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INDEX.

ABBREVIATIONS.
See EVIDENCE, 3.

ABUTTING OWNERS.

See HIGHWAYS, 3; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONE, &

ACCEPTANCE.

Bee CHECKS; INSURANCE, 12.

ACCIDENTS.

See INSURANCE, 16, 17; NEGLIGENCE, 2

ACCOMMODATION PAPER.
See NEGOTIABle Instrumenta, 6.

ACCOUNTS.

See EVIDENCE, 9.

ACTIONS.

1. CONSOLIDATION OF.-It is a common practice to consolidate actions pend. ing in the same court that might have been brought in one action. Bullard v. Thorpe, 867.

2 A WRIT OF PROHIBITION WILL ISSUE TO PREVENT THE SPLITTING UP OF AN ENTIRE INDIVISIBLE CLAIM so as to give a justice of the peace jurisdiction, if that judicial officer insists on proceeding, notwithstanding the objections interposed. Bullard v. Thorpe, 867

ADULTERY.
See HOMICIDE, 1, 2.

ADVERSE POSSESSION.
See PARTY Walls, 2.

ADVERTISEMENTS.
See EXECUTION 3. 4.

AFFIDAVITS.

PRACTICE-AFsidavits of DEFENSE averring an expectation of ability to prove certain facts, to be sufficient must be predicated of facts previously stated, and not of mere beliefs, or inferences, or conclusions. Second Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 652.

See JUDGMENTS, 1; NEGOTIABLE Instruments, 4.

AGENCY.

1. THE DECLARATION OF AN AGENT to the effect that his principal had been negligent with respect to a past transaction is not admissible, because it is a mere expression of his opinion. Plymouth County Bank v. Gilman, 782.

2 THE DECLARATIONS OR STATEMENTS OF AN AGENT during the progress of a business transaction are admissible, as against his principal, if they purport to disclose the steps taken toward the accomplishment of the business. Hence a statement of a cashier of a bank as to the measures pursued toward the collection of notes left with it are admissible against it. Plymouth County Bank v. Gilman, 782.

8. LIABILITY OF AGENT FOR PAYMENT RECEIVED OTHERWISE THAN IN MONEY.-An attorney in fact with power to sell land “for such price and on such terms as to him shall seem meet," has no authority to accept as payment the worthless bonds of an insolvent corporation, and, if he sells the land, and accepts such bonds or any thing besides money in payment, he is liable to his principal in assumpsit for the price of the land in lawful money. Paul v. Grimm, 648.

4. WHILE ONE WHO ALLOWS AN UNDISCLOSED AGENT TO APPEAR and act as principal is not permitted to deny that he had full authority, this rule does not apply where the agent was not given any authority to act as principal, and it is not shown that the principal allowed him to do so or had reason to suppose that the agent was acting outside of the authority given. Murphy v. Barnard, 340.

See ANIMALS; Banks, 9; Corporations, 20, 21; Husband and Win, 1; INSURANCE, 9.

ALIBI.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 6.

ALIENATION OF AFFECTION.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4, 5.

ALIMONY.

See MARRIAGE and DIVORCE, 9.

AMENDMENTS.

See COURTS; Pleading, 3.

ANIMALS.

DOGS - LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF. - An owner of premises, who, having knowledge of the vicious and dangerous character of a dog owned by his agent, permits such dog to run at large, is liable for any damage done by the dog to a passerby. It is otherwise if the agent owning the dog knows he is dangerous, but the owner of the premises does not, as the knowledge of the agent not in the scope of the agency is not the knowledge of the principal. Harris v. Fisher, 452.

ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS.

See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 9.

APPEAL

L AMOUNT NECESSARY TO JURISDICTION.-The supreme court of Vir ginia has jurisdiction of an appeal by several parties if the amount in controversy as to one amounts to the jurisdictional amount or more, although the amount involved as to the others is below such amount, provided the questions as to all are the same, and the claims have been consolidated and heard together. Craig v. Williams, 934.

2 STARE DECISIS.-Where the facts presented in two appeals are the same the decision given on the first appeal becomes the law of the case in all its subsequent stages, and will not be reviewed on the second appeal. Plymouth County Bank v. Gilman, 782.

3. FINDINGS OF FACT MAY BE REVIEWED IF ERRORS OF LAW ENTER INTO THEM.—While an appellate court will not disturb the findings of fact made by the trial judge, unless they are manifestly against the weight of the testimony, this rule does not apply if he committed error of law in reaching his conclusions of fact, as where he made a mistake as to the onus probandi. Hall v. Hall, 696.

4. EVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATIONS-PRESUMPTION.-In the absence of any showing to the contrary an appellate court presumes that the trial court did its duty in passing upon the admissibility of dying declarations in evidence as a preliminary question, and that they were properly admitted. Von Pollnitz v. State, 72.

5 TRIAL OBJECTIONS.-A misstatement of testimony by the judge to the jury, in charging them, must be called to his attention at the time, or be remedied by a motion for a new trial. An exception thereto noted after trial raises no question of law which can be considered on appeal. Simmons Hardware Co. v. Bank, 700.

6. JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION-COSTS.-An original question cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Hence, the question as to whether a judgment by confession, otherwise absolutely void, could be made legal and valid to the extent of costs charged by the officers of court for services rendered in obtaining such judgment, cannot be urged on appeal where it was not raised in the court below. Woods v. Bryan, 688. 7. One who relies upon the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of a jury or the finding of a court must move for a new trial. Otherwise a supreme court cannot review the evidence upon appeal. Evenson v. Webster, 802.

