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ants seek to invoke a particular remedy or forum through splitting their demands (Dusenbury v. Habisreitinger, 129 N. Y. Supp. 2; Pilcher v. Ligon, etc., 91 Ky. 228; Lucas v. LeCompte, 42 Ill. 303), and has also been applied in the administrative adjustment of claims. I quote below from an opinion rendered by the Comptroller General (2 Compt. Gen. 529) upon a similar question arising in the Post Office Department.

"If the Postmaster General, upon investigation of any case of damage within the provisions of this statute, should find that the claim is a proper charge against the United States, but that the amount properly payable thereon would exceed $500, he would not be authorized to adjudicate and settle such claim and he could do no more than report it to Congress for consideration in like manner as though the provision in the act of June 16, 1921, had not been enacted. But if the amount awarded by the Postmaster General does not exceed $500 and payment thereon is accepted by the claimant, such payment constitutes a full and final settlement of the entire claim, and the claimant is thereby precluded from asserting thereafter any other claim arising from the same damage."

"(4) May claims growing out of Civilian Conservation Corps operations which do not involve the negligence of an employee or enrollee of the Corps, but rather the negligence of some other officer or employee of the Government be considered and handled under the act of December 28, 1922, or is section 16 to be reviewed as providing an exclusive remedy for all Civilian Conservation Corps claims, and thus require a disapproval of such claims as not covered by either law?"

As above indicated, section 16 of the act of June 28, 1937, supersedes the act of December 28, 1922, only to the extent of its application. Therefore, any claim which does not come within the act of June 28, 1937, because not "caused by the negligence of any enrollee or employee of the Corps," within the proper contemplation of those words as used in the statute, may be considered under the act of December 28, 1922, or other applicable statute by the head of the department in which the individual responsible for the dam

age is employed. However, the application or nonapplication of the several statutes in particular cases involving particular "employees" can be determined only upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances as the cases actually arise.

Respectfully,

HOMER CUMMINGS.

TAXABILITY OF INCOME FROM INDIAN LANDS

The decision in Superintendent v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 418, must prevail over the Attorney General's opinion of March 20, 1925, regarding the taxability of income from restricted lands of the Quapaw Indians.

The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

SEPTEMBER 27, 1937.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of September 15.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Superintendent v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 418 (May 20, 1935), that income on funds derived from the restricted allotment of a full blood Creek Indian which are in excess of his needs and are held by the United States in trust for him, is subject to the Federal income tax, must prevail over the contrary conclusion reached in the Attorney General's opinion of March 20, 1925 (34 Op. 439), regarding the taxability of income from restricted lands of the Quapaw Indians.

Respectfully,

HOMER CUMMINGS.

LEGALITY OF PROPOSED CONVEYANCES OF RECREATIONAL DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS TO STATES, ETC.

"Sale" and "lease" import a transfer for value, ordinarily money. The conclusion in the opinions of Sept. 10, 1934, and Sept. 16, 1935, concerning dedications of certain land, is not applicable to other land acquired for a purpose now accomplished, and therefore in excess of present needs, but affected by no obligation respecting its use.

The authority in sec. 5 of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 to "grant, sell, lease * * * or otherwise dispose of" property acquired thereunder does not contemplate a mere giving away of property remaining on hand at the completion of a project. Proposed conveyances or leases are not authorized, unless particular cases warrant application of the principles stated in the opinions supra.

The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

SEPTEMBER 29, 1937.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Under date of August 12 you requested my opinion as to whether lands acquired under section 203 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (48 Stat. 195, 202) and section 5 of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 115, 118) for recreational demonstration projects may be "leased" or "conveyed" to States, municipalities or other public corporations "without other consideration than agreements to maintain and use them for purposes of public recreation."

