437 Reporter's Statement of the Case MADDEN, Judge; and LITTLETON, Judge, concur. JONES, Judge; and WHALEY, Chief Justice, took no part in the decision of this case. In accordance with the above opinion and upon a stipulation filed by the parties showing the amount due thereunder to be $10,497.34 together with interest thereon as provided by law from April 22, 1938, and upon plaintiff's motion for judgment, it was ordered April 3, 1944, that judgment for the plaintiff be entered in the sum of $10,497.34 together with interest thereon as provided by law from April 22, 1938. MORRIS STEIN, FRANK S. SCHWINGER, COPARTNERS, TRADING AS REGAL EQUIPMENT COMPANY, v. THE UNITED STATES Increased labor costs under National Industrial Recovery Administration Act.-Following the decision in John E. Sjostrom Co., Inc. v. United States, 100 C. Cls. 548, it is held that the evidence in the instant suit is not sufficient to show that increased labor costs were the result of the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Administration Act. The Reporter's statement of the case: Mr. Fred B. Rhodes for the plaintiff. Mr. N. A. Clapp, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea, for the defendant. Mr. Currell Vance was on the briefs. The court made special findings of fact as follows: 1. The plaintiffs are copartners, trading and doing business under the firm name and style of Regal Equipment Company, with its office and main place of business in New York City, New York. Plaintiffs are residents of the State of New York. *Plaintiffs' motion for new trial overruled June 5, 1944. Plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari pending. Reporter's Statement of the Case 101 C. Cls. 2. This action is brought pursuant to the Act of Congress approved June 25, 1938 (52 Stat. 1197), entitled "An Act to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and enter judgment upon the claims of Government contractors whose costs of performance were increased as a result of enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act, June 16, 1933." 3. At the times here involved plaintiffs were engaged in buying and selling various textiles, such as piece goods, sheets, pillow cases, linens, and similar articles. They were not manufacturers. On July 1, 1933, they entered into a contract with the Treasury Department to supply to the Government on order of various of its agencies certain textiles listed under plaintiffs' name in the General Schedule of Supplies, fiscal year 1934. A copy of the contract is in evidence and made part hereof by reference. It bears serial number Tgs. 9377. Its terms and requirements have been fully executed by both parties. 4. The prices listed in the general schedule, which was made a part of the contract, were the agreed prices for the articles to be supplied. The prices so agreed to were based by plaintiffs on prices prevailing before enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Upon receipt of an order from a Government agency for articles listed in the general schedule, plaintiffs went into the market, bought the article, and invoiced it to defendant at the contract price. In so doing they ran the risk of an increase in market price, or gained a greater profit in the event of a decrease in market price. Shipments under the contract were made directly from the manufacturers to Governmental institutions involved. 5. The plaintiffs signed the President's Reemployment Agreement August 9, 1933. 6. Under the provisions of the Act of June 16, 1934, 48 Stat. 974, and within the limitation provided in Section 4 of that Act, plaintiff's presented to the Treasury Department a claim for increased costs of performance under the above 451 Opinion of the Court described contract. The claim was disallowed by the Comptroller General for lack of sufficient proof. 7. The proof is insufficient to show the amount of the increase in cost of performance of plaintiffs' contract as a result of the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The court decided that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover. WHITAKER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiffs sue to recover increased costs due to the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act. On July 1, 1933, plaintiffs entered into a contract with the defendant to furnish certain supplies, such as piecegoods, sheets, pillow cases, linens, bedspreads, and similar articles, at stated prices upon order during the year July 1, 1933, to June 30, 1934. Plaintiffs' bid was put in during February 1933; the contract was awarded in June 1933. During the year goods in the amount of about $8,000 were ordered by the defendant and were supplied by plaintiffs. When the goods were ordered plaintiffs went into the open market and bought them as cheaply as possible, and resold them to the defendant at the contract price. They claim that the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act increased the prices they had to pay for the goods purchased by them, with the result that their cost of fulfilling the contract was