contradistinction from the heathen world, inasmuch as Israel in general is called the servant of God, in distinction from the heathen, although in itself it was not perfectly the servant of God. But where now, in Israel, is the proper throne of this cogía, and the full revelation of it? V. 15 points us to the temple; (and to this, the later doctrine respecting the Shechinah attaches itself). Vs. 32, 33, direct our view to the book of the Covenant, the Law from which Wisdom flows. But if the author remained consistent with himself, then would not only the Messianic idea be extinguished in the conceit that the temple and the book of the Covenant would ever be sufficient, but he must content himself with the purely external dwelling of copía in Jacob. But so little do we find in him or in the book of Wisdom, of the σogía as connected with the Messianic idea,' that both acknowledge Wisdom to be satisfied neither with a general taking root in Jacob, nor in that external abode with him. Hence Sirach represents her as ever striving after a constant enlargement (vs. 17-22). It seeks no more. An extensive increase satisfies it. Still more does the author of the book of Wisdom, who is less theocratical in his opinions, satisfy himself with a transition (μeravaßáEw) of Wisdom into the souls of the pious (wvɣás óoías). But inasmuch as these writers recognize only an imparting to many, so they acknowledge no concentration in one. Thus they more and more lose sight of the need of the same, and in a twofold way institute a levelling process. The Palestine writers do indeed maintain a theocratic standpoint, but the religious process comes to a halt; and instead of strenuous advance, instead of a Messianic idea developed more purely and amply, they seek progress in the extension of it, and in the making of proselytes, and the hope for a political Messiah, whose prosperity, as they view the matter, will be on the most extensive scale.2

The Alexandrians, on the contrary, as the book of Wisdom shows, tasting of heathen-wisdom, suffer to evaporate a sense of the need of a historic God-man; they even lose, by mingling with heathenism, the noble religious foundation and the steadfast belief of the Hebrew fathers. Does PHILO make an exception to this remark? This demands, in the present position of our question, a more thorough investigation.

The book of Wisdom shows, that Philo with his method of thought stands not alone, but that in his works has been preserved for us the blooming or philosophic school which undoubtedly was widely extended, since it grew up even on Jewish ground. It is worth the pains

1 This in itself is to be sure unexpected, since in these ideas an anti-theocratical and philosophical element is in action, while the true Messianic idea shoots up only on theocratic ground.

2 Mohammedism is a continuation of this phase of Judaism.

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of examining his views with more particularity, because he was not merely a contemporary with Christ, and, while Palestine was beholding the Saviour, was the greatest of the Jews out of Palestine, but also because his system was the most direct counterpart of Christianity, and a corresponding picture which deceived many. In him Judaism, tinged by Hellenism, wrought itself up to an effort to accomplish by the power of reflection, that which the Messianic idea was designed to do, and thereby to make a substitute for the Messiah and render him superfluous. Out of this process of the ideal mutual operation of the heathenish and Jewish, which produces in him a kind of prelude of perfectible Christianity, we may explain the phenomenon, that for a time some persons of slender acuteness for historical sifting, have regarded him as a Christian, and may also explain his changing of colors between two opposite stand-points, which mocks all attempts at conciliation.

In what follows, Philo will be considered principally in respect to the stand-point of his Messianic views; and these may be best exhibited by a right comprehension of his doctrine of the Logos, which has been so diversely understood by different persons.1

The different views which have been taken of Philo's system appear gradually to have come to an agreement in this, viz. that it is made up of heterogeneous ingredients; and also, that it represents in a peculiar way the ancient distinction between God revealed and God concealed. Lücke maintains, that the theological positions in respect to Wisdom and Word run together, as they regard the Philonic Logos separated from God, p. 253 Comm. Others assert, that his Logos, in its ultimate

