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Views of Philo.


with matter which in itself is not divine. His idea of God will not shield him from the charge of Pantheism in the last sense, for this idea is not held in a moral way; but only his views of matter, or his Dualism. In relation to this, he names the world of the Logos the garment of God, (De Prof. § 20. I. 562). For this actual world, "the same Logos is now mortal, an intercessor with the immortal, and messenger of the Lord to his subjects;" therefore mediator between both parties. This office he gladly exercises. "I stand" (so he introduces him as mythologically speaking, I. 501, 502), “in the midst, between the Lord and you, since I am neither unbegotten as God is, nor begotten like you, but in the midst of extremes, I am a surety for both; for the Creator, that he may be assured the whole race will not fall and perish, choosing disorder instead of order; for the created being, that he may have good hope that a gracious God will never overlook his own work. For I would fain be the herald of peace, who brings a joyful message from God, the eternal guardian of peace."

The like may be found elsewhere, (De Prof. § 20. I. 562). Bauer's gradation (loc. cit. p. 68 seq.), viz. (1) WISDOM (God) with its fundamental powers of goodness and might; (2) Logos, in the second rank corresponding to σοφία, (θεός and κύριος answering to goodness and might in the first case), I find partly not to be held fast in Philo, and partly that it proves nothing for a special personality of the Logos; yea, as little as thought (λóуos лeoßúræpos) is something personal in contrast with thinking, or word (λóɣos nqoqoqıxós) in contrast with thinking. That power and goodness, together with wisdom, are very important designations in Philo, will be shown hereafter. But they are not so in respect to the inner essence of God, or rather they belong not at all to this when strictly considered, but they are dvvάues or potencies in him, which have their meaning in respect to his activity, (II. 261, De Sacrificant. § 15. De Profug. § 18 seq. I. 560 seq.). All essence of God is in so far destitute of attributes, as it is the presupposed source of all properties, but cannot in itself be separated. But to proceed:

The high priest is the divine Logos, faultless by birth and essence, his Father being the vous and his mother copía. The eldest Logos is clothed with the world, as with a garment; with earth and water, with air and fire, and whatever comes therefrom. He is, as reason, the bond of the existing God which holds all parts together as members, just as the imparted soul (that of man) does the members of his body. The high priest, moreover, is called Logos, at one time, as the faultless unity of the world, which he represents as κόσμος νοητός as world-idea; and in this idea is individuality reconciled and mediated with God. Real is it, however, in so far as it is not an inoperative

idea, but makes the actual world with its formative material into an actual expression of itself, of the divine seal, or into a garment. Therein, being everywhere present, he lives, and moves, and represents his ideas. And as such a living energic unity, he gives surety as well to the world for its completeness in the view of God, as to God himself, the existing One. For he is the world itself, according to that which makes it a xóoμos; which is not merely ideal, but real. Still this world-idea contains no relation to history in itself. The Logos is not the world-idea respecting the world viewed in a moral light by a free agent, and to be realized through a revelation from God in the progress of history, but it is that which is immediately actual, i. e. physical. Here the point becomes prominent, where the deep antagonism of the Philonic system against the Christian idea is clearly disclosed; while at the same time, in what has been heretofore said, there is a deceptive resemblance to Christian doctrines, at least in the mode of expression. But before we treat of this, viz. Philo's attitude in respect to the Messianic ideas of his nation, and his position in regard to Christianity, let us look back for a moment on what has thus far been adduced.

It is clear from this, that nothing obliges us to understand Philo's Logos as a hypostasis; but everything which is usually brought forward for this purpose, when closely inspected, is opposed to this. Such a hypostatical plurality in God is altogether against the manner of the man, who with such stringent force is hurried away from plurality to unity. He has sacrificed to this strenuousness for unity the deep moral discrepance which ancient Hebraism made between God and the world; and on the reef of λn, has only contrived to save himself from sinking into the undistinguishing unity of God and the world.

