PLEDGE.

1 PLEDGE OF SEVERAL ARTICLES AND ACTIONS THEREFOR.-If several artieles are pledged to secure a loan the pledgor's right of action upon the pledgee's failure to return the property on demand is entire. He cannot maintain a separate action for each article. Bullard v. Thorpe, 867. 2. ONE ENTIRE CONTRACT.-If several items of property are pledged at one time, for one sum, and no reason exists for a demand of the several items at separate times, it is one entire contract. Bullard v. Thorpe, 867.

POLICE POWER.

See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 2; INSURANCE, 1; STATUTE, &.

POSSE COMITATUS.
See ARREST; SHERIFFS

POSTPONMENT.

See EXECUTION, 3.

POWERS.

See MORTGAGES, 1-4.

PRESENTMENT.

See NEGOTIABLE Instruments, 1, 2

PRESUMPTION.

800 Appeal, 4; Boundaries; Carriers, 1, 2; CORPORATIONS, 25; EVIDENOR, 4; HOMICIDE, 3; INSANE PERSOons, 1; JUDGMENTS, 1, 2; RAPE, 2

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
See AGENCY, 1,

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
See SURETYSHIP.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 6.

PROHIBITION (WRIT OF).

1 A WRIT OF PROHIBITION IS a writ directed to the judge and parties to the suit in any inferior court commanding them to cease from the prosecution thereof, upon a suggestion that either the cause originally, or some collateral matter arising therein, does not belong to that jurisdiction, but to the cognizance of some other court. Bullard v. Thorpe, 867.

2. A WRIT OF PROHIBITION MAY ISSUE, THOUGH THE RECORD ON ITS FACE shows the court to have jurisdiction, if it appears by extrinsic evidence that such showing is false. Bullard v. Thorpe, 867.

3. A WRIT OF PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE TO PREVENT ERRORS AND IRREGU. LARITIES if the matter adjudged is within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Bullard v. Thorpe, 867.

See ACTIONS, 2.

PROMOTERS.

See CORPORATIONS, 9, 10.

PROOFS OF LOSS.

See INSURANCE, 6, 7.

PUBLIC POLICY.

See OFFICERS, 4, 5; PARENT AND CHILD, ♣

QUIETING TITLE

See CLOUD ON TITLE.

RAILROADS.

1. RIGHT OF TO PURCHASE AND CONVEY LAND.-A railroad company, unless prohibited by statute, may acquire the fee to land by purchase for corporate purposes, and lawfully convey same in fee for other purposes after the object of the purchase has been accomplished; and, in an action by one tracing title to it to recover a part of the land wrongfully withheld by one who unlawfully entered thereon, it is error to grant a nonsuit on the ground that the company could not convey such land in fee. Chamberlain v. Northeastern R. R. Co., 717. RAILWAY CONSTRUCTED SO AS TO DESTROY OR INJURE A PULIC HIGHWAY.—If a railway corporation authorized to construct and maintain a road between two points without the precise road being designated constructs such road parallel to a public highway, and in such a manner that landslides must and do occur, whereby the highway is rendered impassable and useless, the railway corporation is answerable to the county for the damages thus produced. Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Whitley County Court, 220.

& MASTER AND SERVANT-EMPLOYEE WHEN NOT IN SERVICE OF HIS EMPLOYER.—If a railroad corporation furnishes its employees with a pass upon which they are entitled to ride to and from their homes without compensation, they are not, while so riding and not engaged in any business of their employer, to be regarded as in the service of the corporation, so that compensation can be recovered for their death from the negligence of the corporation or its employees, under a statute providing that, if, by reason of the negligence of a corporation operating a railroad, or of the unfitness, or gross negligence, or carelessness of its servants while engaged in its business, the life of a passenger, or of a person being in the exercise of due diligence and not a passenger, or in the employment of such corporation, is lost, the corporation shall be punished in a sum designated in the statute. Doyle v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 335.

MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE OF VICE-PRINCIPAL.—If a railroad engineer, with the knowledge and permission of the conductor in charge of the train, leaves his engine to be operated by an inexperienced fireman, and the brakeman on the train is injured through the negligence of such fireman, the railroad company is liable for the injury. In such case the conductor is the representative of the company, and not a fellow-servant with the brakeman. Norfolk etc. R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 906. & LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF FELLowSERVANT. —If the negligence of a railroad company contributes to and

has a share in producing an accident causing an injury to its servant it is liable, though the negligence of a fellow-servant of the injured servant contributes to the accident. Norfolk etc. R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 906.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-A DIRECTION IN A STATE CONSTITUTION REQUIR ING ALL RAILWAY CORPORATIONS TO RECEIVE FOR TRANSPORTATION the cars of other corporations does not require the former to receive such cars if in a dangerous condition, nor exonerate them from liability to their employees injured in the performance of their duties by reason of such cars being of a dangerous and faulty construction, rendering them unsafe to the persons required to handle them. Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 214.

7. LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO EMPLOYEE FROM THE CARS OF ANOTHER CORPORATION. A railway corporation receiving for transportation over its line a car of another corporation owes to its employees the duty of at least an ordinary inspection by one competent to know whether or not the car is in a safe condition for transportation, and can be handled without danger by a subordinate who will exercise ordinary care. Such a subordinate, for injuries received while in the exercise of due care on his part, may recover compensation from his employer, though the injury was not a consequence of the car being out of repair, but of its peculiar construction, rendering it more than ordinarily dangerous from its employment of an appliance not in common use. Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 214. DUTY AND LIABILITY OF RESPECTING CARS OF OTHER CORPORATIONS.If one railway corporation receives the cars of another for transportation it is the duty of the former to make careful superficial inspection of their condition, such as an ordinarily prudent man engaged in such a business would make for the protection and safety of his employees required to handle the cars, and when such defects are patent, and an injury occurs to an employee by reason of a defect that is unknown to him, his employer is answerable. Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 214. ELECTRIC RAILWAYS-NEGLIGENCE.-MEASURE OF DUTY FOR PEDESTRIANS who cross a public highway traversed by surface cars propelled by electricity is to use such precaution for their safety as a reasonably prudent man would use under the circumstances. If other vehicles threaten their safety, or if their attention is distracted by apparent imminence of danger from other sources, they must act with ordinary prudence with reference, not to any one source of danger as paramount, but with reference to the group of circumstances making up the situ ation by which they are confronted. Connelly v. Trenton etc. Ry. Co., 424.

10. NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY FOR DEATH OF TRESPASSER.-A railway company exercising due diligence and care is not liable for running over and killing a trespasser upon one of its trestles who, through gross neg. ligence, voluntarily places himself in a danger which he could have avoided in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence. The fact that the person so killed voluntarily encumbered himself with the care of a child and lost his life in protecting it does not render the company liable for his death, provided he could have saved his life in the exercise of ordinary care, if not so encumbered at the time of the accident. Atlanta etc. Ry. Co. v. Leach, 47.

11. FAILURE TO SIGNAL, ETC., ELSEWHERE THAN AT A PUBLIC CROSSING IS NOT NEGLIGENCE.-The statutory requirements as to giving signals and checking the speed of railroad trains do not require this to be done upon the track elsewhere than at a public crossing. Hence, the omis sion of the engineer to do this, where a stranger is walking on a trestle on a railroad track, though it is between a blow-post and a public crossing, is not negligence if the presence of the stranger is unknown to the engineer. Atlanta etc Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 145.

12. DUTY AND LIABILITY AS TO STRANGER UPON TRACK NOT AT A PUBLIC CROSSING.-After the presence of a stranger upon a railway track at a place other than a public crossing becomes known to the engineer, a failure on the latter's part to observe all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence to avoid injury, will render the company liable if injury results, unless it could have been avoided by the use of ordinary care on the part of the person hurt or killed. Atlanta etc. Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 145.

18. EVIDENCE-LIABILITY FOR Causing Death Where no NEGLIGENCE IS IMPUTABLE.-The failure of the servants of a railroad company to comply with the statutory requirements as to signals, speed, etc., in approaching public crossings is, when a part of the res gestæ, admissible in evidence in a railway accident case to show negligence arising from a breach of duty, due at the time and place of the calamity, by the company, to the person injured or killed; but if the evidence as a whole shows that such person was injured or killed upon the track elsewhere than at a public crossing, and that there was no negligence imputable to the company other than the failure of its servants to give signals or to check the speed of the train at a place other than a public crossing, the company is not liable. Atlanta etc. Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 145. 14. NEGLIGENCE-Evidence of Speed of Train.—In an action against railroad company to recover for an injury caused by its negligence at a crossing, an ordinance limiting the speed of trains is admissible to show that the train causing the injury was being run at a negligently high rate of speed. Lederman v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 644. 16. NEGLIGENCE-EVIDENCE-SPEED OF TRAINS.-In an action against a railroad company to recover damages for an injury caused by its negli. gence at a crossing, a witness who is more than five hundred feet away from the place of the accident, and not in sight of the crossing, is not competent to testify as to the speed of the train at the time of its reaching such crossing. Lederman v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 644.