8. TRIAL-ERROR CURED BY VERDICT.-In an action by the payee of a cheek against the bank upon which it is drawn, and where there is a verdict for the whole amount of the check, with interest, the supreme court will not consider. an exception to the instructions, imputing error therein as to plaintiff's right to recover in part. Simmons Hardware Co. v. Bank, 700.

9. PRACTICE-Upon reversing judgment it is necessary for the appellate court to rule upon questions raised upon the motion for a new trial and which will probably not arise again at the next hearing. Miles ▼. State, 140.

10. CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHTS OF ACCUSED WHEN REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. The failure of the trial court to ask a prisoner, after conviction and before pronouncing judgment, if he has any thing to say why judgment should not be pronounced, is no ground for a reversal when the prisoner is represented by counsel. Warner v. State, 415.

11. Rehearing.—A petition for rehearing based upon evidence not in the record on appeal will be refused. Bailey v. Bailey, 713.

12 REHEARING-NONSUIT.—If a judgment of nonsuit has been set aside by the supreme court, and a new trial ordered, upon a consideration of the only ground upon which the nonsuit rested, a rehearing will not be granted, because the supreme court did not consider other grounds in support of the nonsuit, and which were not passed upon in the court below, as these points may be made and decided upon the new trial. Chamberlain v. Northeastern R. R. Co., 717.

See MANDAMUS, 1; NEW TRIAL.

APPOINTMENT.

Bee OFFICERS, 1, 4, 5.

ARREST.

ARREST FOR FELONY BY MEMBER OF POSSE-Demand for AUTHORITY HOMICIDE.—If a person not a known officer, but a member of a sheriff's posse, makes an arrest for felony without having the warrant in his possession, he ought, upon demand to show his authority, to make known the fact that the warrant exists, where it is, and that he is acting under its authority or by command of the officer who has it in his possession. The omission to do so does not, however, authorize resistance to arrest where the party to be arrested knows in fact, or believes on reasonable and probable grounds, that he is under a charge of felony, that a warrant is out for his arrest, and that the arrest attempted is really in consequence of the warrant, and in execution of the same. If, on the other hand, the demand for authority is made in good faith, without a knowledge that a warrant is out, and for the purpose of eliciting information actually wanted and needed, a failure to comply with the demand would justify resistance to any reasonable and proper extent. Under such circumstances, if the arresting party is killed by the other during such resistance, the homicide might amount to manslaughter only, or, if the former made the first demonstration with a deadly weapon, the killing might be justifiable homicide, either case depending upon the facts as found by the jury. Robinson v. State, 127. See EXTRADITION; HOMICIDE, 15; Sheriffs,

ASSAULT.

Bee PLEADING, 1; Rape, 3–7; ReFORM SCHOOLS.

ASSESSMENTS.

See CORPORATIons, 7, 8; Taxes, 5–7.

ASSIGNMENT.

See INSURANCE, 13, 14; MORTGAGES, 6–12.

ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
See INTERVENTION, 2.

ASSISTANCE (WRIT OF).

1. WRIT OF ASSISTANCE CAN BE Issued Only AGAINST PERSONS in privity with parties who have been concluded by a decree, and have refused,

after notice, to let purchasers at a judicial sale under such decree into possession. Exum v. Baker, 449.

2 QUESTIONS OF TITLE cannot be tried on an application for a writ of assistance as against parties in possession claiming adversely and not bound by the decree under which the writ is asked. Exum v. Baker, 449.

& Purchaser of land at tax sale, not claiming title through or under a mortgagor, mortgagee, or his assignee, and not a party to a proceed. ing to foreclose the mortgage to which they are parties, is not in priv. ity with them, and a writ of assistance cannot issue against him at the instance of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Exum v. Baker, 449.

ASSUMPSIT.

See PARTNERSHIP, 2, 3.

ATTORNEY IN FACT.

See AGENCY, 3.

ATTACHMENT.

1. EXEMPTIONS-"COMMERCIAL TRAVELER"-WAGES OF ARE SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT.-One employed as a "commercial traveler" to sell goods for his employer, though employed and paid for his services by the day, is not a "day laborer" within the meaning of the statute, and his wages are, therefore, not exempt from the process of garnishment. Briscoe v. Montgomery, 192.

2 RETURN.-An attachment in equity as well as at law to be valid must be made returnable to a term of the court in which the suit is pend ing, and not to a rule day of such court. Craig v. Williams, 934. See CHATTEL MORTGAGES, 7.

AUCTIONS.

SALES-REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH BID-DAMAGES ON RESALE.-To enable the owner of land to recover the difference between a purchaser's bid made at an auction sale of such land and the amount obtained on a resale thereof made necessary by the refusal of such purchaser to com. ply with his bid, it is necessary and essential that he be given notice, before the resale is made, of the intention to resell at his risk, and to hold him bound for any difference between his bid and the price obtained at the resale, but it is not necessary, in addition to this, that any direct notice should be given him of the time and place of the resale. Green v. Ansley, 110.

DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED.

BAILMENT.

All bailees are required to exercise care and diligence in protecting and keeping safely the thing bailed; but different degrees of diligence are required according to the nature of the bailment. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Guilmartin, 182.

See BANKS, 13.

BANKS.

1. LIABILITY OF FOR ACTS OF CASHIER.-If moneys are deposited with one acting as cashier of a bauk, and are received by him ia that capao

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