But after all, success cannot attend on an effort so to merge the mass of Logos-doctrine, with what is appended to it, into the absoluteness of the simple divine Being, that this can become immediately identical with that divine Being. As little as the divine Logos is a hypostasis, so little is he God in himself (zò "Or). Still, since, according to what has gone before, the Logos is at all events to be again reckoned as God himself, we are compelled to say, that in the Philonic doctrine of the Logos, the way is prepared, although remotely, for the doctrine of a distinction in God himself. God is distinguished in respect to his self-existence and his living power. (A higher category Philo could not attain to). As existing in himself, he is the to "Ov; as actual Being, he is Logos. To these two principal elements may be added a third, viz., that he as Logos, (1) Is, inseparably and at the same time, both the world of divine thoughts, and he who thinks


Philo's Logos.

them. (2) He it is who reveals them in matter, which he constitutes the medium of actuality for the ideal-world. So we have divine life as it were in three stages of development, to which it proceeds or extends itself (I. 209), viz., God in himself, the ideal world, and the actual world. But to separate the three has been a mere matter of endeavor. The discrepancies sink down again into each other, when closely examined. To particularize; the actual world, so far as it is to be regarded as a determination of the divine life, is not through itself separated from the ideal world, but only through something external, viz. its relation to matter, (see above). The ideal world, however, even the Logos generally considered, cannot be fixed upon as an objective distinction of God, from God; for if reason were to be reckoned only on the side of the Logos, so could God hardly be named God. Or if one says, that the Logos is God as the object of thought, a ɛós who thinks with oogía, so partly this cannot be carried through strenuously, since the Logos means him who thinks the ideal world; and partly we should then have no being-thought-of as pertaining to God, since the object of thought is much more only the world. In fact Philo calls, in like manner, God and the Logos the rózos (dwelling-place) of the universe, which encompasses all and is encompassed by nothing, since


'Here belongs the question, whether Philo applies to the divine Logos the distinction between Logos ἐνδιάθετος and Logos προφορικός. In De Vit. Moys. lib. III. 154, he uses these words: A twofold Logos should be distinguished, as well in relation to rò av as in relation to men. In relation to the first, we must discriminate between that Logos which stands related to the incorporeal and archetypal ideas from which comes the ideal world, and that one who stands related to the visible world, which is a mere imitation and copy of the other. In men, however, the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός are to be distinguished, e. g the immanent word [thought] and the spoken one. Unquestionably both the couples correspond, in Philo's view, inasmuch as he unweariedly carries through this relation of the similarity between the Logos and man. Then, moreover, he does not understand, by the Logos évdiúveros in men, reason as inactive, but reason in its immanent activity, the world of man's thoughts; which corresponds to the kooμog vonrós of the Logos. So comprehended, however, the discrimination between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός, according to Philo's meaning, can beyond all doubt be transferred to the divine Logos; and indeed it must be, in accordance with the nature of the thing. It is to be regarded as altogether accidental, that Philo has not himself done this, as later writers did; for their meaning he virtually expresses, since he teaches, that besides God as in himself there is a Logos with the aforesaid twofold relations. These two relations of the Logos, however, are related to each other in a manner not different from that of the Logos in regard to God as in himself, who is so often called his Father. It belongs to the divine pattern, that this relation should be respected in all its gradations, the self-discrimination belonging to all immanent life.

VOL. VII. No. 28.


he himself is one and all. He demands that the spirit, in its height of thought, should overleap the plurality of numbers, the three-oneness, and even duality proximate to the Movάs, and elevate itself to the unmixed and altogether simple idea, independent of any want. All apparent manifoldness in God's operations, as well in respect to the ideal as the actual world, belong merely to the person who contemplates them. When he, on one hand, in order to deny that God himself appears, designates the Old Testament theophanies as the radiation of his potencies, (e. g. De Abrah. § 22. II. 17. De Nomin. mut. I. 581. De Confus. Ling. I. 430, 431, § 33), so he conceives of these potencies, not as separate from God, but each one as infinite in itself, (De Monarch. Lib. I. § 6. Tom. 218). Since Moses could not see God, therefore he desires to behold his attendants, the divine potencies, which as a unity are called God's dóğa. But God answers, that they are altogether invisible and ideal, also incomprehensible like God in their essence, but that they radiate an image or make an impression of these ¿végysia. To that which is destitute of quality and form they give shape, without any change in their eternal and essential being. Therefore if God and the potencies were to be placed together, [he could say to Moses]: "Neither myself nor my potencies couldest thou hope to comprehend as to their essence. What is attainable by thee I grant readily and willingly. Therefore I invite thee to the contemplation of the world," (ib. p. 219).


