been selected by the 'sister superior'in compliance with the written request of the directors, they come to their work as a religious duty, and their wages pass, under the operation of their vows, into the treasury of the order. If a school so conducted is not dominated by sectarian influence, and under sectarian control, it is not easy to see how it could be. If in some neighboring borough the several departments of the public school should be filled by Episcopal clergymen as teachers, who should appear only in their canonical robes, and with their prayer-books suspended from their necks, and if Catholic parents of children entitled to admission into the school should appeal to the courts for relief for their children from the presence and influence of ecclesiastics who insisted upon keeping the name of their church and their relation to it before the minds of their pupils, I should no more doubt their right to such relief than I can doubt the right of the plaintiffs in this case."

SCHOOLS.-WHAT CONSTITUTES A SECTARIAN SCHOOL: See County of Cook ▼. Industrial School, 125 Ill. 540; 8 Am. St. Rep. 386, and extended note.

JOBE V. Hunter.

[165 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 5.]

MARRIED WOMEN-ESTOPPEL AGAINST BY AGREEMENT.-If, after judgment has been entered on a mechanic's lien against husband and wife, counsel enter into an agreement to amend the record so as to change the given name of the wife, strike off the judgment, and permit the judg ment defendants to file an affidavit of defense, the wife is estopped to subsequently repudiate such agreement.

MECHANICS' LIENS — MARRIED WOMAN'S LIABILITY FOR. — If a husband enters into a contract for the erection of a building on his wife's land, with her knowledge, she participating in conversations between her husband and the contractors relative to the work during the time it is being done, and making no objection at any time, such land is liable for mechanics' liens arising out of the work done.

ACTION to enforce mechanics' liens against the lands of a married woman for work done under a building contract entered into by her husband. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appealed.

J. R. Large, for the appellants.

H. L. Castle, for the appellee.

"GREEN, J. The claim of lien in this case was filed both against James W. Hunter and his wife, naming her as such. The scire facias was issued in the same way. Before the trial on January 9, 1892, an agreement in writing was made and signed by counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for Alice Hunter, by which it was agreed that the name of Jennie Hunter

should be changed to Alice Hunter, and that service was accepted, judgment was stricken off, writ stayed, and defendants allowed fifteen days to file an affidavit of defense. In the caption of this agreement both the claim of lien, No. 20, April term, 1891, and the action of scire facias, No. 296, April term, 1891, were mentioned, and the agreement related to both. The effect of the amendment was to change the name of the wife from Jennie to Alice wherever it occurred in the proceedings. As she obtained very important concessions for this agreement she cannot now repudiate it.

On the merits of the case it was shown, without any contradiction, by competent testimony, that the wife had full knowledge of the contract, that the building was being erected on her land, that she took part in the conversations between her husband and the contractors relative to the work as it progressed, that she made no objection at any time, and that considerable sums of money were paid on the contract from time to time, until out of a total of fifteen hundred and eleven dollars and ninety cents claimed for the whole work, only a small balance of three hundred and twelve dollars and six

teen cents remained unpaid, and for the recovery of that sum this action was brought. As none of these facts were disputed, it is a necessary assumption that the work was done and the building erected on the land of the wife with her full knowledge and consent. In the case of Forrester v. Preston, 2 Pittsb. Rep. 300, it was decided by the district court of Allegheny county that in just such circumstances as these the wife was liable. Said Williams, J., in that case: "But the building in this case was not erected without the consent of the wife under a contract made with a stranger. It was erected under a contract made with the husband, and, as the facts abundantly show, under the knowledge, 8 approbation, and concurrence of the wife. It is true that the husband made the contract in his own name, but the building was, with the knowledge and concurrence of the wife, designed and erected for her, and, therefore, in making the contract the husband may be regarded in law as the agent of the wife so much so as if he had avowedly acted by her express authority. The husband's agency may be legitimately inferred from the relation and acts of the parties." As we regard this as good law, and as it was pronounced long before the mar ried persons' property act of 1887 was passed, by which the

contracting power of married women was so greatly enlarged, it is certainly good law now.

This case arose while the act of 1887 was in force, but the act of 1893, which repealed the act of 1887, still further enlarges the contracting power of married women, and it may well be that under either of these laws it would no longer be necessary to refer her liability in such cases as this to an assumed agency of her husband. However that may be, we are clearly of the opinion that, upon the undisputed facts of this case, the defendant, Alice Hunter, and her lot upon which the house in question was erected, are plainly liable. to the plaintiff's claim. All the assignments of error are dismissed.

Judgment affirmed.

