circumstances (not now before me) may warrant a contrary conclusion under the principle applied in my opinions of September 10, 1934, and September 16, 1935, as herein explained. Respectfully, HOMER CUMMINGS. AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE AUTOMOBILE TIRES AFTER REJECTION OF IDENTICAL BIDS AS COLLUSIVE Under sec. 3709 R. S. automobile tires immediately needed in an exigency may be procured by open purchase. If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that competition is not possible, sec. 3709 is inapplicable and articles may be procured by open purchase or negotiated contract. The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. SEPTEMBER 30, 1937. MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of September 28 with further reference to the identical bids submitted to your Department for supplying automobile tires and rejected as collusive. Since you have determined that there is a public exigency you are authorized under the statute (R. S. 3709; U. S. C., title 41, sec. 5) to procure by open purchase tires immediate delivery of which is required by the exigency. Moreover, as pointed out in my opinion of January 12, 1935, to the Secretary of War, "section 3709 R. S. has long since been interpreted as applying only 'where competition * * * is possible."" Therefore, if you should determine that the case is one in which competition is not possible you would be warranted in acquiring the articles in question by open purchase or negotiated contract without further advertisement for bids. Respectfully, HOMER CUMMINGS. MEANING OF THE WORD "DAY" IN SECTION 2 OF THE SEAMEN'S ACT OF MARCH 4, 1915, AS AMENDED The word "day" in sec. 2 of the Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, as amended, must be given its common and legal signification, that is, a calendar day of 24 hours commencing at midnight. The SECRETARY OF COMMERCE. OCTOBER 5, 1937. MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of September 3, 1937, in which you request my opinion as to the proper interpretation of the word "day" appearing in section 2 of the act of March 4, 1915, c. 153, 38 Stat. 1164, as amended by the act of June 25, 1936, c. 816, 49 Stat. 1930, 1933 (U. S. C., title 46, sec. 673). The amended section reads as follows: "That in all merchant vessels of the United States of more than one hundred tons gross, excepting those navigating rivers, harbors, lakes (other than Great Lakes), bays, sounds, bayous, and canals, exclusively, the licensed officers and sailors, coal passers, firemen, oilers, and water tenders shall, while at sea, be divided into at least three watches, which shall be kept on duty successively for the performance of ordinary work incident to the sailing and management of the vessel. The seamen shall not be shipped to work alternately in the fireroom and on deck, nor shall those shipped for deck duty be required to work in the fireroom, or vice versa; nor shall any licensed officer or seaman in the deck or engine department be required to work more than eight hours in one day; but these provisions shall not limit either the authority of the master or other officer or the obedience of the seamen when in the judgment of the master or other officer the whole or any part of the crew are needed for maneuvering, shifting berth, mooring, or unmooring, the vessel or the performance of work necessary for the safety of the vessel, her passengers, crew, and cargo, or for the saving of life aboard other vessels in jeopardy, or when in port or at sea, from requiring the whole or any part of the crew to participate in the performance of fire, lifeboat, or other drills. While such vessel is in a safe har bor no seaman shall be required to do any unnecessary work on Sundays or the following-named days: New Year's Day, the Fourth of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day, but this shall not prevent the dispatch of a vessel on regular schedule or when ready to proceed on her voyage. And at all times while such vessel is in a safe harbor, eight hours, inclusive of the anchor watch, shall constitute a day's work. Whenever the master of any vessel shall fail to comply with this section and the regulation issued thereunder, the owner shall be liable to a penalty not to exceed $500, and the seamen shall be entitled to discharge from such vessel and to receive the wages earned. But this section shall not apply to vessels engaged in salvage operations: Provided, That in all tugs and barges subject to this section when engaged on a voyage of less than six hundred miles, the licensed officers and members of crews other than coal passers, firemen, oilers, and water tenders may, while at sea, be divided into not less than two watches, but nothing in this proviso shall be construed as repealing any part of section 4463 of the Revised Statutes. This section shall take effect six months after the enactment of this Act." [Italics supplied.] Unless something can be collected from the statute to warrant a different construction, the common and legal signification of the word "day" is the space of time which elapses while the earth makes a complete revolution on its axis, reckoned from midnight to midnight-in other words, a calendar day. Standard Dictionary; Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Bl. Comm. 141; Henderson v. Reynolds, 84 Ga. 159, 162; Zimmerman v. Cowan, 107 Ill. 631; Benson v. Adams, 69 Ind. 353, 354; State v. Michel, 52 La. Ann. 936, 941; Stevenson v. Donnelly, 221 Mass. 161; Pannell v. Glidewell, 146 Miss. 565; Opinion of the Justices, 45 N. H. 607, 610; Serrell v. Rothstein, 49 N. J. Eq. 385, 386; State v. Richardson, 16 N. D. 1, 8; Kane v. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. St. 522. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. Green Cove Railroad, 139 U. S. 137, 144, 145; Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U. S. 381, 383; Bristol Mfg. Corporation v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 781, 784; 29 Op. A. G. 371. The act contains no definition of the word "day," and I find nothing in its history to warrant ascription to the Congress of intent to use the word in other than its ordinary sense. Unlike the act of May 11, 1918, c. 72, 40 Stat. 549, providing that no licensed officer on any ocean or coastwise vessel shall be required to do duty to exceed nine hours "of any twenty-four" while in port, including the date of arrival, or more than twelve hours "of any twenty-four" at sea, except in case of emergency, and the act of March 4, 1907, c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415, making it unlawful for any common carrier to require or permit telegraph operators and others to be or remain on duty for a longer period than nine hours "in any twenty-four hour period," the act here involved is not so phrased. The simple word "day" appears to have been used deliberately and without qualification. It has been suggested that the day contemplated by the statute is susceptible of reckoning from the time a vessel leaves her berth, or from the time when an affected member of her crew reports for duty. The files transmitted to me, however, show that the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation of your Department is convinced that so to interpret "day" would lead to difficulties such that the enforcement of the eight-hour provision of the act would be impractical, if not impossible. I have considered the suggestions and have arrived at the conclusion that adoption of either would attribute, without justification in law, to the word "day" a sense at variance with that which it ordinarily carries as well as one which, apparently, would jeopardize in practice the effective administration of the eight-hour provision of the statute. It is my opinion, therefore, that unless and until the Congress shall manifest a contrary intention, the word "day" in section 2 of the act is to be construed as contemplating a calendar day of twenty-four hours, commencing at midnight. Respectfully, HOMER CUMMINGS. APPLICABILITY OF CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT ACT TO UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, MARSHALS, ETC. The phrase "officers and employees of the courts of the United States," in sec. 1 of the act of July 13, 1937, amending the Civil Service Retirement Act, includes only officers and employees in the judicial branch. United States attorneys and marshals are in the executive branch and are not brought within the Civil Service Retirement Act by the act of July 13, 1937. The PRESIDENT. OCTOBER 15, 1937. MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have your letter of September 1, 1937, in which you request my opinion upon the question presented to you by the Civil Service Commission in its letter of August 30, 1937, whether the language "officers and employees of any of the courts of the United States," contained in the act of July 13, 1937, c. 494, 50 Stat. 512, brings within the operation of the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930 (46 Stat. 468), as amended, the United States attorneys and their employees and the United States marshals, their deputies and other employees who are not already entitled to benefits under the retirement law. The first section of the act of July 13, 1937, reads as follows: "That the Act of May 29, 1930 (46 Stat. 468), for the retirement of employees in the classified civil service and in certain positions in the legislative branch of the Government, is hereby amended to include all other employees in the legislative branch and all officers and employees of any of the courts of the United States who are not entitled to the benefits of any other retirement Act whose tenure of employment is not intermittent nor of uncertain duration.", Your question may be substantially answered in the following language of the Supreme Court, used in determining that a deputy United States marshal was a proper protector of an associate justice of that court: "The ministerial officers through whom its commands must be executed are marshals of the United States, and belong emphatically to the executive department of the |