The whole world, formed by God, breathes forth morning and evening thank-offerings to him, (Quis Rer. div. I. 501. § 41). It is animated and intelligent, (De Opif. Mund. I. 28-34. De Incorrupt. II. 495-507). Its inborn reason is the law, the order of the uniIt is son of God, itself is θεῖον, also μεγαλόπολις πρὸς ἀλήDear. It is through and through one and all. Its power cannot be compelled; for it comprises everything in itself. It is incapable of solution into parts, and is indestructible, (Comp. De Mund. II. p. 616 seq. § 14 seq.). It cannot come into confusion, nor can it increase and have different gradations and age. Otherwise it would, in the beginning, have been a child, and like children aλoyos; which is impious. It cannot, as he supposes, be denied without sin, that the world is always perfect both in soul and body, (De Mund. Incorrupt. II. 496. § 9 seq.). It is άyévvyros and äpvagros, (II. 496, 505). Particularly does he inveigh against the doctrine, that the world may be consumed by fire; yea, generally against a regeneration of the world. For the world seems to him to be beautiful and perfect. He has tasted of a Hellenic potion, and omits nothing in it. Sunk down from a moral stand-point to a physical one, he has no apprehen


Office of the Jewish high-priest.

sion of matter of fact, and no need of it. In truth there is, according to him, nothing at variance in the world, and no proper reconciliation is needed. But as he, where he must and will speak of God, presents nothing as contained in God but the world, (instead of thinking of God as absolute, he thinks of him only as world), so he speaks, with the same mixture of ideas where he speaks of the world, in such a manner that he denies it to be properly world, and puts immediate divine predicates in its place.

In the world, man takes the first place. Yet strictly taken, only the archetype-man, who is not distinguished from the Logos and hardly can be reckoned to the actual world. (De Opif. Mund. p. 32, 33. § 46. § 47). In the actual world, however, man with all his imperfection occasioned by his body, represents the world in miniature, (I. 494). The world is the great man; man is the little world; and the four elements are physically interchanged in him, (De Opif. Mund. § 51). Above all has God endowed him with lordly reason; and the same that is in God is in men. Hence it follows, indeed, that because the contents of divine reason is only the world, the like must be the case with human reason. Still man forms the point of unity in the actual world; specially that man, who is one in thinking and willing with the order and reason immanent in the world; which in a man's consciousness becomes a vóuos, (De Opif. Mund. § 50). Such an one is the pious man (II. 407), and the wise. Among the nations, the race of the Jews represent this flower of humanity, (II. 15. De Abrah. § 19 ad fin.). For all mankind have they obtained the priestly and prophetic office. In Israel itself, the prophets, as divine interpreters and the wise, have obtained this rank, (II. 222. De Monarch. lib. § 9); for the wise man is worth as much as the world, (ἰσότιμος τῷ κόσμῳ, Tom. I. 165. De Sacrif. Abel. § 3). These nobles are a propitiation, a ransom for the world. Specially the Jews, the most beloved of God (ib.), perform the office of priests and prophets for the whole world in a way stated and arranged; (such stand above the rank of a king, II. 124. De Vit. Moy. I. § 50). Therefore the high priest, when he enters the sanctuary, bears the symbols of the whole world, for he is the representative of the universe before God, (De Vit. Moy. III. § 14. Tom. II. p. 155. De Monarch. II. § 6. Tom. II. p. 227). Other priests pray and present offerings only for friends and fellow-citizens. The high priest of the Jews performs prayer and thanksgiving, not barely for the collected race of men, but also for the elements of nature, the earth, water, air, and fire, inasmuch as he regards the world (so it in truth is) as his country, in the place of which he is accustomed to propitiate its Ruler through supplication and prayer.


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