ESTOPPEL AGAINST MARRIED WOMEN.-The doctrine of estoppel applies to married women: Crenshaw v. Julian, 36 S. C. 283; 4 Am. St. Rep. 719, and note; McDanell v. Landrum, 87 Ky. 404; 12 Am. St. Rep. 500, and note; Dobbin v. Cordiner, 41 Minn. 165; 16 Am. St. Rep. 683, and note; Brown v. Thompson, 31 S. C. 436; 17 Am. St. Rep. 40, and note. See, also, the notes to Cook v. Walling, 10 Am. St. Rep. 21; Keen v. Coleman, 80 Am. Dec. 525; Lowell v. Daniels, 61 Am. Dec. 453; and the extended notes to Cravens v. Booth, 58 Am. Dec. 115; Shivers v. Simmons, 28 Am. Rep. 374, and Reis v. Lawrence, 49 Am. Rep. 87.

MECHANICS' LIENS AGAINST THE PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN.-A married woman's property is not subject to a mechanic's lien, though the building is located within forty feet of the dwelling occupied by her and her husband, and she witnessed its construction and progress, and gave some direction to the carpenters, if she showed no more interest in the improvement than a wife would take in a building on land belonging to her husband, and the contract for the work was made by him, and the materials procured on his order, and, for aught that appears to the contrary, were sold on his personal credit, and she did not, in fact, authorize him to act as her agent, and was not consulted about the contract and had no knowledge of its terms: Hoffman v. McFadden, 56 Ark. 217; 35 Am. St. Rep. 101, and note. Compare Althen v. Tarbox, 48 Minn. 18; 31 Am. St. Rep. 616, and note. AM. ST. REP., VOL. XLIV. -41

ROBERTS V. FIREMAN'S INSURANCE COMPANY.

[165 PENNSYLVANIA State, 55.]

INSURANCE-INSURABLE INTEREST IN TRUST PROPERTY.-Under a policy of insurance providing that the assured is insured in his own name on a "stock of wallpaper, shades, and other merchandise not more haz ardous, his own or held by him in trust, or on commission, or sold but not removed," while contained in a certain building, the insured who holds such goods for the benefit of the true owners, as their property, for their use and advantage, receiving a fixed compensation for his services, holds them in trust, and it is not necessary that, in addition to such holding, there should be superadded a personal and individual interest of his own as owner, in order that he may recover in case of loss. INSURANCE OF PROPERTY HELD BY AGENT OR IN TRUST.-An agent or consignee having the principal's property in his possession, being responsible for it and having a special interest in it to the amount of his commissions, may insure it in his own name, and, in case of loss, recover the full amount of the policy, holding all beyond his own interest in trust for his principal.

J. S. and E. G. Ferguson, for the appellants.

M. A. Woodward and James W. Collins, for the appellees.

59 GREEN, J. By the express terms of the policy in this case the plaintiff, John S. Roberts, was insured to the extent of two thousand five hundred dollars, "on stock of wallpaper, shades, and other merchandise not more hazardous, his own or held by him in trust, or on commission, or sold but not removed," while contained in a certain described store building. We understand these terms to mean that if he held any property of the kind named in the building, which was "his own," it was insured; if he had any property which was "held by him in trust," it was insured; or any held "on commission," or "sold but not removed," it was all insured by the policy. Here are four distinct classes of property covered by the policy that are not distinct as to their character or kind, but as to the kind of title or condition on which they were held. To enable the plaintiff to recover therefor it was not necessary that he should be the owner of the goods. If he held them in trust it was sufficient. That means, if others were the real owners, and he held them for the benefit of the owners, as their property, for their use and advantage, it was not necessary that, in addition to that kind of ownership or holding, there should be superadded a personal and individual interest of his

own as owner in order that there might be a recovery. The words of the policy would be without meaning if such requirement were essential. By the terms of the agreement between Roberts and the owners he was intrusted with the exclusive care, management, and direction of the entire stock of goods belonging to the owners at the store in question; he was to carry on the business in his own name and by his own efforts and exertions, but entirely for the benefit and advantage of the real owners; he was to keep accurate books of account of all his transactions open at all times; and at such times as they should appoint he was to account for and pay over the net profits or income arising out of the business; and at the end of the agreement he was to wind up the business and turn over all the property and assets to the true owners. For his services he was to receive a fixed compensation, payable monthly, of three thousand dollars per annum. It is difficult to imagine a more perfect example of a trust relation between the plaintiff and the owners, and we have not the slightest difficulty in holding that the property insured by this policy came literally within the designation or description "held in trust by him."

In Biddle on Insurance, section 171, it is said: "An agent having the custody of goods, and liable to account to his principal for goods, may insure, and he may do so in his own name, either by policy for whom it may concern or as trustee," citing many authorities. In Richardson on Insurance, section 131, the writer, referring to the expression in policies, "their own or held by them in trust or on commission, or sold but not delivered," says, citing numerous decisions: "Such special phrases are often employed to show that persons holding the property of others may secure the protection of the policy, though the title to the property may, or may not, be in them. 'Held in trust' means simply that the goods or property are in the custody of the insured. The phrase is not used in its strict technical meaning."

In the case of California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 133 U. S. 387, it was said in the opinion of the court by Blatchford, J: "It was lawful for the plaintiff to insure in its own name goods held in trust by it, and it can recover for their entire value, holding the excess over its own interest in them for the benefit of those who have intrusted the goods to it."