1 Comp. Dähne, historical Sketch of the Jewish Alexandrine Philosophy, 1834, (reviewed by Bauer in the Year-Book of scientific Criticism, 1835, Nov. No., 95 seq.). Gfrörer, Philo and the Alexandrine Theosophy, Stuttg.1831. Grossmann, Questiones Philonianae, Leipz.1829. L. A. Simson, Summa Theolog. Joann. Diss. 1839, pp. 28-64. Georgii, On the recent Contrarieties, in the comprehension of the Alexandrine religious Philosophy, particularly of Jewish Alexandrinism, printed in Illgen's Journal for historical Theology, 1839, Part and 4. Dr. Edw. v. Muralt, Investigations in respect to Philo, in relation to the MSS. belonging to the Petersburgh Academy, viz. of 27 Treatises of the same, read on the 5th of June, 1840. Semisch, Justin Martyr, Vol. II. 1842, pp. 267-274. Bauer, the Christian Doctrine respecting the Trinity and the Incarnation of God, 1844, pp. 59-76; also his Christian Gnosis, 1835, p. 42 seq. Lücke, Comm. on John, edit. 3, Vol. I. 253, 272 seq., (which also gives the more ancient literature). A. Franck, the Cabbala, or religious Philosophy of the Hebrews, tranlated (into German) from the French, by Ad. Gelinek, Leips, 1844, specially pp. 215-249. Ritter, History of Philosophy, Vol. IV. pp. 428, 446 seq. Neander, Church History, edit. 2, Vol. I. pp. 84 seq., de- Error in tinne pendent on others in its representations; as also, to name no more, Strauss, Cation. The Critique of Christian Doctrine, Vol. I. pp. 414 seq.

clause in the original applies to

Strauss, not Neander.

relation, is only an ideal potence. So G. A. Meier (History of the Doctrine of the Trinity, Vol. I. p. 20 seq.) regards his Logos only as an abstraction an idea or notion of the world; and he attributes to it a merely theoretic meaning.

The main controversy, however, has respect to the following questions:

(1) Is Philo's Logos mere personification, or actual hypostasis? Many recent writers defend this last view. Besides Grossmann, Dähne, Gfrörer, Ritter, Lücke (p. 279), Semisch (p. 274), there are some of the older writers, e. g. Keil and Ballenstedt. Still Lücke does not deny, that the opposing grounds of the Reviewer of Grossmann and Gfrörer have great weight; (see Leips. Lit. Journal, 1831, No. 126, p. 1001 seq.-1832, No. 255, p. 2029 seq.). Simson, yon Muralt, and in part Franck and others, are in opposition to these writers. Lücke concedes that Philo exhibits inconsistencies; as does Semisch also, loc. cit. p. 274. His words are: "To be sure, Philo does not strenuously recognize the personality of the Logos throughout; and indeed he appears sometimes to resolve his personal subsistence fully into an attribute, etc." Lücke has most fully and completely presented the grounds for maintaining his personality. These

are:

ἀρχάγγελος.

(a) Philo calls the Logos dozáryelos.' But he also names him ἀρχιερεύς, παράκλητος; and yet Lücke confesses, that these words prove as little as the appellations opgaris or deoμós. Besides, granting that these words are to be taken in the same sense as the O. Test. angel in Philo, yet they are so identified with ἰδέαι, λόγοι, δυνάμεις, that their personal meaning is often questionable. Yea, since the Logos is again the principle of unity in these δυνάμεις and ἄγγελοι, one may, instead of concluding that the angels are personal, and the Logos also, with equal right conclude the contrary, viz., that either the Logos is personal, and then for him the angels are not so but impersonal energies of which he is the unity; or that the angels are personal, and then the Logos is no longer their personal unity.

(b) Philo calls the Logos deureoos sós,' Euseb. Praep. Evang. VII. 13. But he immediately adds, that he so speaks only catachrestically, because deúzegos deós is for him properly a contradictio in adjecto, [i. e. a contradiction of the main principle by virtue of a quality ascribed to it]. The passage undoubtedly refers to something not completely divine, but which is capable of contact with the world, while that which is divine in the highest sense is incapable of this. But whether this imperfectly divine being is personal, or is only one aspect of God which ideally has a fixed meaning, namely, that of

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revelation, which, without being personal, may be spoken of in the way of personification is not decided by this. Recent writers also speak of something in God which is not God, and of God as being in something which is different from him, etc.

(e) The Logos is the image of God; yet God is personal, and consequently his Logos.' But the body of man is an image of his spirit; and a mirror reflects back the form. The Logos is indeed a living power; but so are impersonal energies. Moreover we are thus fully entitled to draw the conclusion, that all nature, inasmuch as it is the image of the Logos, must be personal because he is so.