18. CARRIERS-Demurrage for Detention of CARS.-A charge by a railroad company against a consignee of one dollar per car per day for every day that cars remain unloaded after notice to the consignee of their arrival, and the lapse of three days, is reasonable and valid. Norfolk etc. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 916.

17. CARRIERS-DEMURRAGE FOR Detention of CARS.-A charge made by a railroad company against a consignee for the detention of its cars and the occupation of its tracks after due notice of the arrival of the cars and the allowance of three days in which to unload them, is neither a transportation, storage, or terminal charge, nor a subterfuge for adding to the cost of transportation in excess of the rates prescribed by statute, and, if reasonable, is valid, and may be enforced. Norfolk etc. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 916.

18. PASSENGER, WHO IS.-One to whom, while in the employ of a railway corporation, a ticket or pass is issued entitling him to ride to and from his home to his place of employment, must be regarded as a passenger for whose death from negligence the corporation is answerable, if he was entitled to ride on such pass more times than is necessary in traveling to and from his work, and at the time of his injury he was not engaged in any business of the corporation, if such pass was not a mere gratuity, but furnished part of the consideration which induced him to enter the employment of the corporation. Doyle v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 335.

19. RELEASE FROM LIABILITY.--If a statute makes the killing of a passenger of a railway corporation through gross negligence punishable by a penalty payable to the widow and children or next of kin, such passenger cannot release the corporation from liability, and therefore his agreement to do so cannot bar an action brought for his death by an administrator for the benefit of the persons entitled to the penalty. Doyle v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 335.

20. CARRIERS of Passengers-BREACH OF CONTRACT-DAMAGES.-The failure of a railway company to carry a passenger according to contract, if caused by defective equipments inerely, does not entitle the passenger to exemplary damages, when the only injury complained of is delay and inconvenience, and no bad motive on the part of the railroad company is shown. Hansley v. Jamesville etc. R. R. Co., 474.

1. CARRIERS of Passengers-Expulsion FROM TRAIN-Exemplary DAMAGES. —It is an essential prerequisite to the right to recover exemplary damages for wrongful expulsion of a passenger from a train that there should be evidence of undue force, unnecessary rudeness in the application of the force, or insult, malice, or some willful wrong accompa nying the act of ejecting him or causing him to leave the train. Hansley v. Jamesville etc. R. R. Co., 474.

22. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR EXPULSION.—If a railroad ticket provides that when presented to the conductor the passenger shall sign his name thereto and "otherwise identify" himself as the original purchaser, the conductor is not entitled, after the passenger has offered to sign the ticket, to refuse such offer and require the passenger to "otherwise identify" himself, and to eject him from the train for refusing to do so, and the railroad company, upon ratifying the acts of the conductor, is liable to the passenger in exemplary damages. Norfolk etc. R. R. Co. v. AnderBon, 884.

23. STREETS.-THE COURTS WILL NOT ENJOIN OR LIMIT THE OPERATION OF A RAILWAY upon the public streets, unless other ways of travel and transportation are thereby prevented by unreasonable obstruction. Louisville Bagging Mfg. Co. v. Central etc. Ry. Co., 203.

94. Street Railways.-THE OPERATION OF AN ELECTRIC STREET RAILWAY by an overhead or trolley wire upon the public streets will not be enjoined on the ground that it is dangerous to those who reside on or do business on such streets, and that it prevents the use of the street for the purpose of loading and unloading vehicles. Louisville Bagging Mfg. Co. v. Central etc. Ry. Co., 203.

Bee HIGHWAYS, 2; Negligence, 2, 4, 7; Release; Statutes, 9; SUBROGATION, 3; WITNESSES, 6.