active service during the entire period of a desertion or unauthorized absence not followed by dishonorable discharge. The case now submitted is not quite so extreme, but it presents the same question to the extent that the unauthorized absence covered the entire period for which credit is claimed.

"The bill to provide adjusted service compensation, as introduced in the Sixty-seventh Congress (the measure was finally enacted in the succeeding Congress), provided for deducting periods of unauthorized absences of more than 1 day; but this was eliminated upon recommendation of The Adjutant General of the Army, who stated that the administration of such a provision, requiring detailed examination of all service records, would cost much more than it would save. (Hearings, H. R. 1, 67th Cong., pp. 108-114, 599–605.) There is little doubt that this view resulted in the enactment of the statute in such form as to permit indulging the fiction of rendition of 'active service' during unauthorized absences; but the reason which prompted it does not apply to cases in which the absence or desertion effectually terminated all actual military service and was coextensive with the entire period for which adjusted compensation might have been allowed."

The purpose of the World War Adjusted Compensation Act, as disclosed by its terms, is to compensate veterans who rendered active service during the period of this Nation's participation in the World War, and not those who, like the present claimant, avoided such service. This view is supported by the definition of the term "veteran" in section 1 of the act as "a member of the military or naval forces of the United States at any time after April 5, 1917, and before November 12, 1918."

Assuming that technically the applicant was a member of the military forces of the United States during his unauthorized absence, the fact is that by reason of that absence of almost 2 years and his subsequent confinement while, awaiting trial and serving sentence, he rendered no active service at any time between April 5, 1917, and November 12, 1918, unless it can be said that his confinement

after July 5, 1918, awaiting trial and serving sentence constituted such service.

It is true that the present claimant was returned to duty December 25, 1918, and continued in the service until honorably discharged November 9, 1920, thus rendering some active service after April 5, 1917, and prior to July 1, 1919; but while the statute extends the compensable period to July 1, 1919, I have no doubt that this was done in order that veterans who had rendered service between April 5, 1917, and November 12, 1918, might receive compensation not only for that service but also for service during such additional period as was necessary to permit of their orderly demobilization. I cannot believe that the Congress intended to compensate one whose only service prior to the armistice consisted of a short period of confinement such as is shown in this case.

It is my opinion, therefore, that the claimant is not entitled to compensation under the World War Adjusted Compensation Act.

Respectfully,

HOMER CUMMINGS.

WORLD WAR ADJUSTED COMPENSATION ACT-COMPUTATION OF ADJUSTED SERVICE CREDIT IN CASES AFFECTED BY REENLISTMENT

There is no occasion to disturb the construction of sec. 202 (d) of the World War Adjusted Compensation Act by the War and Navy Departments for 14 years as inapplicable to immediate reenlistments.

The construction of that section by the War Department for the same period, when computing adjusted service credit, as excluding service rendered after reenlistments between November 11, 1918, and July 1, 1919, which were not immediate, being adequately supported, should not be abandoned, notwithstanding that the contrary view prevailing in the Navy Department may be presented to and favored by the Congress.

It appears that sec. 5 of the act of August 16, 1937, 50 Stat. 660, 661, was not intended to be applicable to increase compensation authorized by the World War Adjusted Compensation Act.

THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

MARCH 4, 1938.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of February 19, submitting the facts in the case of William Gordon and requesting my opinion as to the proper interpretation of section 202 (d) of the World War Adjusted Compensation Act (43 Stat. 121, 122; U. S. C., title 38, sec. 591 et seq.).

You state that William Gordon was inducted into the military service October 2, 1917, was honorably discharged on account of demobilization April 29, 1919, reentered the service by enlistment for 1 year on May 6, 1919, and was honorably discharged upon expiration of his enlistment May 5, 1920. He is entitled to benefits under the World War Adjusted Compensation Act.

The statute provides for adjusted service credit based upon military or naval service and reads, in part, as follows: "SEC. 201. The amount of adjusted service credit shall be computed by allowing the following sums for each day of active service, in excess of sixty days, in the military or naval forces of the United States after April 5, 1917, and before July 1, 1919 * * *

"SEC. 202. In computing the adjusted service credit no allowance shall be made to- * * *

"(d) Any individual entering the military or naval forces after November 11, 1918-for any period after such entrance * *

In both the War Department and the Navy Department the language of subsection (d) has been interpreted as not applying to any individual whose enlistment expired between November 11, 1918, and July 1, 1919, if he immediately reenlisted so that there was no actual break in his service. This is a reasonable view, followed in practice during nearly 14 years, and there is no apparent occasion for disturbing it now.

If the veteran delayed his reenlistment, as in the case of Mr. Gordon, so that his military service was interrupted, your department has interpreted the statute as providing for the exclusion of service rendered after the reenlistment. The Judge Advocate General of the Army points out that

this accords with the rule that a statute is to be construed, if possible, so as to give some effect to every part thereof; that since only veterans with actual service before November 12, 1918, are entitled to the benefits of the act, section 202 (d) must be applicable to some reenlistments or it becomes surplusage.

In the Navy Department, however, the view has prevailed that service rendered after reenlistment under all such circumstances is to be included when computing the adjusted service credit. This avoids cutting off a veteran's right because of some inadvertence or procrastination in attending to his reenlistment under circumstances that could not then have suggested to the average individual any great need of haste.

The Congress has provided in section 5 of the act of August 16, 1937, c. 659, 50 Stat. 660, 661, that service following reenlistment after November 11, 1918, "shall be considered as World War service under the laws providing benefits for World War veterans and their dependents." The section is copied below.

"That notwithstanding any provision of law or veterans' regulation, except as to emergency officers' retirement pay, reenlistment in the military or naval service on or after November 12, 1918, and before July 2, 1921, where there was prior service between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918, shall be considered as World War service under the laws providing benefits for World War veterans and their dependents."

The conclusion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army that the broad and general language of this section cannot be applied in the computation of adjusted service credit under the World War Adjusted Compensation Act with the effect of increasing the amounts of compensation authorized by that act, and that it was not actually intended to have such application (S. Rept. 1147, 75th Cong., 1st sess.), appears to be sound.

As a matter of strict statutory construction, the view which has prevailed in the War Department is adequately supported. Other factors suggest the possibility that the

Congress would now favor the contrary view which has prevailed in the Navy Department and may have so intended in the first place, but such considerations cannot add to or subtract from the words actually used in the statute.

Under the circumstances I cannot properly advise you to abandon the practice which has been followed in your Department during the 14 years that have elapsed since the World War Adjusted Compensation Act became law, but I do suggest that the matter warrants consideration by the Congress with a view to the enactment of clarifying legislation.

Respectfully,

HOMER CUMMINGS.

POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO REMOVE MEMBERS OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY FROM OFFICE

The Tennessee Valley Authority being an executive agency, the President is authorized under Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, to remove its members from office. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, dealt with a member of a commission which the Court held exercised quasilegislative and quasi-judicial functions, involving factors not present in the case of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and did not disturb the prior ruling as applied to executive officers. The provision in section 4 (f) of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act for removals by concurrent resolution of the Senate and House does not provide an exclusive means of removal, apparently being intended to provide a method in addition to impeachment. The provision in section 6 that the President shall remove members for violation of the inhibition against political appointments, etc., cannot be construed as intending that he shall not remove them for other causes.

The PRESIDENT.

MARCH 18, 1938.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to comply with your request for my opinion respecting your power to remove members of the Tennessee Valley Authority from office.