United States would not take jurisdiction of them, do not decide that writ of error was not the proper process for bringing up the cases for review, and they are not proper authorities to sustain the objection that this is not the proper remedy. 516 Having held that writ of error is the proper mode of bringing up for review criminal contempt proceedings, the next question is, To what extent will such proceedings be reviewed? It seems to be well settled that contempt orders or judgments, while not ordinarily reversible for mere error, may be set aside for want of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter or the defendant, or for want of power to render the particular judgment or the order complained of: Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13, 23; Hayne on New Trial and Appeal, sec. 198; 2 Bishop's Criminal Law, sec. 268; Vilas v. Burton, 27 Vt. 56; People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74; Phillips v. Welch, 11 Nev. 188; State v. Galloway, 5 Cold. 327; 98 Am. Dec. 404. Bishop, in the section cited, supra, says: "It is not within the plan of this volume to discuss questions of practice, yet it may be observed that the very nature of contempt compels the court against which it is committed to proceed against it, and, if the court has jurisdiction, precludes any other or superior tribunal from taking cognizance of it, whether directly on an appeal, or otherwise. Under peculiar provisions of law, however, in some of the states, and the pressure of modern opinion, the superior courts do in a measure-not fully-correct errors of the inferior ones in the mat ter." In Vilas v. Burton, 27 Vt. 56, it is said: "The English courts have always held that proceedings for contempt in one court, when the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, are not revisable in any other court. And no cases are brought to light where such proceedings in the superior court have ordinarily been held revisable, unless when the proceedings were so irregular as to be against the law, and to give the court no proper jurisdiction." In the case of People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74, the court said: "The question whether the alleged offender really committed the act charged will be conclusively determined by the order or judgment of the court, and so with equivocal acts, which may be culpable or innocent, according to circumstances; but, when the act is necessarily innocent or justifiable, it would be preposterous to hold it a cause of imprisonment." In Phillips v. Welch, 11 Nev. 188, it was held that the review must be limited to the question of jurisdiction, and that no error of fact or law not jurisdictional in character could be considered. These decisions are in harmony with the decision in California: Ex parte Perkins, 18 Cal. 60; People v. O'Neil, 47 Cal. 517 109; Roe v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 93; Hayne on New Trial and Appeal, 198. See, also, Romeyn v. Caplis, 17 Mich. 455. While we have jurisdiction to review an order punishing for a criminal contempt, so far as to ascertain whether the court inflicting the punishment had jurisdiction, and as to whether the words or acts charged constitute a contempt, yet the decision of the court making it is not to be lightly reversed. It ought not to be reviewed unless it is apparent that no contempt has been committed, or that the court exercised its authority in a capricious, oppressive, or arbitrary manner. A case might arise, even if the court has jurisdiction, where the acts alleged as a contempt were not contemptuous, nor intended to be. In the case at bar there can be no doubt the court below had jurisdiction to punish for contempt a person who willfully and intentionally violated an order of court restraining and forbidding a sale of property under a mortgage foreclosure. The only question, then, arising in this case is whether the act of the plaintiffs in error constitutes a contempt. The record shows that such an order was made, and it is alleged that it was brought to the knowledge of the plaintiffs in error, restraining the sale ander the mortgage of Frank La Due to A. M. Knight; yet, in the face of this knowledge, these plaintiffs in error did proceed to make the sale. But it is said the manner in which this was communicated to them did not import to them such a legal notice as they were bound to respect. If we were inclined to agree with this view from the evidence, we think, under the rule above announced, we would not be justified in reversing a court which had found as a matter of fact to the contrary. The judgment of the court recites, after hearing the affidavits of several parties and the argument of counsel, that the plaintiffs in error did willfully and knowingly violate the injunction order, and are guilty of contempt. This finding of fact, when based upon conflicting testimony or upon testimony which is susceptible of more than one construction, will not be set aside by an appellate court. The plaintiffs in error admit the receipt of the telegram stating an order had been made restraining them from proceeding with the sale. This was received before the sale had taken place. They do not deny that they knew that A. W. Campbell was the judge 518 of the circuit court of the county in which the sale was to take place. If any doubts existed as to the genuineness of the telegram there could have been no serious consequences following a postponement of the sale until such time as this could have been ascertained, and it was their duty to have done so. Not having done so, as