probable; that is, as permanent as the means of acquiring fortunes in India; but that some profit will accrue to the Company is absolutely impossible. The Company are to bear all the charge outwards, and a very great part of that homewards; and their only compensation is the surplus commission on the sale of other people's goods. The nation will undoubtedly avoid great loss and detriment, which would be the inevitable consequence of the total cessation of the trade with Bengal, and the ships returning without cargoes. But if this temporary expedient should be improved into a system, no occasional advantages to be derived from it would be sufficient to balance the mischiefs of finding a great parliamentary corporation turned into a vehicle for remitting to England the private fortunes of those, for whose benefit the territorial possessions in India are, in effect and substance, under this project to be solely held.