increased. They sue for the sum of $4,376.12. At the hearing before the Commissioner it was admitted that this claimed increase was in part due to processing taxes in the amount of $1,228.48; this amount they have eliminated from their claim. They also admit that the last two items of their claim were not sold in pursuance of the contract under which they sue. The commissioner has eliminated from the amount claimed both the processing taxes and the last two items above mentioned, and as a result has found that plaintiffs' costs were increased as the result of the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act by the amount of $2,883.25. We have carefully examined the testimony introduced Opinion of the Court 101 C. Cls. and we are of the opinion that plaintiffs have not shown the amount by which their costs were increased as the result of the passage of this Act. The only testimony as to the amount of the increase is the claim filed by them with the Comptroller General under the Act of 1934, and the testimony of plaintiff Stein that this claim accurately stated the difference between what plaintiffs were compelled to pay for the goods purchased by them for resale to the defendant and the amount for which they could have purchased them at the time they put in their bid. Plaintiff Stein also testified that this increase was the result of the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The testimony of the people from whom plaintiffs purchased these goods was not introduced. No other testimony to show the reason or reasons for the increase in cost was introduced. The persons from whom plaintiffs purchased these goods had much more intimate knowledge of the factors bringing about the increase than did plaintiffs. Plaintiff Stein's own testimony cannot be regarded as other than an assumption on his part. Undoubtedly the National Industrial Recovery Act was partially responsible for the increase, but, for all we know, other factors may have contributed thereto. For instance, we know that the levy of processing taxes increased prices. There may have been other factors. Plaintiffs did introduce a document put out by The Cotton-Textile Institute, Inc., which recommended to its members an adjustment of prices on pre-existing contracts on account of the increase in prices due to the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Some of the items included in this pamphlet were sold to the defendant by plaintiffs; but the increase in prices of such items recommended by The Cotton-Textile Institute was substantially less than that claimed by plaintiffs. This document is proof of the fact that there was some increase in the price of some of the articles sold due to the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act, but it disproves plaintiff Stein's statement as to the amount of that increase. Documents introduced by the defendant show that causes other than the National Indus 451 Syllabus trial Recovery Act contributed to an increase in prices of such goods. As to the items not included in the document of The CottonTextile Institute, plaintiff Stein's testimony stands alone. We cannot accept his unsupported statement, made with so little opportunity to know the facts, as sufficient proof of the facts alleged in the petition. On this state of the record we are obliged to hold that plaintiffs have not proven their case. John E. Sjostrom Co. Inc. v. United States, 100 C. Cls. 548. Plaintiffs' petition will be dismissed. It is so ordered. MADDEN, Judge; and LITTLETON, Judge, concur. JONES, Judge; and WHALEY, Chief Justice, took no part in the decision of this case. IRWIN & LEIGHTON v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 44915. Decided April 3, 1944] On the Proofs Government contract; decision of contracting officer not binding upon the Court; the defendant bound by decision of its own contracting officer. In a suit involving a Government construction contract the Court is not bound by the findings of the contracting officer as to damages due to delay (Langevin v. United States, 100 C. Cls. 15), but unless the clear weight of the evidence shows the delay was less than that found by the contracting officer, the Government is bound by his finding. Same; extension of time by contracting officer on account of delay; contractor not entitled to recover for such delay.-Where the contracting officer extended plaintiffs' contract time on account of delay due to defendant's consideration of proposed changes; and where, according to the evidence adduced, it is questionable whether or not the plaintiffs were delayed at all on account of the change in question; and where it is found that the delay was not unreasonable; it is held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover. Magoba Construction Co. v. The United States, 99 C. Cls. 662, 690; Silberblatt & Lasker, Inc. v. The United States, 101 C. Cls. 54, cited. Same; delay by strike for which Government was not responsible; damages not recoverable therefor.-Where contractors were delayed 20 days by a strike in subcontractor's plant, for which |