reasonable men would have done, the consequence must follow. The judgment of the court below is affirmed. CONTEMPT-WHEN CRIMINAL PROCEEDING. - When the contempt con sists of something done or omitted in the presence of the court tending to impede or interrupt its proceedings or lessen its dignity, or out of its presence in disregard or abuse of its process, or in doing some act injurious to a party protected by order of the court which has been forbidden by its order, the proceeding is punitive, and by way of punishment for the wrongful act and to vindicate the authority and dignity of the people as represented in and by their judicial proceedings: Lester v. People, 150 Ill. 408; 41 Am. St. Rep. 375, and note. CONTEMPT REVIEW OF JUDGMENT FOR. -The finding of a court that a contempt has been committed is not conclusive in a proceeding by a writ of review if it further appears from all the facts disclosed that the acts charged, and found could in no circumstances constitute contempt of court: In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526; 37 Am. St. Rep. 78; but see Lester v. People, 150 Ill. 408; 41 Am. St. Rep. 375. The question of review of contempt proceedings will be found thoroughly treated in the extended notes to Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors, 40 Am. St. Rep. 36, and Mullin v. People, 22 Am. St. Rep. 417. CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT. DOUGLAS V. JAMES. [66 VERMONT, 21.] WILL, CONSTRUCTION OF CHILdren, Who are.—Part of a will provided as follows: "I give, devise, and bequeath all the remainder of my estate, real and personal, in equal shares, to my children who may be liv. ing at the time of my decease, during their respective natural lives, and, after their respective deaths, in equal shares to their respective children; and if any child shall have died previous to my decease, leaving children, the share of such child shall go to his or her children in equal shares; provided, that if any of my said children shall die after my decease, without children, the share of such child shall be equally divided among my other children in the same manner as my other estate." This was construed to let in the grandson of one of the testator's daughters so that he took the share of his grandmother upon her decease, although his mother had died before the making of the will, and his grandmother had no other children. EJECTMENT. Plea, the general issue. The cause was tried by the court upon an agreed statement of facts. There was a judgment pro forma for the plaintiff, and the defendant excepted. Stewart & Wilds, for the defendant. Button & Button, for the plaintiff. 33 ROWELL, J. The part of the will that we are called upon to construe reads as follows: "I give, devise, and bequeath all the remainder of my estate, real and personal, in equal shares, to my children who may be living at the time of my decease, during their respective natural lives, and, after their respective deaths, in equal shares to their respective children; and if any child shall have died previous to my AM. ST. REP., VOL. XLIV.-52 (817) decease, leaving children, the share of such child shall go to his or her children in equal shares; provided, that if any of my said children shall die after my decease, without children, the share of such child shall be equally divided among my other children in the same manner as my other estate." Polly Hurd, the defendant's grandmother, was a daughter of the testator's, and long survived him, and died without children, her daughter, Salome James, the defendant's mother, having died before the will was made. The demanded premises were set off to Mrs. Hurd for life, and she possessed them till her death, and the defendant has possessed them since; and the question is, whether he is entitled to them under the will. In the first place, the testator gives life estates to his children that survive him, remainders to their children. Had he stopped here none of his grandchildren would take except the children of his surviving children. But he goes on to say that "if any child shall have died previous to my decease, leaving children, the share of such child shall go to his or her children in equal shares." It is claimed that the words "any child," as here used, relate equally to the testator's descendants of either degree named in the previous clause, and include grandchildren as well as children, and therefore include the defendant's mother; that the words "the share of such child shall go," etc., mean that the share such child would have taken if living, "shall go," etc; that the words of the proviso, "if any of my said children shall die after my decease, without children," favor this construction, 24 as the words "without children," should be construed to mean without having had children, or without issue; and that therefore the defendant takes. We recognize the rule that in construing wills the word "children" is deemed to have been used in its popular sense, that is, as signifying descendants in the first degree, and that this sense is not to be enlarged so as to include more remote descendants, unless it appears that such was the intention of the testator. But this rule must be considered with due regard to the other rules of construction applicable to the case, and such construction adopted as will best effectuate the testator's purpose as disclosed by the will when read in the light of the attendant circumstances. Another rule is, that, although an intention to disinherit an heir, even a lineal descendant, when it clearly appears, must be carried |