The sections mentioned are copied below:

"SEC. 203. (a) With a view to increasing employment quickly (while reasonably securing any loans made by the United States) the President is authorized and empowered, through the Administrator or through such other agencies as he may designate or create, (1) to construct, finance, or aid in the construction or financing of any public works project included in the program prepared pursuant to section 202; (2) upon such terms as the President shall prescribe, to make grants to States, municipalities, or other public bodies for the construction, repair, or improvement of any such project, but no such grant shall be in excess of 30 per centum of the cost of the labor and materials employed upon such project; (3) to acquire by purchase, or by exercise of the power of eminent domain, any real or personal property in connection with the construction of any such project, and to sell any security acquired or any property so constructed or acquired or to lease any such property with or without the privilege of purchase: * ics supplied.]

*

[Ital

"SEC. 5. In carrying out the provisions of this joint resolution the President is authorized (within the limits of the

appropriation made in section 1) to acquire, by purchase or by the power of eminent domain, any real property or any interest therein, and improve, develop, grant, sell, lease (with or without the privilege of purchasing), or otherwise dispose of any such property or interest therein." [Italics supplied.]

Each statute authorized the selling or leasing of property acquired thereunder. Both "sale" and "lease," however, import a transfer for value, ordinarily money. (See U. S. C., title 40, sec. 303b, providing that "except as otherwise specifically provided by law, the leasing of buildings and properties of the United States shall be for a money consideration only.")

In the documents accompanying your letter reference is made to my opinions of September 10, 1934 (38 Op. 57, 63) and September 16, 1935 (38 Op. 273, 275), dealing with dedications or conveyances of land acquired under the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act for subsistence homesteads and low-cost housing projects. I quote below for ready reference from the opinion last mentioned:

"In my opinion to you of September 10, 1934, I considered a proposed dedication of land for roads, streets, walks, parks and parkways in connection with subsistence homesteads projects, provided for in another section (208) of title II of the National Industrial Recovery Act and stated the following conclusions:

""This question is answered affirmatively. I do not regard such dedication as necessarily representing a gratuity. It more nearly approximates the transfer of a liability, properly assumable by the local authorities. Roads and streets, at least, are indispensable and it is hardly to be supposed that they are to be owned and maintained indefinitely by the United States in a community of private citizens who, as pointed out in the opinion of July 18, 1934, will have the political status of residents of the states and of the subdivisions thereof in which they live, with the right to have their needs for roads, schools, etc., considered by the local authorities in like manner as other citizens.'

"The same reasoning is applicable here; and I therefore answer both questions affirmatively, with the qualification, however, that the function of any lands dedicated for use as parks or playgrounds must be incidental to the contemplated low-cost housing or slum-clearance projects and reasonably necessary in order to provide therefor proper light, air, approaches, etc., as distinguished from monumental, landscaping, scenic or similar functions."

It is to be noted that the land dealt with in these opinions had been acquired by the United States for the use and benefit, and presumably at the ultimate expense, of the persons settled thereon-including streets, parks, playgrounds, etc., no less than the actual home sites-and that ultimate conveyance of the public spaces to the community or other local political body was a necessary incident, since there was no intention that the United States should exercise in these communities the local jurisdiction which ordinarily attaches to Federal ownership of roads, parks, etc.

The same conclusion would be required in other similar cases arising under the same statutes. However, neither your letter nor the documents submitted therewith indicate whether or not the circumstances are the same in connection with any of the recreational demonstration project sites; and the conclusion reached in the opinions mentioned is not applicable to land acquired for a purpose now accomplished, and therefore in excess of the present needs of the Government, but affected by no obligation to use it in any particular manner or for the benefit of any particular community or group of citizens.

The language of section 5 of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act appears to be very broad, authorizing the President, in carrying out the act, "to grant, sell, lease * * * or otherwise dispose of" property acquired thereunder, but it does not contemplate a mere giving away of public property remaining on hand at the completion of a project.

Considering the foregoing, it is my opinion that the proposed conveyances or leases are not authorized, saving, however, any particular cases in which the peculiar facts and

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