(d) Others, e. g. Semisch, add to this the argumentation derived from the idea of the Logos as mediating between God and the world. Rightly, however, does Lücke acknowledge, that the idea of a mediator (doxuosus) proves nothing. God himself can, in one aspect of his being, accomplish the mediation so as it is represented in Philo. This is not ethical, but only physical or metaphysical. Bauer acknowledges in Philo's system a contradiction fully unreconciled. In his view, it contains two systems, one God who cannot reveal himself, and yet a world which, through the Logos, is a revelation of God, p. 63. For this Logos Bauer obtains in one respect a hypostasis, by separating him from copía, which he assigns to God most high as an attribute, with two other subordinate ones, goodness and power. Out of these three, especially out of wisdom, the Logos is then said to be a hypostatic emanation. The cogía in God stands related to the Logos, as the Logos ἐνδιάθετος to the Logos προφορικός. But how, from this relation, more than the actual reality of the Logos can be deduced, or how it follows that he exists as a subject, does not appear. Indeed Bauer has not once shown any established difference between the Logos and the cogía. The consequence of this would be, that the latter is introduced as speaking and creating, while the Logos is represented as a creature; which are ideas that lie far out of the circle of Philo's vision.

On the other hand, Bauer finds moreover in Philo's Logos a conception altogether empty and formal. In his view, he is only the ideal world, or the world conceived of as a unity; and in this way everything accords with the nominalistic views, (p. 74). In a similar way does Franck decide, respecting the two-foldness of the system in unity, as it stands in Philo. But with a Hellenic ingredient he combines also a Cabbalistic one, educed from Persia; while the conflict of the Hellenic idea in respect to the Absolute Being, (which appeared to Philo exceedingly sublime and imposing), with the O. Test. idea of God, appears to me sufficient to explain all in a satisfactory manner.

Philo has not, like Plotinus, his only fixed stand-point in the Absolute, the rò ov. But although the Hellenic idea takes so strong a grasp upon him, yet has the O. Test. idea of God an influence over him. The latter he designs to place on a higher eminence; and this it is which involves him in a chaotic circuiting and fluctuating. He succumbs under the self-contradictory undertaking, to show that the O. Test. religion is the religion of the Hellenic Absolute, whose glory consists in this, viz., that all besides itself is only a mere shadow of the glory which it includes in itself. In this way he sacrifices the ethical absoluteness or lofty nature of God to the physical one, vainly imagining that he is doing service to ongέлɛα. But with this offering he attains to no definite end, because the other ingredient, his empirical starting point, is the religion, whose vindication as the absolutely true is the main object for which he is striving. He paraphrases it, he generalizes it, he evaporates it, in order to do it honor. But by all this he does not design to arrive at the position, that God only exists, or that only the absolute idea and knowledge respecting it exists, but it still remains his ultimate object, to unite philosophy and religionthat religion which, when rightly understood and comprehended, is the religion of the Old Testament.

Still, however diverse these views may seem to be, all without any difficulty will concede, that the Logos, if he be hypostatized, was regarded by Philo only as a being separate from God, existing out of the divine sphere, and subordinate to the Supreme. If Philo entertained the proper idea of real creation, then the Logos must have appeared to him, in case he designed to hypostatize him as the Arians afterwards did, as a created being. Yet he does not maintain that, but regards him rather in the light of the Emanation-philosophy. This brings him apparently nearer to that Christian idea, which was in later times call the homoousian. In truth, however, the emanation-idea of God stands nearer to Heathenism than to Christianity, inasmuch as, from the nature of the thing, an emanation-hypostasis always comprises something which is evanescent and uncertain. Since now the original archetype, represented in the manner of the emanation-philosophy, differs but little from God revealed (as distinguished from God concealed), it makes but little difference whether one, with Lücke, hypostasizes the Philonic Logos in the manner of the Emanationists; or whether he denies the divine hypostasis in Philo, but concedes the difference between God concealed and revealed. The question respecting the Philonic hypostasis has a much more limited interest than is often assigned to it. Indeed it may be regarded as in a measure a mere vexed question, because it lay, in respect to him, entirely